Filed: Aug. 23, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4138 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MARTIN LUIS VASQUEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:03-cr-00357-NCT-3) Submitted: July 28, 2006 Decided: August 23, 2006 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4138 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus MARTIN LUIS VASQUEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:03-cr-00357-NCT-3) Submitted: July 28, 2006 Decided: August 23, 2006 Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4138
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MARTIN LUIS VASQUEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (1:03-cr-00357-NCT-3)
Submitted: July 28, 2006 Decided: August 23, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Kearns Davis, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Martin Luis Vasquez appeals his resentencing following
this court’s remand. See United States v. Vasquez, 142 F. App’x
676 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished). For the reasons stated below,
we affirm Vasquez’ 292-month sentence.
Vasquez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute in excess
of fifty grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable
amount of methamphetamine. The presentence report recommended a
base level offense of thirty-eight pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(c)(1) (2003) (Drug Quantity
Table), adjusted upward two levels for obstruction of justice, for
a total offense level of forty. Based on a total offense level of
forty and a criminal history category of I, the guidelines range
for imprisonment was 292 to 365 months. The district court adopted
the findings of the presentence report and sentenced Vasquez to the
low end of the guidelines range, 292 months’ imprisonment.
We vacated Vasquez’ sentence and remanded for
resentencing because the district court’s findings regarding drug
quantity violated United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005). On
remand, the district court resentenced Vasquez to the same 292-
month term of imprisonment. Vasquez appealed, and his attorney
filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738
(1967), questioning whether Vasquez’ sentence was reasonable under
Booker. Vasquez was informed of the opportunity to file a pro se
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supplemental brief, but declined to do so. The Government did not
file a responding brief.
After Booker, a sentencing court is no longer bound by
the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. See United
States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). In a
post-Booker sentencing, district courts must calculate the
appropriate guideline range, consider the range in conjunction with
other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), and impose a sentence. United
States v. Green,
436 F.3d 449, 455-56 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
126
S. Ct. 2309 (2006). However, a “district court need not explicitly
discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record.” United States v.
Eura,
440 F.3d 625, 632 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted),
petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. June 20, 2006)
(No. 05-11659). A sentence imposed within the properly calculated
guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.
Green, 436 F.3d at
457; see United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 341-44 (4th Cir.
2006) (discussing justifications for finding sentence within
properly calculated advisory guidelines range presumptively
reasonable).
Vasquez’ 292-month sentence is within the properly
calculated advisory guideline range and below the forty-year
statutory maximum set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). In
sentencing Vasquez, the district court considered the nature and
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seriousness of the offense, particularly the significant drug
quantity attributed to Vasquez. See 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a)(1),(2)(A). Acknowledging that Vasquez did not have any
extensive criminal history, see § 3553(a)(1), the court stated the
length of Vasquez’ sentence was meant to be a deterrent, to protect
the public from future criminal conduct and to protect the public
from the perjury committed by Vasquez. § 3553(a)(2)(A),(B),(C).
The court considered Vasquez’ explanation for his perjury as a
mitigating factor, but found that nearly two years after trial,
Vasquez provided no evidence to corroborate his claims that anyone
was threatened or harmed as a result of his decision to tell the
truth. We therefore find the sentence imposed by the district
court was “selected pursuant to a reasoned process in accordance
with the law.”
Green, 436 F.3d at 457.
Accordingly, we affirm Vasquez’ sentence. As required by
Anders, we have reviewed the record and have found no meritorious
issues for appeal. This court requires that counsel inform his
client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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