Filed: Mar. 20, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1896 KODOR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; EDWARD J. KOPPEL; GRACE ANNE DORNEY KOPPEL, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus PETER D. ROSE, d/b/a Office of Peter Rose, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:06-cv-01256-AW) Submitted: February 23, 2007 Decided: March 20, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-1896 KODOR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; EDWARD J. KOPPEL; GRACE ANNE DORNEY KOPPEL, Plaintiffs - Appellants, versus PETER D. ROSE, d/b/a Office of Peter Rose, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge. (8:06-cv-01256-AW) Submitted: February 23, 2007 Decided: March 20, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1896
KODOR ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; EDWARD
J. KOPPEL; GRACE ANNE DORNEY KOPPEL,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
PETER D. ROSE, d/b/a Office of Peter Rose,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(8:06-cv-01256-AW)
Submitted: February 23, 2007 Decided: March 20, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas D. Murphy, James A. Mood, Jr., MURPHY & MOOD, P.C.,
Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. John S. Vander Woude,
ECCLESTON & WOLF, P.C., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kodor Associates Limited Partnership, a Maryland limited
Partnership, Edward J. Koppel, and Grace Koppel (collectively the
“Koppels”) appeal the district court’s dismissal of their action
for breach of contract against Peter D. Rose (“Rose”), a
Massachusetts architect, on the ground that the action was filed
beyond the applicable Maryland three-year statute of limitations
period. None of the facts of the case are in dispute. The subject
contract provided that Rose design and draft complete and
coordinated architectural drawings for a projected $4.2 million
residence, identify a builder for the construction of the
residence, deliver those drawings to the builder, and supervise
construction through completion of the project, in exchange for a
fee of $840,000. Construction commenced in the summer of 2002.
Rose was paid in full prior to commencement of construction. At
various times, beginning the date construction began until the
termination of the agreement on March 6, 2003, construction was
held up as a result of delays caused by Rose’s failure to provide
architectural plans to the builder. The Koppels were forced to
expend additional funds, over the estimate, because Rose failed to
deliver the drawings to the builder in a timely fashion and needed
to revise several of the drawings that were delivered. In February
2003 construction was discontinued due to Rose’s failure to produce
drawings necessary for construction to continue.
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On February 24, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose a letter
demanding full performance of Rose’s obligations under the
agreement, stating that the Koppels had incurred damages solely as
a result of the delays caused by Rose’s failure to provide timely
documents and plans to the builder, and requesting that he notify
his insurance carrier of the Koppels’ claims against him. On
February 28, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose an email requesting
assurance of full and complete performance under the contract by
March 3, 2003, and requesting written confirmation that Rose would
promptly notify his insurance carrier of the Koppels’ claimed
damages. On March 3, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose a letter
requesting a meeting on March 6, 2003. In this letter, she stated
that Rose was in material breach due to his failure to fulfill his
obligations for months, and reiterated the request of assurance of
performance under the contract, as well as verification that Rose
had notified his insurance carrier of the Koppels’ claims. On
March 6, 2003, Grace Koppel sent Rose a letter terminating their
agreement on the basis that Rose had been in material breach “for
some time.” The letter included a request for the delivery of all
files and drawings pertaining to the Koppel residence so
construction could continue with another architect. On March 20,
2003, Rose delivered the requested items.
The Koppels filed their complaint alleging breach of
contract on March 17, 2006. Rose filed a motion to dismiss or, in
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the alternative, for summary judgment, together with a memorandum
in support, to which was attached a number of exhibits. The
district court granted Rose’s motion to dismiss on the ground that
the claim was barred by the applicable Maryland statute of
limitations.1
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
erred in determining that the date for accrual of this action for
breach of contract was the date of the Koppels’ letter terminating
Rose, rather than the later date when Rose delivered construction
drawings that were substantially incomplete. Specifically, the
Koppels challenge the district court’s determination that they were
on notice of their claims against Rose by March 6, 2003, at the
latest, when they terminated their contract with him due to the
delay damages they had incurred as a result of Rose’s alleged
failure to provide timely and complete construction drawings for
the construction of the Koppels’ residence, pursuant to the terms
of the contract between them.
The statute of limitations in Maryland begins to run when
a party has knowledge of facts sufficient to put an ordinarily
1
Pursuant to Maryland law:
A civil action at law shall be filed within three years
from the date it accrues unless another provision of the
Code provides a different period of time within which an
action shall be commenced.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101 (2004).
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prudent person on inquiry, prompting such reasonable person to
inquire further. See Poffenberger v. Risser,
431 A.2d 677, 681
(Md. 1981). The parties do not dispute that the trial court was
legally correct in applying Maryland’s discovery rule2 to the
statute of limitations analysis, and determining that the statute
of limitations began to run when the breach was readily
discoverable, not at the moment when the extent of the damages was
ascertainable.
The Koppels assert on appeal that their cause of action
did not accrue until delivery of the drawings by Rose because “Rose
could have provided substantially complete drawings on that day,
vitiating any claim for breach of his agreement to provide them.”
They contend that prior to March 20, 2003, when Rose delivered the
drawings, Rose’s breach was not “reasonably ascertainable.”
We find that the district court correctly held that the
Koppels’ action was barred by the statute of limitations. It is
undisputed that the Koppels sustained monetary damages beginning in
the summer of 2002, when construction commenced. It is undisputed
that those damages were sustained by the failure of Rose to timely
provide the agreed-upon drawings. It is also undisputed that Rose
fulfilled some of the terms of the contract, such as assisting in
the selection of a builder for the subject residence and producing
2
See Poffenberger v.
Risser, 431 A.2d at 681; Doe v.
Archdiocese of Washington,
689 A.2d 634, 644 (Md. App. 1997).
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partial drawings prior to March 6, 2003, the date of his
termination, but that he failed to fully perform under the
agreement. As the district court found, the extent of the damages
sustained by the Koppels, which did not occur until after Rose
delivered the incomplete drawings on March 20, 2003, was not the
lynchpin for the accrual of the Koppels’ cause of action.3 Rather,
it was the point at which a reasonable person could have discovered
that a breach had occurred. See Lumsden v. Design Tech Builders,
Inc.,
749 A.2d 796, 804 (Md. 2000). As the district court held,
this point was no later than March 6, 2003, the date the Koppels
terminated their contract with Rose, and prior to which they had
sustained ongoing damages related to the construction delays caused
by Rose’s failure to perform under the contract. Hence, the
Koppels’ action for breach of contract, having been filed more than
three years after March 6, 2003, was untimely.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
the Koppels’ action. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
3
We find to be without merit the Koppels’ contention that Rose
could have “vitiated” his nonperformance under the contract had he
produced complete drawings on March 20, 2003, given that they would
still have had a potentially viable cause of action against Rose
for breach of contract based on the damages sustained by the
Koppels because of Rose’s failures to timely deliver the drawings
to the builder and the need to revise several of the drawings that
were delivered. Such cause of action would still have had to have
been filed within the applicable three-year statute of limitations
period, however.
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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