Filed: Oct. 13, 2005
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6712 SPENCER LAMONT STACEY, Petitioner - Appellant, versus THEODIS BECK, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District Judge. (CA-04-664-1-WLO) Submitted: September 30, 2005 Decided: October 13, 2005 Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Remanded by unpublis
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-6712 SPENCER LAMONT STACEY, Petitioner - Appellant, versus THEODIS BECK, Secretary, North Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District Judge. (CA-04-664-1-WLO) Submitted: September 30, 2005 Decided: October 13, 2005 Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Remanded by unpublish..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-6712
SPENCER LAMONT STACEY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
THEODIS BECK, Secretary, North Carolina
Department of Corrections,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, District
Judge. (CA-04-664-1-WLO)
Submitted: September 30, 2005 Decided: October 13, 2005
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Spencer Lamont Stacey, Appellant Pro Se. Sandra Wallace-Smith,
Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Spencer Lamont Stacey seeks to appeal the dismissal of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition entered on March 3, 2005.
Stacey, however, did not file his notice of appeal until April 29,
2005,* which is outside the thirty day appeal period under Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The appeal period is “‘mandatory and
jurisdictional.’” Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr.,
434 U.S. 257,
264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson,
361 U.S. 220, 229
(1960)).
We construe Stacey’s pro se notice of appeal, in which he
indicated his intent to appeal and alleged that he did not timely
receive notice of his action being dismissed, as a motion to reopen
the time to note an appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). See
United States v. Feuver,
236 F.3d 725, 729 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we remand the case to the district court for it to
determine whether Stacey satisfies the requirements of Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(6). Ogden v. San Juan County,
32 F.3d 452, 454 (10th Cir.
1994). The record, as supplemented, then will be returned to this
court for further consideration.
REMANDED
*
This court has given Stacey the benefit of the “prison
mailbox” rule, Houston v. Lack,
487 U.S. 266 (1988), regarding the
filing date of this document.
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