Filed: Dec. 18, 2006
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4214 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus EMIL EAGLIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (3:04-cr-00547-MBS) Submitted: December 14, 2006 Decided: December 18, 2006 Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joshua Snow Kendrick, JOSHUA
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4214 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus EMIL EAGLIN, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge. (3:04-cr-00547-MBS) Submitted: December 14, 2006 Decided: December 18, 2006 Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Joshua Snow Kendrick, JOSHUA ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4214
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
EMIL EAGLIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Margaret B. Seymour, District Judge.
(3:04-cr-00547-MBS)
Submitted: December 14, 2006 Decided: December 18, 2006
Before MICHAEL, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joshua Snow Kendrick, JOSHUA SNOW KENDRICK, P.C., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Stanley D. Ragsdale, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Emil Eaglin appeals from his conviction pursuant to a
guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
of cocaine and the resulting concurrent 235-month sentences.
Eaglin’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious
issues for appeal, but addressing the validity of Eaglin’s plea and
sentence. Eaglin was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but he has not done so. Because our review of
the record discloses no reversible error, we affirm.
We find that Eaglin’s guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered after a thorough hearing pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11. Eaglin was properly advised of his rights, the
offenses charged, and the maximum sentence for the offenses. The
court also determined that there was an independent factual basis
for the plea and that the plea was not coerced or influenced by any
promises. See North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970);
United States v. DeFusco,
949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
We find that the district court properly applied the
Sentencing Guidelines and considered the relevant sentencing
factors before imposing the 235-month sentences. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); see United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005). Additionally, we find that
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the sentence imposed is reasonable. See United States v. Green,
436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.) (“[A] sentence imposed within the
properly calculated [g]uidelines range . . . is presumptively
reasonable.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006).
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Eaglin’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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