Filed: Nov. 02, 2007
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4531 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus PAMELA YVETTE HOFFLER-RIDDICK, Defendant - Appellant. No. 06-4701 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PAMELA YVETTE HOFFLER-RIDDICK, Defendant - Appellee. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District Judge. (4:05-cr-00009-WDK) Argued: September 28, 2007 Decid
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 06-4531 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus PAMELA YVETTE HOFFLER-RIDDICK, Defendant - Appellant. No. 06-4701 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus PAMELA YVETTE HOFFLER-RIDDICK, Defendant - Appellee. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District Judge. (4:05-cr-00009-WDK) Argued: September 28, 2007 Decide..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4531
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
PAMELA YVETTE HOFFLER-RIDDICK,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 06-4701
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
PAMELA YVETTE HOFFLER-RIDDICK,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Walter D. Kelley, Jr.,
District Judge. (4:05-cr-00009-WDK)
Argued: September 28, 2007 Decided: November 2, 2007
Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and Norman K. MOON,
United States District Judge for the Western District of Virginia,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Stephen A. Hudgins, Newport News, Virginia, for
Appellant/Cross-Appellee. Lisa Rae McKeel, Assistant United States
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News,
Virginia, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ON BRIEF: Chuck Rosenberg,
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee/Cross-
Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Pamela Yvette Hoffler-Riddick was
convicted of one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and four counts of money
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I). The
district court granted Hoffler-Riddick’s post-trial motion for
judgment of acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c) as to the
substantive money laundering counts. Hoffler-Riddick appeals her
conviction and sentence for conspiracy to commit money laundering,
and the Government cross-appeals the district court’s judgment of
acquittal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the conspiracy
conviction and reverse the district court’s judgment of acquittal.
I
From 1994 until February 2000, Hoffler-Riddick was employed by
the City of Norfolk, Virginia, as a teacher, principal, and
administrator.1 In 1996, she began a romantic relationship with
John Cecil McBride, a financial advisor with the brokerage firm of
Wheat First Securities (now known as Wachovia Securities). In
1998, McBride began conducting business with Aaron Burton, a major
drug dealer in Richmond, Virginia. McBride testified at trial that
1
We draw the facts largely from the written opinion of the
district court, viewing them in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Harris, 31 F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir.
1994).
3
when he first met Burton, he understood Burton to be a former drug
dealer who now had a legitimate business. In reality, Burton was
still dealing drugs. Burton asked McBride to help him invest the
profits he earned from this supposedly legitimate business, and
McBride soon began assisting Burton with all of his financial
needs.
One of the services McBride provided to Burton was help in
purchasing a vehicle. Burton’s credit was so poor that no
financial institution would lend him the money to make such a
purchase. To circumvent this problem, McBride began searching for
a nominee to obtain a loan and “own” the vehicle while Burton made
the payments. After McBride unsuccessfully solicited several
business associates for the task, Hoffler-Riddick agreed to
purchase a vehicle in her name so long as someone else paid the
vehicle loan and she did not have any responsibility for ongoing
expenses such as insurance or personal property taxes. Hoffler-
Riddick and McBride also agreed that the vehicle would remain in
her name for only one year.
On February 20, 1998, Hoffler-Riddick purchased a 1998
Chrysler Town and Country van on Burton’s behalf. McBride
completed and Hoffler-Riddick signed a number of documents relating
to the purchase, including loan and insurance applications and a
vehicle registration. McBride paid for the van by taking $8,000
in cash from Burton and converting it into a cashier’s check with
4
which to make the down payment. The balance of the purchase price,
approximately $25,000, was financed in Hoffler-Riddick’s name
through Chrysler Financial. McBride made the monthly payments of
$473.32 via checks drawn on his personal accounts, for which he was
reimbursed in cash by Burton. On May 31, 2000, McBride paid off
two loans totaling $6,560 that Hoffler-Riddick owed to the Norfolk
School Employees Federal Credit Union as a reward to Hoffler-
Riddick for serving as nominal owner of the van.
In September 2000, more than two years after the vehicle
purchase, Hoffler-Riddick demanded that McBride honor their
agreement and pay off the Chrysler Financial loan. To comply with
Hoffler-Riddick’s demand, McBride obtained $16,650 in cash from
Burton. On September 28, 2000, McBride converted this cash into
two cashier’s checks in the amounts of $9,000 and $7,629.74,2 which
he forwarded to Chrysler Financial.
Although Hoffler-Riddick did not know at the time she
purchased the van that Burton’s money represented proceeds of drug
distribution activities, she was fully aware of that fact by
September 2000, when she demanded that the loan be paid in full.
McBride informed Hoffler-Riddick on numerous occasions about the
true source of Burton’s money. Furthermore, in April 1999 Hoffler-
Riddick accepted McBride’s invitation to take an afternoon drive
2
McBride explained that checks in amounts less than $10,000
were used in order to avoid federal reporting requirements.
5
with him from his home in Chesapeake, Virginia to New Kent County,
Virginia. During the trip, McBride carried three kilograms of
cocaine for delivery to Burton, which Hoffler-Riddick examined out
of curiosity.
Despite learning that Burton’s money came from drug dealing,
Hoffler-Riddick continued to help McBride convert Burton’s cash
into other assets. For example, in May 1999, McBride agreed to
help Burton use his drug money to purchase a house located at 329
Center Street in Hampton, Virginia (the Center Street Property).
McBride gave Hoffler-Riddick $10,000 in cash and instructed her to
convert it into cashier’s checks. On May 20, 1999, Hoffler-Riddick
arranged for her goddaughter and subordinate employee, Patrice
Jones, to use the cash to purchase two $5,000 cashier’s checks from
NationsBank (now Bank of America) in Norfolk. However, the checks
could not be used because they were made payable to a title company
rather than to the attorney closing the transaction. On May 24,
1999, acting on McBride’s instructions to remedy the situation,
Hoffler-Riddick had Jones exchange the checks for new cashier’s
checks made payable to the proper party. Using these and other
laundered funds, Burton purchased 329 Center Street for $95,000.3
3
Hoffler-Riddick participated in other money laundering
activities as well, which we need not recount here.
6
II
At trial, Hoffler-Riddick was convicted on counts 40-43 of the
Indictment, which charged her with “concealment” money laundering
stemming from the September 2000 payoff of Burton’s van, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).4 Following trial, the
district court granted Hoffler-Riddick’s motion for judgment of
acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c), and the Government appeals.
We review de novo the district court’s entry of a judgment of
acquittal. United States v. Harris, 31 F.3d 153, 156 (4th Cir.
1994). In reviewing that judgment, we must determine whether the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
could have permitted a rational jury to convict Hoffler-Riddick on
that charge. Id.
In order to obtain a conviction for concealment money
laundering, the Government was required to prove: (1) Hoffler-
Riddick conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction
having at least a de minimis effect on interstate commerce or
involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in,
or the activities of which have at least a de minimis effect on,
interstate commerce; (2) the property that was the subject of the
transaction involved the proceeds of specified unlawful activity;
4
Although the Indictment charged Hoffler-Riddick with
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i),
(a)(1)(B)(ii) and (a)(2), the Government proceeded at trial solely
on a concealment theory.
7
(3) Hoffler-Riddick knew that the property involved represented the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and (4) Hoffler-Riddick
knew that the transaction was designed, in whole or part, to
conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the
ownership, or the control of the proceeds of the unlawful activity.
United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 221 (4th Cir. 1998).
Only the final element is at issue on appeal.
The district court concluded that the Government had failed to
prove the fourth element of concealment money laundering,
explaining that “[t]here was simply no evidence that defendant
Hoffler-Riddick initiated the loan payoff transaction for the
purpose or design of concealing assets.” J.A. at 2064 (emphasis
added). In reaching this conclusion, the district court misstated
the Government’s burden of proof. Under the law, “[t]he Government
need not prove that the defendant had the purpose of concealing the
proceeds of illegal activity. Instead, . . . the Government must
only show that the defendant possessed the knowledge that the
transaction was designed to conceal illegal proceeds.” United
States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in
original).
Applying the proper standard, we hold that there was
sufficient evidence to permit the jury to conclude that Hoffler-
Riddick knew that the loan payoff transaction was designed to
conceal the fact that the payoff funds were the proceeds of
8
Burton’s illicit drug activity. The evidence established that by
September 2000, Hoffler-Riddick knew that Burton, the beneficial
owner of the van and the source of the payoff funds, was a drug
dealer with no legitimate income. Through her assistance in the
purchase of the Center Street Property, Hoffler-Riddick had also
become familiar with the system Burton and McBride had devised for
laundering Burton’s drug proceeds: Burton would provide cash,
which would then be converted into cashier’s checks in amounts less
than $10,000 in order to avoid reporting requirements. The obvious
purpose of both the use of cashier’s checks and the structuring was
to conceal the illicit source of the funds. Based on this history,
the jury was entitled to conclude that Hoffler-Riddick knew, or was
willfully blind to the fact, that the loan payoff would be
accomplished in the same fashion, and in fact, it was.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s entry of judgment of
acquittal as to counts 40-43 of the Indictment.
III
Hoffler-Riddick also challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support her conviction for money laundering conspiracy,
as well as procedural rulings made at trial and the calculation of
9
her sentence.5 We find no error in these aspects of the
proceedings below.
IV
Based on the foregoing, we affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
5
We lack jurisdiction to review Hoffler-Riddick’s claim that
the district court erred in refusing to grant a downward departure,
and therefore do not reach this issue. See United States v. Quinn,
359 F.3d 666, 682 (4th Cir. 2004).
10
