Filed: Apr. 10, 2008
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1225 THOMAS M. BECKNER, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus AMERICAN BENEFIT CORPORATION; EMPLOYER- TEAMSTERS LOCAL NOS. 175 AND 505 PENSION TRUST FUND; ROBERT T. BIGGS; FRANK T. LITTON, JR.; JIM WAUGH; RICHARD K. HALL; RALPH WINTER; CLIFF BRACKMAN; DENNIS MORGAN, Trustees, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District J
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-1225 THOMAS M. BECKNER, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus AMERICAN BENEFIT CORPORATION; EMPLOYER- TEAMSTERS LOCAL NOS. 175 AND 505 PENSION TRUST FUND; ROBERT T. BIGGS; FRANK T. LITTON, JR.; JIM WAUGH; RICHARD K. HALL; RALPH WINTER; CLIFF BRACKMAN; DENNIS MORGAN, Trustees, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Ju..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1225
THOMAS M. BECKNER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
AMERICAN BENEFIT CORPORATION; EMPLOYER-
TEAMSTERS LOCAL NOS. 175 AND 505 PENSION TRUST
FUND; ROBERT T. BIGGS; FRANK T. LITTON, JR.;
JIM WAUGH; RICHARD K. HALL; RALPH WINTER;
CLIFF BRACKMAN; DENNIS MORGAN, Trustees,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,
District Judge. (3:06-cv-00184)
Argued: December 6, 2007 Decided: April 10, 2008
Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD, United
States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting
by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William D. Ryan, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant. Michael
John Del Giudice, CICCARELLO, DEL GIUDICE & LAFON, Charleston, West
Virginia; Michael A. Katz, WILLMAN & ARNOLD, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant Thomas M. Beckner sought retirement benefits
pursuant to a Plan titled the Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit of $2,500,
although he had never been a Kroger employee. In the alternative,
Beckner requested the 30-And-Out Benefit of $2,000. The fiduciary
denied both claims.
Beckner subsequently filed suit in the district court under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., against American Benefit Corporation (ABC),
Employer-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 and 505 Pension Trust Fund
(Fund), and Robert T. Biggs, Frank T. Litton, Jr., Jim Waugh,
Richard K. Hall, Ralph Winter, Cliff Brackman, and Dennis Morgan
(Trustees) contending improper denial of the Plan’s Kroger 30-And-
Out Benefit of $2500 per month. Alternatively, Beckner sought the
Plan’s 30-And-Out Monthly Benefit of $2000 per month.
The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In
addition, Beckner filed two motions for discovery. The district
court denied both of Beckner’s motions for discovery and entered
judgment for ABC, the Fund, and the Trustees. This appeal
followed.
I.
The relevant facts, as set forth in the district court's
opinion, are as follows:
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The Fund was created in 1958 by certain local unions
and various employers when they entered into agreements
to provide pension benefits to participants. The Plan
was restated, reconstituted, and re-adopted effective May
1998. [Beckner] has participated in the Fund since 1974
. . . . Although [Beckner] concedes that he has never
worked as a Kroger employee, he asserts that the Plan
does not provide that the Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit is
only for Kroger employees and he otherwise meets all the
qualifications to obtain the benefit.
By letter dated September 14, 2004, ABC denied
[Beckner’s] request for the Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit of
$2,500 because [Beckner] was not a Kroger employee. ABC
also denied [Beckner’s] request for the 30-And-Out
Benefit of $2,000 because [Beckner] did not meet the
Plan’s $33.34 multiplier rate as of December 31, 1987.
[Beckner] appealed these decisions to the Fund’s Appeal
Committee, which was comprised of two trustees and two
“Fund Consultants” from ABC. At their meeting held on
November 3, 2004, the Appeals Committee recommended that
[Beckner’s] appeal be approved. On November 18, 2004,
the Trustees met and denied [Beckner’s] appeal. The
minutes from that meeting provide, in relevant part:
Excerpts from the Special Trustees’ meeting
held March 31, 1997 and the regular Trustees’
meeting of September 10, 1998 were reviewed.
It was noted the Minutes of September 10, 1998
reflected the increase from $2,000 to $2,500
per month applied only to employees of Kroger
and that historically the Kroger 30-and-Out
Benefit had only been applicable to Kroger
employees. The Plan provisions requiring a
minimum multiplier of $33.34 on December 31,
1987 or contributions at the rate required
under the National Master Freight, United
Parcel Service or National Tank Haul Agreement
to qualify for the $2,000 per month 30-and-Out
Benefit were discussed. MOTION was then made,
seconded and passed to deny Mr. Beckner’s
application for a Kroger 30-and-Out Benefit on
the basis he had never been an employee of the
Kroger Company and to deny Mr. Beckner’s
application for the $2,000 per month 30-and-
Out Benefit on the basis the minimum
multiplier and contribution requirements had
not been satisfied.
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Minutes of Trustees’ Meeting (Nov. 18, 2004). [Beckner]
was permitted to appeal this decision and argue that he
detrimentally relied upon a printing error contained in
the 2001 Summary Plan Description (SPD).
On May 4, 2005, the Appeals Committee met and
discussed [Beckner’s] appeal. [Beckner] appeared at the
hearing and told the Appeals Committee that he and his
wife believed he qualified for the Kroger 30-and-Out
Benefit of $2,500 under the 2001 SPD. The Appeals
Committee deferred the action to the Trustees. On May
19, 2005, the Trustees met and discussed [Beckner’s]
case. After discussing the language of the Plan and the
SPD, the Trustees denied [Beckner’s] appeal “on the basis
the Kroger 30 and Out benefit is available only to
employees of Kroger Company and that . . . Beckner did
not provide a preponderance of evidence to prove that he
had detrimentally relied on the language of the Summary
Plan Description.” Minutes of Trustees’ Meeting (May 19,
2005). On appeal to [the district court], [Beckner]
asserts that nowhere in the Plan does it provide that the
“Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit” of $2,500 per month is only
available to Kroger employees.
(J.A. 613-15.)
II.
On appeal, Beckner argues that the district court erred in
applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to the Fund and
the Trustees’ denial of his claim. The Court examines this issue
of law de novo. Colucci v. Agfa Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431 F.3d
170, 176 (4th Cir. 2005).
Where “the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to
construe the terms of the plan[,]” the court’s consideration is
limited to whether the Trustees abused their discretion in denying
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benefits. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115
(1989). Therefore, we must determine if such authority can be
found here. In our review of the record before us, we have located
the following:
First, Article VIII, Section 8.01 of the Plan, provides that
“Any payment of benefits under the Plan shall be contingent upon
the approval by the Trustees of the application for benefits which
a Participant or a Beneficiary must complete and file with the
Trustees.” (J.A. 496.)
Second, Article X, Section 10.01 of the Plan states that “This
Plan shall be administered by the Trustees in accordance with and
pursuant to the Trust Agreement.” (J.A. 502.)
Third, in Section 2.04 of Article II of the Trust Agreement,
we read that
The Trustees shall formulate a written plan for the
payment of such retirement pension benefits . . . as they
deem feasible. . . . Said Trustees shall draft
procedures, regulations, and conditions for the operation
of the Plan, including . . . conditions of eligibility
for covered Employees and Participants, procedure of
claiming benefits, schedules of types and amounts of
benefits to be paid and procedure for the distribution of
such benefits.
(J.A. 548.)
Fourth, we find in Section 2.05, Article II of the Trust
Agreement that “The Pension Plan may be amended by the Trustees
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from time to time as they in their discretion may determine.”
(J.A. 548.)
Fifth, Section 3.01 of Article III of the Trust Agreement
provides, in relevant part, that “The administration of the Trust
Fund shall be vested in six Trustees, sometimes referred to as the
Board of Trustees, three of whom shall be Employer Trustees, and
three of whom shall be Union Trustees.” (J. A. 549.).
Sixth, Article VII, Section 7.02 of the Trust Agreement states
that
All questions or controversies, of whatever character,
arising in any manner or between any parties or persons
in connection with the Trust Fund or the operation
thereof, whether as to any claim for any benefits
preferred by any Employee, or any other person, or
whether as to the construction of the language or meaning
of the rules and regulations adopted by the Trustees or
this instrument, or as to any writing, decision,
instrument or accounts in connection with the operation
of the Trust Fund or otherwise, shall be submitted to the
Board of Trustees for decision, and the decision of the
board . . . shall be binding upon all persons dealing
with the Trust Fund or claiming any benefits thereunder.
(J.A. 558.)
Seventh, Amendment No. 2, Amending Article VII, Section 5.01
of the Trust Agreement to add subsection n., provides that “To
construe and interpret this Agreement and the Plan established
hereunder, and any such construction or interpretation adopted by
the Trustees in good faith shall be binding upon the Union,
Employers, Employees and Participants.” (J.A. 564.)
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Having carefully reviewed these documents, we are of the firm
opinion that Plan grants the Trustees “discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the
plan.” Firestone Tire, 489 U.S. at 115. Accordingly, the district
court’s decision to apply the abuse of discretion standard was not
error.
III.
Beckner next contends that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to the Fund and the Trustees as to his eligibility
for the Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit. We review de novo the trial
court’s granting of a motion for summary judgment. Bryant v. Bell
Atlantic Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002).
According to the Trustees, to be entitled to the Kroger 30-
And-Out Benefit, one first must have been employed by Kroger. The
minutes of a September 10, 1998, Trustees’ meeting support that
this historically has been the Trustees’ interpretation. The
minutes provide, in relevant part, that
Actuary Carlton reviewed exhibits, copies of which are
attached to and become a part of these Minutes, which
showed the cost of providing to Kroger participants a
$2,500 minimum monthly benefit after thirty (30) years of
contributory service on or after January 1, 2004.
Actuary Carlton showed currently there are eight (8)
Kroger participants under the Fund and four (4) would be
affected by the benefit change. He showed the total
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Actuarial liability increase would be affected by the
benefit change. He showed the total Actuarial liability
increase would be $154,875 and the annual normal cost
would increase $1,970. Actuary Carlton showed the
additional yearly cost to the Fund, which included the
amortization payment and normal cost would be $14,708.
Trustee Hall made a motion to approve a minimum benefit
of $2,500 a month after thirty (30) years of contributory
service beginning on or after January 1, 2004, for Kroger
participants, provided the participant has worked eight
(8) of the last ten (10) years at the Kroger rate and
contingent upon ratification of contracts increasing
their contribution levels. The MOTION was seconded and
passed.
(J.A. 143) (last emphasis in original; all others added).
A memorandum to the “Fund Participants Covered Under the
Kroger Plan of Benefits” also supports the Trustee’s position. The
memorandum provides, in relevant part, that “since Kroger did not
become part of this Plan until April 1, 1974, you will not be able
to retire under this Benefit until on or after April 1, 2004.”
(J.A. 284.) Simply stated, the date on which Kroger became a part
of the Plan is immaterial if, as Beckner maintains, the Kroger 30-
And-Out Benefit is open to anyone with the required contribution
rate. Because the memorandum states that the benefit is
unavailable to the participants until thirty years after Kroger
joined the Plan, however, it is only reasonable to interpret the
letter as having been written with the understanding that the
Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit was for Kroger employees only.
9
Moreover, although the Appeals Committee initially recommended
that Beckner be granted the Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit, the
Trustees, at their November 18, 2004, meeting, decided otherwise.
(J.A. 204, 208.) “It was noted the Minutes of September 10,
1998[,] reflected the increase from $2,000 to $2,500 per month
applied only to employees of Kroger and that historically the
Kroger 30-And-Out Benefit had only been applicable to Kroger
employees.” (J.A. 208.)
In sum, because we find the Trustees’ interpretation that
Beckner must have been employed by Kroger to reap the Kroger 30-
And-Out Benefit to be reasonable, we must affirm the district court
on this issue.
IV.
Beckner also maintains that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the Plan on the issue as to whether
Beckner is entitled to receive the 30-And-Out Benefit.
The Plan provides, in relevant part that
To be eligible for a 30-And-Out Monthly Benefit of
$2,000, a Participant must retire from Covered Employment
at any age, and:
(i) have been an active Participant on or after January
1, 1994, and
(ii) retire at any age after having thirty (30) Years of
Future Credited Service (Contributory Service), and
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(iii) have had contributions made to the Fund on his/her
behalf at the United Parcel Service, National Master
Freight, National Tank, Kroger or a Contribution Rate
that had a $33.34 multiplier at December 31, 1987, and
(iv) have had contributions at the rate of $368.33 or
greater per month made to the Fund on his/her behalf for
six (6) out of the last eight (8) years of his/her
participation in the Fund prior to retirement.
(J.A. 458.)
The evidence before us establishes that as of December 31,
1987, Beckner’s multiplier was $25.15 per month. This rate fails
to satisfy the minimum multiplier of $33.34, as provided above.
Nevertheless, Beckner maintains that because he meets the
Kroger rate requirement, he is entitled to receive the 30-And-Out
Benefit. The Trustees, however, argue that the Kroger contribution
rate applies only to Kroger employees. Therefore, according to the
Trustees, because Beckner was not a Kroger employee and did not
fulfil the minimum multiplier of $33.34, he is barred from
receiving the 30-And-Out Benefit.
Finding this interpretation of the Plan to be reasonable, we
agree with the district court’s decision to enter judgment for the
Fund and the Trustees on this issue.
V.
Beckner next claims that the district court committed
reversible error in granting summary judgment to ABC on the
11
question of whether ABC is a fiduciary under the terms of the Plan.
We review this question of law de novo. Bryant, 288 F.3d at 132.
Section 1002(21)(A) of Title 29 of the United States Code
defines a fiduciary under an ERISA plan “as a person who exercises
any discretionary authority or control over the management of the
benefit plan or the management or disposition of its assets, a paid
investment advisor, or a person with any discretionary authority or
responsibility in administering a benefit plan covered by the Act.”
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
From our review of the record, we have found no evidence to
support the suggestion that ABC had a fiduciary role in Beckner’s
case. The final decision to deny the benefits that Beckner sought
rested with the Trustees alone. As such, we are unable to find
that the district court erred in granting ABC’s motion for summary
judgment.
VI.
Finally, Beckner complains that the district court erred in
denying his requests for discovery in this matter. The Court
affords substantial discretion to a district court in managing
discovery and reviews discovery rulings only for an abuse of that
discretion. Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of
Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 929 (4th Cir. 1995).
12
According to Beckner, the district court should have allowed
him the opportunity to cross examine those involved in the denial
of his claims. He also argues that the record may be incomplete.
Contrary to Beckner’s contentions otherwise, this is a
straight-forward ERISA action. The fiduciary, in this instance the
Trustees, made a decision that the claimant disagreed with so the
claimant brought suit in the district court. The district court
was presented with the record that the Trustees relied on to make
their decision. Because of the terms of the Plan, which granted
the Trustees the “discretionary authority to determine eligibility
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan,” Firestone
Tire, 489 U.S. at 115, the district court reviewed the Trustees’
decision for an abuse of their discretion. Finding that the
Trustees’ interpretation of the Plan was reasonable, the district
court ruled in favor of the Fund and the Trustees.
We are unable to fathom how the allowance for additional
discovery, and thus additional evidence, could modify that
determination. Therefore, it is our judgment that the district
court did not err in denying Beckner’s motion for discovery.
VII.
In light of the foregoing discussion and rationale, the
judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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