Filed: May 26, 2005
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-7257 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner - Appellee, versus ALBERT F. IAQUINTA, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (HC-98-764) Submitted: April 27, 2005 Decided: May 26, 2005 Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 04-7257 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner - Appellee, versus ALBERT F. IAQUINTA, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (HC-98-764) Submitted: April 27, 2005 Decided: May 26, 2005 Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. J..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-7257
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
versus
ALBERT F. IAQUINTA,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (HC-98-764)
Submitted: April 27, 2005 Decided: May 26, 2005
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant
United States Attorney, Michelle T. Fuseyamore, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Albert F. Iaquinta appeals from the district court’s
order determining that he continues to meet the criteria for civil
commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000). We affirm.
Iaquinta was charged in the District of New Jersey in
1994 with threatening to kill President Clinton, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 871(a) (2000). He was never tried. Rather, due to his
“psychotic and disruptive” behavior after being charged, the
District of New Jersey ordered a psychological evaluation under 18
U.S.C. § 4246(b) to determine if Iaquinta should be civilly
committed for being a danger to others or their property. Iaquinta
was eventually transferred to FCI-Butner, North Carolina. On
October 2, 1998, FCI-Butner filed a Certificate of Mental Disease
or Defect and Dangerousness and recommended that Iaquinta be
committed to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246. On
February 16, 1999, the Eastern District of North Carolina agreed
and ordered Iaquinta committed to the custody of the Attorney
General for suffering from a mental defect that makes him a danger
to others or their property.
On February 2, 2000, July 7, 2001, and November 18, 2002,
Iaquinta filed motions to determine if he still met the criteria
for commitment under § 4246. On all three motions, the district
court determined that he still met the criteria for commitment
under § 4246. On March 29, 2004, a fourth motion was filed to
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determine if his commitment was still warranted, the denial of
which is the subject of this appeal. After holding hearings on
this motion, the district court ordered that Iaquinta’s commitment
to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246 be continued
because he continued to meet the requirements for such commitment.
Under § 4246, if, after a hearing, a district court
determines a person is suffering from a mental disease or defect
that would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person or serious damage to property of another, the court may
commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. Once
committed, an individual may periodically move for a hearing under
18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (2000) to determine whether the committed
person should be discharged from commitment under § 4246. The
committed person may be released from commitment if the district
court finds that he has recovered from his mental disease or defect
to such an extent that his release would no longer pose a
substantial risk of harm to others. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e). This
court will overturn a district court's finding that a substantial
risk of harm exists only if the finding is clearly erroneous.
United States v. Cox,
964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). A
finding is clearly erroneous when “the reviewing court is left with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Faulconer v. Commissioner,
748 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir.
1984).
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We have independently reviewed the briefs and joint
appendix and conclude that the district court did not clearly err
in finding that Iaquinta still meets the requirements for
commitment under § 4246. We therefore affirm the order of the
district court continuing Iaquinta’s commitment under § 4246. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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