Filed: Feb. 17, 2004
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-1970 RITA D. POEPPEL, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. (CA-01-2880-6-25) Submitted: January 30, 2004 Decided: February 17, 2004 Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. C.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-1970 RITA D. POEPPEL, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge. (CA-01-2880-6-25) Submitted: January 30, 2004 Decided: February 17, 2004 Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. C. R..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-1970
RITA D. POEPPEL,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(CA-01-2880-6-25)
Submitted: January 30, 2004 Decided: February 17, 2004
Before LUTTIG and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
C. Rauch Wise, LAW OFFICE OF C. RAUCH WISE, Greenwood, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Debbie W. Harden, Katherine T. Lange,
WOMBLE CARLYLE SANDRIDGE & RICE, PLLC, Charlotte, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Rita D. Poeppel appeals from the district court’s orders
awarding summary judgment to Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford)
on her action seeking to recover the proceeds on an accidental
death and dismemberment policy pursuant to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 - 1461 (2000), and
denying her motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e).
On August 5, 2000, Randall Lee Duvall, Poeppel’s brother,
died as the result of injuries sustained in a single-car collision
in Greenville, South Carolina. The toxicology report disclosed
that, at the time of the collision, Duvall was driving with a blood
alcohol level of .212%, over twice the legal limit for operating a
motor vehicle under South Carolina law. The district court granted
summary judgment to Hartford after Poeppel sued alleging that she
was denied benefits under the policy in contravention of ERISA.
The district court concluded that an intoxicated driver’s death in
a single-vehicle collision as a result of drinking and driving did
not result from an accident and was therefore not an “injury” as
defined in the policy. Poeppel v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 273 F.
Supp. 2d 714 (D.S.C. 2003).
On appeal, Poeppel argues that the district court erred
in concluding that Duvall’s death was not caused by an accident and
that the automobile wreck was caused by Duvall’s consumption of
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alcohol. The benefit plan in this case does not give the plan
administrator discretionary authority to determine benefits under
the plan. Therefore, we review the denial of benefits de novo.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). In
interpreting the benefits provisions of ERISA-regulated insurance
plans, courts are guided by federal substantive law. Baker v.
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
171 F.3d 939, 942 (4th Cir.
1999); Wickman v. N.W. Nat’l Ins. Co.,
908 F.2d 1077, 1084 (1st
Cir. 1990).
The majority of federal courts have held that, when death
is the natural or probable consequence of an act or course of
action, it is not the result of an “accident” as that term is
defined in an accidental death or dismemberment policy. See Baker,
171 F.3d at 942. Moreover, in Baker, we adopted the rule that “‘a
death that occurs as a result of driving while intoxicated,
although perhaps unintentional, is not an “accident” because that
result is reasonably foreseeable.’” Id. (quoting Cozzie v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co.,
140 F.3d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir. 1998)). We conclude
that this rule is controlling in this case and that accidental
death benefits were properly denied.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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