Filed: Oct. 22, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1882 DEAN M. INMAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED; KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST PARTICIPATIONS, Defendants – Appellees, and KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST GROUP, Defendant. - AARP, Amicus Supporting Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, District Judge. (3:06-cv-00011-nkm-bwe) Argued: September 24, 2009 Decided: O
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-1882 DEAN M. INMAN, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED; KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST PARTICIPATIONS, Defendants – Appellees, and KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST GROUP, Defendant. - AARP, Amicus Supporting Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, District Judge. (3:06-cv-00011-nkm-bwe) Argued: September 24, 2009 Decided: Oc..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-1882
DEAN M. INMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST OF AMERICA, INCORPORATED; KLOCKNER
PENTAPLAST PARTICIPATIONS,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
KLOCKNER PENTAPLAST GROUP,
Defendant.
----------------------------------------
AARP,
Amicus Supporting Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon,
District Judge. (3:06-cv-00011-nkm-bwe)
Argued: September 24, 2009 Decided: October 22, 2009
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and
Mark S. DAVIS, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Adam Augustine Carter, EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, PC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Melvin Earl Gibson, Jr.,
TREMBLAY & SMITH, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees. ON
BRIEF: R. Scott Oswald, EMPLOYMENT LAW GROUP, PC, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Thomas E. Albro, Patricia D. McGraw,
TREMBLAY & SMITH, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees.
Laurie A. McCann, Daniel B. Kohrman, AARP FOUNDATION LITIGATION,
Melvin Radowitz, AARP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Supporting
Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Dean Inman appeals the grant of summary judgment against
him on his claim of discrimination under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (West 2008), and
his request for declaratory judgment, both of which arise from
his assertion that he was improperly terminated. We reverse the
grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Klöckner Pentaplast of America, Inc. (“KPA”) is one of the
world's leading producers of films for pharmaceuticals, medical
devices, food, electronics, and general purpose thermoform
packaging, as well as printing and specialty applications. In
2001, Cinven Company and J.P Morgan bought KPA for more than
$800 million, planning to cuts costs, increase profits, and re-
sell the company in four or five years. In 2007, they sold KPA
to a private equity firm for approximately $1.8 billion.
When he was fired by KPA in December 2005, Inman was 58
years old and was serving as Vice President of Technology.
Inman had worked for KPA for 17 years, starting in 1988 as a
manager in training before eventually becoming head of KPA’s
technical department. Inman was also a member of KPA’s
“Steering Team,” an executive committee comprised of KPA senior
leadership that managed the company.
3
In 2003, Michael Tubridy became President of KPA’s North
and South American Operations after having served unofficially
in that capacity for a few months. Although Tubridy always
appreciated Inman’s technical skills, he did not think much of
his leadership style. In conducting a performance review of
Inman in December 2003, Tubridy expressed concern with Inman’s
group and team leadership abilities. He described Inman’s
allocation of staff responsibilities as “dysfunctional” and
stated that there was room for improvement in the areas of
personnel development and succession planning. J.A. 674.
Tubridy explained that he wanted Inman to create a commercial
development plan for his department, a plan which would set
goals and metrics that would allow the department’s actual
performance to be measured against the goals.
Inman resisted these requests, however, believing they were
not necessary in light of certain historical information kept on
the technical department’s computer system. In early 2004,
after Mike Yeatts, director of KPA’s human resources department,
emailed Inman a draft of the plan Tubridy sought, Inman informed
Yeatts that he rejected the plan “in its entirety.” J.A. 613.
Inman explained in his deposition that the proposal was “very
minimal in value, very sophomoric in its content, nothing of
value” and that Inman “did not understand why someone without
the training, apparent training in such issues would be
4
attempting to provide the information.” J.A. 679. Tubridy
raised this request again during Inman’s 2004 performance
review, this time even sketching out the form that he wanted the
plan to take. Inman still never developed the plan, however,
and by August 2005, Tubridy had concluded that Inman never
would.
Although Tubridy was frustrated with Inman’s refusal to
develop a plan to set measurable goals for his department, it
was a culmination of events over the course of several months in
2005 that Tubridy claims led to his decision to terminate Inman.
First, Inman balked at signing a non-compete agreement and
attempted to renegotiate some of its terms. Tubridy apparently
found that response unprofessional, particularly since Inman was
at the same time requiring each of the employees in his
department to sign the agreement. Then Inman objected to
attending a mandatory training session on how to conduct
employment interviews, sending sarcastic emails about the
subject to the human resources department.
In September 2005, Tubridy decided that because of the
company’s financial condition (which had worsened after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita disrupted their supplies and greatly
increased their costs), KPA needed to implement a wage freeze.
Tubridy presented that idea to the Steering Team on the
afternoon of September 14, 2005, before a scheduled dinner
5
meeting for KPA supervisors. The Steering Team members present
unanimously agreed to the freeze, but Inman was not present
then--he was on his way to the dinner meeting from a KPA site in
West Virginia. Tubridy says he pulled Inman aside during pre-
dinner cocktails and told him about the salary freeze, and he
formally announced the freeze during dinner later that night.
The next day, another member of the Steering Team told Tubridy
that he had heard that Inman was complaining about the salary
freeze. Tubridy claims that he brought Inman in for a meeting,
to give Inman a chance to talk about the salary freeze again,
since the idea had been sprung on him the night before with
little notice. Tubridy testified that Inman told him that he
understood why the freeze was necessary and that he supported
the company’s decision. Tubridy testified that he then told
Inman that he had heard that Inman had complained about the
decision and that Inman’s immediate response was, “I guess I
need to be careful what I share with Charlie Abbey.” J.A. 742.
Tubridy claims he understood that to be a confession of sorts
and therefore that Inman had just lied to him when he had said
he understood and supported the freeze.
Inman’s version of events is different. He maintains that
Tubridy did not tell him about the freeze ahead of time, and
that he learned about it when everyone else did, when Tubridy
announced it at the dinner. Inman says that the day after the
6
announcement, he was in Charlie Abbey’s office and listened to
Abbey complain about the freeze, but Inman did not himself
express disappointment concerning the freeze. As to the meeting
with Tubridy, Inman claims that Tubridy said he had heard that
Inman had some concerns about the freeze, and Inman told him
that he did have questions. Inman said he mentioned Abbey only
because Abbey was “known as a gossip within the company, he’s
known to . . . tell whoppers, to sensationalize stories.” J.A.
883. Inman insists that he never complained about the salary
freeze to anyone in the company.
According to Tubridy, the salary-freeze issue was the last
straw for him. He believed that as a member of the Steering
Team, Inman should support the decisions made by the team, and
he also believed that Inman had lied to him about supporting the
freeze. Tubridy claims he lost confidence in Inman at that
point, and essentially decided then that Inman had to be fired.
A couple of other events occurred after the salary-freeze
meeting that Tubridy contends reinforced his belief that Inman
needed to be replaced. Sometime before the fall of 2005, the
Steering Team decided to reduce costs by changing health
insurance providers. The new policy went into effect in October
2005, and as it turned out, led to an increase in the co-payment
for a medicine Inman was taking. This angered Inman greatly,
and he sent an email to a staffer in the human resources
7
department stating that he would hold KPA “responsible for any
and all harm that is done to my health and/or any increase in my
out of pocket expenses as a result of our new insurance company
playing the role of dictating which medications I should and
should not use.” J.A. 618. Additionally, in response to
inquiries from the human resources department about
participation in a retirement program, Inman sent emails to
another human resources staffer complaining that he could not
afford to participate in light of the wage freeze and
denigrating the company’s decision to implement the freeze.
Mike Yeatts, KPA’s human resources director, told Tubridy about
these emails, and Tubridy told Yeatts to inform Inman that such
behavior would not be tolerated.
On December 15, 2005, Tubridy called Inman into his office
and fired him. Inman claims that in that meeting, Tubridy said
that Inman “did not fit the ‘profile’ or ‘model’ of what is
needed in a technical leader in terms of KPA’s presentation to
potential buyers of the company.” J.A. 824. Inman claims that
Tubridy said that KPA needed a “more energetic person” as leader
of the technical department, “for the appearance of a
revitalized company.” J.A. 824. Tubridy told Inman “that he
wanted KPA work to be more oriented around financial results and
budgets tied to compensation, rather than the ‘same old things’
that [Inman] had provided.” J.A. 824. Inman was replaced by
8
45-year-old David Veasey, who had been Vice-President of
Operations. When Veasey took over, KPA changed the position
somewhat, eliminating some of what had been Inman’s
responsibilities.
In 2003, Inman had been one of a small group of executives
permitted to buy KPA stock, and the expectation was that the
stock would become very valuable once the company was sold.
Inman paid $32,700 when he bought the stock in 2003. After he
was fired, KPA tendered a check for $41,000 to buy back the
stock, in accordance with the terms of the program under which
Inman bought the stock. Inman has never cashed the check,
claiming that he was wrongfully terminated and that he is
entitled to keep the stock, which, since the KPA sale, is worth
substantially more than the $41,000 that KPA tendered.
Inman eventually filed this action against KPA, 1 asserting
various claims under state and federal law, including a claim of
age discrimination. Inman also sought a declaration that he was
entitled to keep the stock. The district court granted KPA’s
motion to dismiss several of the claims. The court later
granted summary judgment against Inman’s age-discrimination
1
Inman also named as a defendant Klöckner Pentaplast
Participations, a Luxembourgian entity formed to allow certain
of KPA’s managers and officers to acquire an ownership interest
in KPA’s parent company, Klöckner Pentaplast Group.
9
claim. Finding no other basis for Inman’s wrongful termination
claim, the district court also granted summary judgment in KPA’s
favor on Inman’s request for a declaratory judgment that he was
entitled to retain the stock.
II.
On appeal, Inman contends that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment against him in light of the evidence
he presented. We agree. 2
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Inman.
See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277,
283 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). To make a prima facie showing of
age discrimination under the pretext framework, a plaintiff-
employee must show that (1) he is a member of a protected class;
(2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was at the
relevant time performing his duties at a level that met his
employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) his position
remained open or was filled by someone substantially younger.
2
Inman also raises a procedural claim, arguing that the
district court improperly looked to KPA’s evidence on an issue
that the magistrate judge had refused to let Inman pursue during
discovery, and that this error warrants reversal. Because of
our disposition of Inman’s substantive argument, we do not
address this procedural claim.
10
See id. at 285. If the plaintiff makes that showing, it is
incumbent on the employer to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See
id. To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must present
evidence showing that the employer’s stated reasons were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. See
id.
There is no question that Inman is a member of a protected
class, that he suffered an adverse employment action, and that
he was replaced by someone substantially younger. The critical
questions before us are whether Inman’s evidence showed that he
was meeting KPA’s legitimate expectations and whether Inman has
established that KPA’s proffered reasons for his termination
were pretextual.
KPA argues that Inman’s claim fails at the legitimate-
expectation step. KPA argues that because Inman refused to
develop the performance metrics Tubridy wanted for the technical
department, refused to support the salary freeze (and lied to
Tubridy about it), and belittled and harassed the human
resources staff, there was no genuine issue of material fact
regarding whether Inman was meeting KPA’s legitimate
expectations. We are not persuaded.
First, some evidence tends to show that Inman was
adequately performing--he received bonuses every year, and he
was singled out for praise by Tubridy at a company gathering
11
just a couple of weeks before he was fired. Moreover, if Inman
has evidence from which a jury could conclude that the real
reason he was fired was his age, the jury could also conclude
that the deficiencies that KPA claimed existed in Inman’s work
were exaggerated to cover up the age-based motivation for the
termination and that any such deficiencies were not sufficient
to prevent his performance from being adequate.
We conclude that Inman has in fact presented sufficient
evidence that KPA’s proffered reasons for terminating Inman were
mere pretext. First, the summary judgment record contains
evidence that if accepted by the jury would contradict KPA’s
position about the salary-freeze issue--the issue that KPA
maintains was the main reason that Inman was fired. According
to Inman, Tubridy did not tell him about the salary freeze
before it was announced, and when Tubridy asked him the next day
if he had concerns about the salary freeze, Inman said that he
did. This is directly contrary to Tubridy’s claim that Inman
told him he supported the wage freeze, and would completely
undercut the claim that Tubridy wanted to fire Inman because he
lied about supporting the wage freeze.
Other evidence supports the conclusion that Inman’s age was
the actual reason for his termination. First, there are the
statements that Inman says Tubridy made when he fired him--that
Inman did not fit the “model” or “profile” of the “energetic”
12
person needed to project KPA as the “revitalized” company that
KPA wanted to present to potential buyers. J.A. 824. There
was also evidence concerning KPA’s dealings with Proudfoot
Consulting. In October 2005, just a few months before Inman was
fired, KPA hired Proudfoot to review its operations and help
devise a plan to increase its efficiency and reduce its
operating expenses. Tubridy and Veasey (who ultimately replaced
Inman, but then was Vice President of Operations) met with
Andreas Paetz of Proudfoot on October 27, 2005, to talk about
the project. Paetz wanted four KPA employees to be assigned to
a task force that would conduct this review and said that they
should be “young,” “energetic,” “future people.” J.A. 970.
Tubridy made notes on a napkin during the Proudfoot meeting.
Tubridy’s napkin-notes included the phrase “young, energ[etic].”
J.A. 976. Veasey had a follow-up meeting with Paetz the next
day, and Veasey’s handwritten notes from that meeting stated
“KPA team – young – energetic, future people.” J.A. 970.
KPA insists that these notations are meaningless because
Tubridy and Veasey were merely writing down what Paetz said, and
Paetz was not a decisionmaker with regard to Inman’s employment.
See, e.g., Brinkley v. Harbour Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598,
608 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]o prove discriminatory animus, the
derogatory remark cannot be stray or isolated, and unless the
remarks upon which plaintiff relies were related to the
13
employment decision in question, they cannot be evidence of
discrimination.” (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). KPA also notes that Paetz, who is
German, explained in his deposition that when he said “young,”
he meant employees who were “young” with the company—who had not
worked for KPA long enough to develop political alliances, etc.
We conclude, however, that these arguments miss the mark.
First of all, even though Paetz was not a decisionmaker,
Tubridy was, and he found Paetz’s reference to “young” employees
sufficiently significant to write it down. Moreover, Paetz’s
explanation of what he meant by “young” is not as clear as KPA
claims. While Paetz did say that “young” referred to length of
employment, at another point in his testimony, he also seemed to
say that it meant chronological age. In any event, given the
usual understanding of the word “young,” it is for a jury to
decide what Paetz meant, and, more importantly, what Tubridy
understood the reference to mean when he wrote it down and
whether Tubridy adopted the goal of having “young, energetic”
workers as his own. 3
3
KPA emphasizes that the selection of the task force is not
the adverse employment action of which Inman complains. While
that is true, the evidence in question still tends to show that
Tubridy was thinking about the need for youth in the company in
the weeks before the alleged age discrimination occurred.
14
III.
In sum, we hold that the district court erred by granting
summary judgment against Inman on his age discrimination claim
and therefore also on his request for declaratory relief.
Accordingly, we vacate the judgment against Inman and remand to
the district court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
15
