Filed: Apr. 06, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1288 SHARON M. DAVERN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant - Appellee, and JUDY SHERMAN; AMORITA ESPIRITU, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (CA-03-2217-2-18) Submitted: January 19, 2006 Decided: April 6, 2006 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpu
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1288 SHARON M. DAVERN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant - Appellee, and JUDY SHERMAN; AMORITA ESPIRITU, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (CA-03-2217-2-18) Submitted: January 19, 2006 Decided: April 6, 2006 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpub..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1288
SHARON M. DAVERN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CHARLESTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
JUDY SHERMAN; AMORITA ESPIRITU,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(CA-03-2217-2-18)
Submitted: January 19, 2006 Decided: April 6, 2006
Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chalmers C. Johnson, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Alice F. Paylor, Kevin R. Eberle, ROSEN, ROSEN & HAGOOD, L.L.C.,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:
Sharon Davern appeals the district court’s decision
directing a verdict against her on her retaliation claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. Finding no error, we affirm.
Davern was employed as a teacher by the Charleston County
School District from 2001 through 2003. In the fall of 2001, she
complained to School District administrators about inappropriate
sexual and racist comments made by school employees. Davern
alleges that, as a result of her complaint, she suffered harassment
and retaliation, culminating in the School District’s refusal to
renew her employment contract at the end of the 2002-2003 school
year.
Davern commenced an action in May 2003 in the Charleston
County Court of Common Pleas, seeking damages for violation of
Title VII and for breach of contract under South Carolina common
law. The School District removed the case to federal court, and it
was tried to a jury on February 14-15, 2005. After Davern
presented her evidence, the School District moved for a directed
verdict on both causes of action. The district court granted a
directed verdict on Davern’s retaliation claim but allowed her to
go forward on the breach-of-contract claim. The jury rendered a
verdict in favor of the School District on the remaining breach-of-
contract claim.
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On appeal, Davern challenges the district court’s ruling
that there was insufficient evidence to support a retaliation
claim. The district court found that none of the School District
administrators who might have been responsible for the decision to
terminate Davern’s employment -- the Principal and Assistant
Principal, as well as the School District’s Associate
Superintendent -- had any knowledge of her complaint and so could
not have acted in retaliation for her filing of it.
Davern notes that a School District investigation of her
complaint included a statement by her Principal denying any
knowledge of racial discrimination at her school. Davern contends
that the Principal’s denial demonstrates that she had knowledge of
Davern’s complaint. But the evidence does not support that
inference. The Principal had stated that she was unaware that
anyone had uttered “racial slurs.” This does not demonstrate that
the Principal knew that Davern, or anyone else, had filed a
complaint alleging discriminatory activity.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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