Filed: Apr. 28, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1443 MANEKE L. PURCHASE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:06-cv-00089-D) Submitted: March 25, 2009 Decided: April 28, 2009 Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpubli
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1443 MANEKE L. PURCHASE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:06-cv-00089-D) Submitted: March 25, 2009 Decided: April 28, 2009 Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublis..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1443
MANEKE L. PURCHASE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:06-cv-00089-D)
Submitted: March 25, 2009 Decided: April 28, 2009
Before TRAXLER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Angela Newell Gray, GRAY NEWELL, LLP, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Steve R. Matheny, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maneke L. Purchase filed this action against the
Commissioner of Social Security, alleging violations of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). Specifically,
Purchase contended her employers subjected her to discriminatory
termination, discriminatory denial of training, and
discriminatory discipline, all in violation of Title VII. The
district court granted Astrue’s motion for summary judgment. We
affirm.
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Nader v. Blair, 549
F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted
only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
To survive summary judgment on her discrimination
claims, Purchase must either come forth with direct evidence of
discrimination or establish a prima facie case of discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973). Purchase submitted no direct evidence of racial
discrimination in her termination. Thus, in order to establish
a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, she must show
that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was
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qualified for her job and performing at a satisfactory level;
(3) she was terminated; and (4) she was replaced by a similarly
situated applicant outside her protected class. See St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Williams v.
Cerberonics, Inc.,
871 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1989). Where a
plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the action, the
burden once again shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
employer’s rationale is just a pretext for discrimination. Id.
at 804.
Here, it is clear that Purchase fails to establish
even a prima facie case of discriminatory termination. Though
it is undisputed that Purchase is a member of a protected class
— she is African-American — and she was terminated from her
position, Purchase fails to demonstrate that she was performing
her job at a satisfactory level. The record is replete with
documentation of her performance shortcomings. Purchase
required regular assistance with routine claims, forms she
completed frequently contained errors that caused processing
delays, and she had difficulty identifying claimants’
eligibility. She could not be trusted to honestly record the
hours she worked or the breaks she took, and regularly failed to
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inform her supervisors when she would take leave. Accordingly,
as no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Purchase was
meeting her employer’s legitimate job expectations, we find that
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
Purchase’s discriminatory termination claim.
Turning to Purchase’s claim of discriminatory denial
of training, Purchase submitted no direct evidence that she was
trained differently than other employees on the basis of her
race. Accordingly, to survive summary judgment, she must
demonstrate a prima facie case of discriminatory training under
the McDonnell Douglas framework. In order to do so, she must
show: “(1) [she] is a member of a protected class; (2) [her
employer] provided training to its employees; (3) [she] was
eligible for the training; and (4) [she] was not provided
training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d
645, 649-50 (4th Cir. 2002).
After reviewing the record, we find it clear that
Purchase failed to present evidence of any denial of training
giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Though Purchase
contends that her employers “failed to provide [her] with the
same training materials provided to similarly situated white
employees,” a claimant’s conclusory allegations are insufficient
to establish a genuine issue of material fact. See Thompson,
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312 F.3d at 649 (noting that “[c]onclusory or speculative
allegations do not suffice” to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact). Moreover, Purchase’s allegations are belied by
the sworn statements of her supervisors, who maintain that she
was trained in the same manner as her fellow trainees, received
proper training, and that all trainees received the same
training materials. Purchase’s supervisors monitored her
training and verified its sufficiency. Statements made by
Purchase herself confirm that she both received, and
successfully completed, extensive training. Accordingly, as no
reasonable factfinder could conclude that Purchase was denied
training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination, we find that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on this claim.
Finally, as Purchase failed to provide direct evidence
of discriminatory discipline, she must demonstrate that (1) she
engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of one outside her
protected class; and (2) she was disciplined more severely than
the other individual. See Lightner v. City of Wilmington, North
Carolina, 545 F.3d 260, 264-65 (4th Cir. 2008). Again, our
review of the record indicates that Purchase fails to establish
a prima facie case. Purchase argues in her complaint that her
supervisors “criticized [her] job performance but did not
criticize the same conduct of similarly situated employees;”
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Purchase told her EEO counselor that she “believe[d] that one
white male trainee became a favorite with her supervisor and
many errors were overlooked.” However, the record is bereft of
a single example of such disparate disciplinary treatment.
Moreover, Purchase’s supervisors are unanimous in
their opinion that the white employee in question performed his
duties satisfactorily. Further, that employee submitted a sworn
statement indicating that his mentor and his supervisors all
reviewed his work performance, and that he did not have any
performance problems. Though Purchase contends that resolution
of this issue required the district court to make a decision
resolving factual issues, Purchase’s unsupported allegations,
without more, are insufficient to raise an issue of material
fact and survive summary judgment. See Thompson, 312 F.3d at
649. Because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that
Purchase was disciplined more harshly than similarly situated
employees outside her protected class, the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment on this issue.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order
granting the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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