UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

THERESA RUSSELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                               No. 01-1149
FIRST HEALTH SERVICES; UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
Wage and Hour Division,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
David G. Lowe, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-00-351-3)

Submitted: May 8, 2001

Decided: May 23, 2001

Before NIEMEYER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Theresa Russell, Appellant Pro Se. Philip Browder Morris, Lori Alise
Rinaldi, MORRIS & MORRIS, Richmond, Virginia; Debra Jean Pril-
laman, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM

Theresa A. Russell appeals the magistrate judge's judgment in
favor of First Health, her previous employer, following a bench trial
in her action under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (West 1999) ("FMLA").* For the following
reasons, we affirm.

On appeal, Russell claims First Health failed to honor its obliga-
tions under the FMLA after Russell provided her supervisor with a
note stating that she required a week's "personal leave." Under the
FMLA, an employer's duties "are triggered when the employee pro-
vides enough information to put the employer on notice that the
employee may be in need of FMLA leave." Browning v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 

, 1049 (8th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, an
employee must provide that information within two days of the begin-
ning of her leave, or as soon as practicable. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.302.
Although Russell did discuss her absence with First Health within two
days of the start of her absence, she failed to fulfill her threshold obli-
gation under the FMLA by affirmatively declining to give First
Health enough information to determine whether her absence related
to a reason covered by the FMLA. See Price v. City of Fort Wayne,

, 1026 (7th Cir. 1997). Because Russell failed to pro-
vide the information necessary to apprise First Health that her leave
might implicate the FMLA within two days of her absence, First
Health did not violate the FMLA in terminating her on the third day
of that absence. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.302 (2000) (requiring notice
within two days "or as soon as practicable" when leave is foreseeable
but cannot be scheduled in advance); 29 C.F.R. § 825.303 (2000)
(requiring notice within two days if leave is unforeseeable absent "ex-
traordinary circumstances").
_________________________________________________________________
*The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).

                  2
In its informal brief, First Health requests that this Court impose
a monetary penalty against Russell to reimburse First Health for the
cost of defending this appeal. We conclude that an award of sanctions
against Russell would be inappropriate.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below in favor of First
Health, deny First Health's request for sanctions, and dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                  3