Filed: Sep. 03, 2003
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-4338 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LEGRANDE HARLEY, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CR-02-309) Submitted: August 28, 2003 Decided: September 3, 2003 Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed in p
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-4338 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus LEGRANDE HARLEY, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CR-02-309) Submitted: August 28, 2003 Decided: September 3, 2003 Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed in pa..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4338
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LEGRANDE HARLEY, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-02-309)
Submitted: August 28, 2003 Decided: September 3, 2003
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Lisa Blue Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Legrande Harley, Jr., appeals from his eighty-seven month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. Harley’s counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but asserting that
the district court imposed too severe a sentence. Harley was
informed of his right to file a pro se brief, but has not done so.
Because our review of the record discloses no reversible error, we
affirm in part and dismiss in part.
We find that Harley’s guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered after a thorough hearing pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11. Harley was properly advised as to his rights, the
offense charged, and the maximum sentence for the offense. The
court also determined that there was an independent factual basis
for the plea and that the plea was not coerced or influenced by any
promises. See North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970);
United States v. DeFusco,
949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Harley challenges the severity of the sentence imposed. We
find that the district court properly computed Harley’s offense
level and criminal history category and correctly determined the
applicable guideline range of seventy to eighty-seven months. The
court’s imposition of a sentence within the properly calculated
range is not reviewable. United States v. Jones,
18 F.3d 1145, 1151
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(4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we dismiss this portion of the
appeal.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm
Harley’s conviction and sentence. We deny Harley’s attorney’s
motion to withdraw as counsel at this time. This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the
client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
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