Filed: Jul. 09, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1552 HILDA L. SOLIS, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM PINDER, JR., Defendant - Appellant, and SEA ISLAND COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, 403(b) Plan, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:03-cv-00653-DCN) Submitted: June 26, 2009 Decided: July 9, 2009 Before T
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1552 HILDA L. SOLIS, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM PINDER, JR., Defendant - Appellant, and SEA ISLAND COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, 403(b) Plan, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (2:03-cv-00653-DCN) Submitted: June 26, 2009 Decided: July 9, 2009 Before TR..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1552
HILDA L. SOLIS, Secretary of Labor, United States
Department of Labor,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM PINDER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
SEA ISLAND COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH CARE CORPORATION, 403(b)
Plan,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge.
(2:03-cv-00653-DCN)
Submitted: June 26, 2009 Decided: July 9, 2009
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles Edward Houston, Jr., THE HOUSTON LAW FIRM, LLC, Hilton
Head Island, South Carolina, for Appellant. Carol A. De Deo,
Deputy Solicitor, Timothy D. Hauser, Associate Solicitor,
Nathaniel I. Spiller, Glenn M. Loos, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
William Pinder, Jr., appeals from the district court’s
order, following a bench trial, that he pay damages in the
amount of $21,692.21 to the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) for
violating the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”). The court also ordered Pinder to pay costs pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). The district court found Pinder
liable for damages that he inflicted when he failed to properly
remit Sea Island Comprehensive Health Care Corporation (“Sea
Island”) employee withholdings to an ERISA-protected pension
plan (“Plan”). Rather, the undisputed evidence reveals that
Pinder, as President and Chief Financial Officer, diverted those
employee pension withholdings to the general operating accounts
of Sea Island.
On appeal, Pinder raises five issues: (1) whether the
district court erred by disallowing him to cross-examine the
Secretary’s witness regarding whether the action was barred by
the statute of limitations; (2) whether the court erred in its
finding that he was a fiduciary under ERISA; (3) whether the
court erred by concluding that this court’s opinion in Chao v.
Malkani,
452 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2006), was controlling;
(4) whether the district court erred in finding that the alleged
losses to the Plan had not been returned to Plan participants;
and (5) whether Pinder was protected by immunity from the
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instant judgment by the bankruptcy court’s reorganization order
granting immunity to directors, officers, and employees of Sea
Island. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The first issue fails as the record reveals that
Pinder was allowed, and did, cross-examine Department of Labor
Investigator Isabel Colon regarding when the Department first
became aware of Pinder’s possible ERISA violations. Pinder’s
remaining four issues fail for the reasons stated in the
district court’s post-trial order granting judgment for the
Secretary. Thus, we find that these issues fail on appeal and
affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Chao
v. Pinder, No. 2:03-cv-00653-DCN (D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2008). We
dispense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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