Filed: Apr. 27, 2007
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4377 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus KEITH BROWN, a/k/a Clown, Defendant - Appellant. No. 06-4640 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus DEANDRE MYERS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:04- cr-00240-JFM-2; 1:04-cr-00240-JFM-1) Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: April 27,
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4377 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus KEITH BROWN, a/k/a Clown, Defendant - Appellant. No. 06-4640 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus DEANDRE MYERS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:04- cr-00240-JFM-2; 1:04-cr-00240-JFM-1) Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: April 27, 2..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4377
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
KEITH BROWN, a/k/a Clown,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4640
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DEANDRE MYERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:04-
cr-00240-JFM-2; 1:04-cr-00240-JFM-1)
Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: April 27, 2007
Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Emanuel M. Levin, EMANUEL M. LEVIN & ASSOCIATES, P.A., Baltimore,
Maryland; William B. Purpura, Jr., LAW OFFICE OF WILLIAM B.
PURPURA, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein,
United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Keith Brown and Deandre
Myers pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute cocaine. Brown claims his sentence at the low
end of the properly calculated sentencing guidelines was
unreasonable. Myers claims the district court erred by not
granting his motion to dismiss the indictment. Find no error, we
affirm.
At Brown’s sentencing, the district court properly
arrived at his range of imprisonment under the advisory sentencing
guidelines. The court also considered the statutory sentencing
factors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). “[A]
sentence imposed ‘within the properly calculated Guidelines range
. . . is presumptively reasonable.’” United States v. Green,
436
F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Newsom,
428
F.3d 685, 687 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
2006 WL 271816 (2006)
(first alteration added)). We will affirm a sentence if it is both
reasonable and within the statutorily prescribed range. United
States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005). We find
the sentence reasonable.
Myers claims the Government breached a plea agreement
filed in a state case. The terms of the plea agreement are
reviewed de novo. See United States v. Snow,
234 F.3d 187, 189
(4th Cir. 2000). Plea agreements are interpreted according to
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contract law, and “‘each party should receive the benefit of its
bargain.’” United States v. Peglera,
33 F.3d 412, 413 (4th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Ringling,
988 F.2d 504, 506 (4th
Cir. 1993)). We find according to the terms of the plea agreement
that the Government was not under any obligation to establish that
Myers breached the agreement prior to his sentencing on his state
conviction or prior to issuing the indictment. We further find the
Government did not waive its right to claim Myers breached the
agreement by not raising such claim prior to his sentencing on his
state conviction.
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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