Filed: Sep. 20, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-2320 ATTORNEYFIRST, LLC, a West Virginia limited liability company, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ASCENSION ENTERTAINMENT, INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation; STEVEN LOPEZ, individually; JURISFIRST, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, doing business as JurisTrust, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Vi
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-2320 ATTORNEYFIRST, LLC, a West Virginia limited liability company, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus ASCENSION ENTERTAINMENT, INCORPORATED, a Delaware corporation; STEVEN LOPEZ, individually; JURISFIRST, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company; ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, doing business as JurisTrust, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Vir..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2320
ATTORNEYFIRST, LLC, a West Virginia limited
liability company,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ASCENSION ENTERTAINMENT, INCORPORATED, a
Delaware corporation; STEVEN LOPEZ,
individually; JURISFIRST, LLC, a Nevada
limited liability company; ACADEMY MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, doing
business as JurisTrust,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Joseph Robert Goodwin,
Chief District Judge. (2:03-cv-02467)
Submitted: September 10, 2007 Decided: September 20, 2007
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Edward Pope Tiffey, EDWARD P. TIFFEY, PLLC, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. R. Terrance Rodgers, ALLEN GUTHRIE MCHUGH
& THOMAS, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia; Richard F. Neely, NEELY
& HUNTER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
AttorneyFirst, LLC brought this action against Ascension
Entertainment, Incorporated (“Ascension”), Steven Lopez,
JurisFirst, LLC (“JurisFirst”), and Academy Mortgage Corporation
(“Academy”), alleging breach of contract by Ascension and Lopez;
negligence and unjust enrichment by Academy; tortious interference
with contractual relations by JurisFirst and Academy; and fraud,
conversion, and violation of the West Virginia Computer Crime and
Abuse Act, W. Va. Code §§ 61-3C-1 - 61-3C-21 (2007), by all
Defendants. A jury rendered a verdict in favor of AttorneyFirst on
a breach of contract claim against Ascension and Lopez, and the
remaining claims were dismissed by the district court as a result
of various motions by the Defendants. AttorneyFirst argues that
the district court erred when it: (i) granted summary judgment
against AttorneyFirst on its negligence claim against Academy; (ii)
granted Defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law on
AttorneyFirst’s conversion, unjust enrichment and breach of the
confidentiality agreement claims; and (iii) would not allow
AttorneyFirst to recall Lopez to the witness stand. Finding no
error, we affirm.
First, we find the district court correctly granted
summary judgment on AttorneyFirst’s negligence claim against
Academy because Academy owed no duty of care to AttorneyFirst. See
Robertson v. LeMaster,
301 S.E.2d 563, 566 (W. Va. 1983) (“[T]o
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establish a prima facie case of negligence in West Virginia, it
must be shown that the defendant has been guilty of some act or
omission in violation of a duty owed to the plaintiff. No action
for negligence will lie without a duty broken.”); see also Aikens
v. Debow,
541 S.E.2d 576, 589-92 (W. Va. 2000) (holding that in the
absence of personal or property damage or a contractual
relationship, a party alleging negligence resulting only in
economic loss must establish a special relationship between the
plaintiff and the tortfeasor). Since AttorneyFirst did not allege
personal or property damage, or the existence of a contractual or
special relationship with Academy, AttorneyFirst could not state a
negligence claim against Academy. Because we find the district
court correctly granted Academy’s summary judgment motion on
AttorneyFirst’s negligence claim, we also find the district court
correctly excluded as irrelevant AttorneyFirst’s proposed expert
testimony to the extent the testimony pertained to the negligence
claim.
Because substantial deference is due a district court’s
evidentiary rulings and reversal may occur only when there has been
an abuse of discretion, see General Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S.
136, 141 (1997), we also find it was within the district court’s
discretion to refuse admission of Attorney First’s evidence of
damages. See United States v. Achiekwelu,
112 F.3d 747, 753 (4th
Cir. 1997) (recognizing that this court will find an abuse of
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discretion only if the district court’s evidentiary ruling was
arbitrary or irrational). Since AttorneyFirst was unable to prove
it suffered damage as a result of Defendants’ alleged conduct, we
also conclude the district court correctly granted Defendants’
motions for judgment as a matter of law on AttorneyFirst’s
conversion and unjust enrichment claims. Wheatley v. Wicomico
County,
390 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2004) (holding that a motion
for judgment as a matter of law “is properly granted if the
nonmoving party failed to make a showing on an essential element of
his case with respect to which he had the burden of proof”).
Additionally, although AttorneyFirst asserts that the
district court erred when it granted Lopez and Ascension’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law on its claim for breach of the
confidentiality agreement because the jury might have awarded it
nominal damages, we conclude that even if the district court erred
by not allowing the jury to determine whether nominal damages were
appropriate, the possibility of a nominal damages award is
insufficient to warrant a new trial. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 346(b). Accordingly, we uphold the district court’s
order granting judgment as a matter of law on AttorneyFirst’s claim
for breach of the confidentiality agreement.
Finally, because “[a] district court has the discretion
to place reasonable limits on the presentation of evidence,” see
United States v. Ford,
88 F.3d 1350, 1362 (4th Cir. 1996)
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(citations omitted), we conclude the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied AttorneyFirst’s request to recall
Lopez to the witness stand so he could authenticate an exhibit.
Although AttorneyFirst had ample opportunity to authenticate the
exhibit during Lopez’s extensive testimony, AttorneyFirst chose not
to do so. Accordingly, we find that it was not error for the
district court to refuse AttorneyFirst’s request to recall Lopez at
the end of the trial. See
id.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
orders granting Academy’s summary judgment motion on
AttorneyFirst’s negligence claim, and granting in part and denying
in part Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motions. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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