Filed: Mar. 20, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1714 RANDY L. GREENE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus A. DUIE PYLE, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Amicus Supporting Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CA- 04-1700-1-JFM) Argued: January 31, 2006 Decided: March 20, 2006 Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and TRAXLER, Circui
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 05-1714 RANDY L. GREENE, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus A. DUIE PYLE, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. - EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Amicus Supporting Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CA- 04-1700-1-JFM) Argued: January 31, 2006 Decided: March 20, 2006 Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and TRAXLER, Circuit..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1714
RANDY L. GREENE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
A. DUIE PYLE, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
---------------------------
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (CA-
04-1700-1-JFM)
Argued: January 31, 2006 Decided: March 20, 2006
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and TRAXLER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: C. William Michaels, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Julie Loraine Gantz, UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, Office of General Counsel, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
Supporting Appellant. Randall Charles Schauer, DILWORTH PAXSON,
L.L.P., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James
L. Lee, Deputy General Counsel, Lorraine C. Davis, Acting Associate
General Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel,
UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington,
D.C., for Amicus Supporting Appellant. Eric B. Meyer, DILWORTH
PAXSON, L.L.P., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
2
PER CURIAM:
A. Duie Pyle, Inc. (Pyle) terminated employee Randy
Greene after Greene complained to management about sexually
offensive materials he found in the workplace. Greene sued Pyle,
alleging hostile work environment and retaliation claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Pyle,
and we affirm.
I.
Greene began working as a truck driver for Pyle in March
2001. At Pyle’s York, Pennsylvania, terminal where Greene was
assigned, he saw certain materials he considered sexually
offensive. The materials were (1) a Penthouse magazine and a
Playboy magazine in the cafeteria, (2) a Playboy magazine in the
men’s room, and (3) at least fifteen faxes, cartoons, or e-mails,
about half of which were posted near the time clock. On April 25,
2002, Greene also saw a list of jokes that played on gender
stereotypes. For example, one joke read, “How many men does it
take to open a beer? None. It should be opened by the time she
brings it.” J.A. 287-88.
Greene reported the inappropriate materials to management
on at least three occasions. In February 2002 he reported to
terminal manager Eric McVeigh that another employee had told an
3
“off-color” joke. J.A. 613. On April 5, 2002, Greene met with Tom
Chambers, Pyle’s Human Resources Director, to express his
discomfort with materials in the terminal that he found offensive.
Greene explained that he was a Christian so that Chambers would
“know where [he] was coming from.” J.A. 153. Chambers responded
that the materials Greene described should not be left around for
others to see and that Pyle did not condone such materials.
Chambers also told Greene that he would discuss the matter with
McVeigh. Later that day, McVeigh called Greene into his office.
McVeigh angrily told Greene that the magazines at the terminal were
not a problem. Nevertheless, McVeigh also said he would talk to
anyone who brought inappropriate materials to work and asked Greene
to bring any such materials he found in the terminal to McVeigh’s
attention.
From April 5 to April 25, 2002, Greene did not find any
inappropriate material inside the Pyle terminal. During the second
week of April, however, another driver standing just outside the
terminal showed Greene a picture of a naked woman with a fish. The
driver “showed [it to] everybody he could.” J.A. 108. On April 25
Greene found the joke list described above taped to the wall, and
he took the list to McVeigh. McVeigh accused Greene of “trying to
cause . . . trouble” and then fired him. J.A. 191.
In June 2004 Greene filed a two-count complaint alleging
that Pyle tolerated a sexually hostile work environment and
4
retaliated against Greene in violation of Title VII. Both Greene
and Pyle filed motions for summary judgment. On May 31, 2005, the
district court denied Greene’s motion and granted Pyle’s. Greene
v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 759 (D. Md. 2005). Greene
appeals.
II.
Greene argues that the district court erred in entering
judgment for Pyle on his hostile work environment claim. To state
a prima facie case of discrimination based on a sexually hostile
work environment, Greene must show (1) that he was harassed because
of sex, (2) that the harassment was unwelcome, (3) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an
abusive working environment, and (4) that some basis exists for
imputing liability to Pyle. Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123
F.3d 766, 772 (4th Cir. 1997). The district court held that
Greene’s allegations, even if accepted as true, do not describe the
degree of severity or pervasiveness necessary to create a hostile
work environment.
Greene, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 763-64. As the
district court noted, the prevalence of pornography and sexual
comments in the workplace can support a claim of hostile work
environment in some circumstances, but the workplace Greene
describes is not the type of abusive environment against which
Title VII protects.
Id. We agree with the district court’s
5
determination that Pyle is entitled to summary judgment on the
hostile work environment claim.
III.
Greene also argues that the district court erred in
rejecting his retaliation claim. Title VII makes it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate against an employee because the
employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice” by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3. To state a prima facie
retaliation claim, Greene must show (1) that he engaged in
protected activity, (2) that an adverse employment action was taken
against him, and (3) that there was a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse action. EEOC v. Navy Fed.
Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the
protected activity element, Greene must show that when he made his
complaint he had an objectively reasonable belief that Pyle engaged
in an unlawful employment practice by allowing offensive materials
in the terminal.
Id. at 406-07. As the district court observed,
Greene’s testimony boils down to a few observations of lewd
magazines and inappropriate jokes or drawings over a seven-month
period of employment.
Greene, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 764. We agree
with the district court’s conclusion that, based on this handful of
observations, Greene did not have an objectively reasonable belief
that Pyle’s actions were unlawful. Because Greene cannot show that
6
he engaged in protected activity, Pyle is entitled to summary
judgment on the retaliation claim.
***
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
entry of summary judgment for Pyle on Greene’s Title VII claims.
AFFIRMED
7
