Filed: Dec. 08, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2062 WILLIAM C. HARDIN, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. BELMONT TEXTILE MACHINERY COMPANY; WALTER RHYNE, individually and in his official capacity as a corporate officer; JEFFREY RHYNE, individually and in his official capacity as corporate President, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:05-cv
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2062 WILLIAM C. HARDIN, JR., Plaintiff - Appellant, v. BELMONT TEXTILE MACHINERY COMPANY; WALTER RHYNE, individually and in his official capacity as a corporate officer; JEFFREY RHYNE, individually and in his official capacity as corporate President, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Senior District Judge. (3:05-cv-..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2062
WILLIAM C. HARDIN, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BELMONT TEXTILE MACHINERY COMPANY; WALTER RHYNE,
individually and in his official capacity as a corporate
officer; JEFFREY RHYNE, individually and in his official
capacity as corporate President,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:05-cv-00492-GCM)
Argued: September 23, 2009 Decided: December 8, 2009
Before KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and James P. JONES, Chief
United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part by
unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: William Everett Moore, Jr., GRAY, LAYTON, KERSH,
SOLOMON, SIGMON, FURR & SMITH, PA, Gastonia, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George Bryan Adams, III, VAN HOY, REUTLINGER, ADAMS
& DUNN, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:
Philip M. Van Hoy, VAN HOY, REUTLINGER, ADAMS & DUNN, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
William C. Hardin, Jr., appeals the district court’s orders
disposing of his claims against his former employer, Belmont
Textile Machinery Company (“Belmont”) and its owners and
officers, Jeffrey and Walter Rhyne. Hardin contends that the
district court erred by dismissing or granting summary judgment
as to his claims for (1) wrongful retaliatory discharge under
North Carolina law; (2) common law fraud; (3) wrongful discharge
due to age and disability discrimination; and (4) violation of
North Carolina’s Wage and Hour Act. Hardin also argues that the
district court erred by not remanding the case to state court
for resolution of his state law claims after the court had
disposed of his federal claims.
We remand the case to the district court for further
consideration of Hardin’s claim that Belmont violated North
Carolina’s Wage and Hour Act by failing to repay his voluntary
salary reductions. We affirm the district court’s decision as
to Hardin’s other claims.
I.
Belmont manufactures machines and parts used to twist and
treat yarn. In 1997 Belmont hired Hardin as an engineering
manager and Hardin rose in the company’s ranks, reaching the
3
position of controller and vice president before he was
terminated in 2005.
Starting in late 2001, the company struggled financially.
Because of these difficulties, Belmont’s president, Jeffrey
Rhyne, met with the company’s salaried employees and asked them
to take a voluntary pay cut beginning in November of 2001. The
employees were free to determine whether they wanted to reduce
their salary, and if so, how much. Rhyne told employees that
Belmont would repay them if and when the company returned to
profitability. Hardin voluntarily participated in the requested
salary reduction.
In 2002, Hardin received a pay raise retroactive to
November 2001. Because the company was still experiencing
financial difficulties, Rhyne asked Hardin to take an additional
salary reduction by not receiving the money due from the
retroactive raise. Hardin agreed. In 2003, Belmont had further
financial difficulties and turned, once again, to its salaried
employees including Hardin for help. The company again promised
that the reductions would be repaid if and when the company
returned to profitability.
While Belmont’s financial future became stable in 2005, its
relationship with Hardin turned rocky. In July 2005, the firm
fired Hardin, then sixty years old, after it discovered that
Hardin was, among other things, moonlighting for another firm on
4
company time. Neither Hardin nor any other employees, including
the Rhynes, have been repaid the voluntary salary reductions.
Belmont contends that the conditions of repayment have not yet
been met because the company has not reached “a sufficient level
of profitability.” (Appellees’ Br. 38.)
In response to his discharge, Hardin sued Belmont and the
Rhynes in state court, and the case was timely removed to the
district court below. The defendants then filed a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The
district court dismissed several of Hardin’s claims, including
the claim that his discharge violated a North Carolina statute
that prohibits retaliatory action against a state employee for
reporting, or refusing to carry out, unlawful activity.
After completing discovery, the defendants moved for
summary judgment on the remaining claims. The district court
granted the motion. In its decision, the court concluded that:
(1) Hardin could not claim protection based on North Carolina’s
whistleblower statute; (2) Hardin had failed to prove the
elements of a fraud claim; (3) Hardin had insufficient proof of
age discrimination; and (4) the statute of limitations barred
5
Hardin’s claim for unpaid wages under the North Carolina Wage
and Hour Act. 1
II.
Our review of a district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim is conducted under a de novo standard of review.
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1998).
In considering a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual
allegations must be accepted as true and the facts must be
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Id.
Our review of a summary judgment order also occurs under a
de novo standard. Cont’l Airlines, Inc. V. United Airlines,
Inc.,
277 F.3d 499, 508 (4th Cir. 2002). In such a review, we
must determine whether there is a genuine dispute about any
material facts.
Id. A grant of summary judgment is improper if
such a dispute exists.
Id.
A.
Hardin argues that he has a claim for wrongful discharge
based on North Carolina’s public employee whistleblower statute.
We disagree.
1
The district court also resolved other claims against
Hardin, which he has not appealed.
6
The North Carolina whistleblower statute prohibits the
retaliatory discharge of a state employee who reports, or
refuses to carry out, unlawful activity. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-
85 (2007). While Belmont is not a state entity and therefore
section 126-85 does not by its terms apply to Hardin’s
employment, he argues that the “public policy” created by the
statute may serve as the basis for a common law wrongful
discharge claim under state law, applicable to private
employment.
We agree with the district court that the limited public
policy exceptions recognized by North Carolina law to the at-
will employment doctrine do not include the state whistleblower
statute, since there is no indication that its protections were
intended to apply to the public generally. See Buser v. S. Food
Serv., Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 556, 566 (M.D.N.C. 1999).
B.
The district court also correctly determined that Hardin
was unable to prove under North Carolina law that Belmont
committed fraud.
To prove common law fraud, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that: (1) the defendant made a false representation of a
material fact; (2) the defendant knew that the statement was
false at the time of utterance; (3) the defendant made the false
statement with the intention that the plaintiff would act upon
7
it; (4) the plaintiff acted upon the false statement; and (5)
the plaintiff suffered injury. See Myers & Chapman v. Thomas G.
Evans, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 385, 391 (N.C. 1988).
There is no evidence that Jeffrey Rhyne misrepresented any
material facts when he asked employees to voluntarily forgo
salaries because the firm was broke. Hardin, Rhyne, and other
company officials testified that the company faced a bleak
financial outlook in 2001 and 2002, when the reductions
occurred. Hardin agreed that when Rhyne made the request,
Hardin knew the salary contributions were necessary to avoid
additional layoffs and to prevent the firm from closing. The
company’s financial statements corroborated this testimony.
Rhyne’s repayment promise cannot constitute a false
representation of a material fact because there is no evidence
that Rhyne intended to break the promise when he asked employees
for help. Hardin conceded in his deposition testimony that when
Rhyne asked for the salary reduction Rhyne intended to repay the
money when the firm became profitable. Hardin also testified
that he understood his contribution was “a risky loan” and that
it was possible the company would never be able to repay him.
(J.A. 177.)
8
Based on these undisputed facts, we conclude the district
court did not err by concluding that Hardin failed to establish
a prima facie case of fraud. 2
C.
We also uphold the district court’s grant of summary
judgment against Hardin on his claim of wrongful discharge on
account of his age and disability.
In North Carolina, employees discriminated against may
pursue a wrongful discharge cause of action against an employer
based on the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act
(“EEPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-422.2 (2007). Wrongful discharge
claims asserted under the EEPA are analyzed under the same
burden-shifting scheme as federal discrimination statutes. N.C.
Dep’t of Corr. v. Gibson, 301 S.E.2d 78, 82–84 (N.C. 1983).
If a plaintiff has no direct evidence of discrimination, he
may establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). To do so,
a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that he is a member of a
protected class; (2) that he suffered from an adverse employment
action; (3) that at the time the employer took the adverse
employment action he was performing at a level that met his
2
The district court alternatively concluded that the
statute of limitations barred Hardin’s fraud claim. Because of
our holding, it is unnecessary to address this issue.
9
employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) that the position
was filled by a similarly qualified applicant outside the
protected class.” King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir.
2003). Whether an employee is performing at a level that meets
legitimate expectations is based on the employer’s perception.
Id.
We agree with the district court that Hardin’s claim of
wrongful discharge fails because he has no direct proof of
discrimination and his allegations do not create a prima facie
case.
Hardin agreed that no “age-related comments” were made
about him during his employment (J.A. 274) and because any such
direct proof of discrimination is lacking, Hardin must create a
prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas standard. King,
328 F.3d at 149. Hardin’s proof must show, among other things,
that at the time of termination, Belmont officials believed
Hardin met the company’s legitimate work expectations and that
Belmont replaced Hardin with someone outside of the protected
classification. Hardin failed to establish either element.
The record contains ample evidence showing that Belmont
officials thought Hardin’s performance was sub par. For
example, Hardin was terminated because he worked for another
firm while on the clock for Belmont. Hardin’s subordinates had
lodged complaints about his abrasive demeanor and poor attitude.
10
And, while working for Belmont as a corporate officer, Hardin
usurped a business opportunity for Belmont by secretly working
for a third party with which Belmont hoped to contract.
From this evidence Belmont’s opinion as to Hardin’s
performance is clear -- Hardin did not meet the company’s
reasonable expectations.
Moreover, the record is devoid of evidence showing that
Belmont replaced Hardin with a worker outside the protected
class. In fact, officials testified that the company absorbed
his position and used a part-time contractor to perform some of
the work.
Hardin also asserted a claim directly under the federal Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West
2008). For the same reasons outlined above, we agree that
summary judgment was also appropriate as to this claim.
D.
Hardin contends that under North Carolina’s Wage and Hour
Act (the “Act”), Belmont owes Hardin the wages he contributed in
the voluntary salary reductions. Specifically, the Act requires
an employer to pay all wages when due, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6
(2007), and, once an employee leaves the company for any reason,
no later than the next regular payday, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.7
(2007).
11
The district court concluded that the Act’s two-year
statute of limitations, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.22(f)(2007),
barred this claim. On appeal, Hardin argues two points. First,
Hardin contends that his claim under section 95-25.7 could have
accrued only after his termination. Hardin also asserts that
the district court erred by basing its conclusion upon his one
deposition answer as to when Belmont regained profitability. We
agree with Hardin that his claim is not barred by the statute of
limitations.
The district court held that the statute of limitations had
run because it found that Hardin believed that Belmont had
returned to profitability and thus owed him the return of his
voluntary salary reductions long before he was terminated. The
district court relied on language in Hamilton v. Memorex Telex
Corp., 454 S.E.2d 278, 282 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995), a case also
involving a claim for unpaid wages under the Act, in determining
that Hardin’s claim was time barred. In Hamilton, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s conclusion that
a plaintiff’s claim for paid vacation time was not barred by the
statute of limitations because his claim under the Act did not
accrue until he left employment.
Id. While the court in
Hamilton noted that “[t]he statute begins to run on the date the
promise is broken” –- language cited by the district court –- it
also pointed out that “[i]n no event can the limitations period
12
begin to run until the injured party is at liberty to sue.” Id.
(quoting Glover v. First Union Nat’l Bank of N.C.,
428 S.E.2d
206, 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993)).
At least one of Hardin’s contentions is premised on the
Act’s obligation to pay all wages due once employment ends. He
had no cause of action under section 95-25.7 until Belmont
refused to pay him the voluntary salary reductions after he was
fired. Since Hardin was terminated in June of 2005 and this
suit was filed in October of that year, the action was properly
instituted within the two-year limitations period.
Hardin also argues that even under the district court’s
view of when his cause of action accrued, it erred in relying
upon a single answer from his deposition as the basis for the
conclusion that the statute of limitations barred his wage
claim.
During his December 2006 deposition, Hardin testified that
Rhyne had pledged to return the voluntary salary reductions once
the firm became profitable. While looking at a financial
spreadsheet dated June 1, 2005, Hardin stated that the company
had become profitable three and a half years earlier. At
another point in the deposition, however, Hardin indicated that
the company had reached minimal profitability in March 2004,
which corresponded with Rhyne’s deposition testimony.
13
Using the district court’s interpretation of Hardin’s
answer the cause of action would have accrued about December
2001, or, three and a half years prior to June 2005. Hardin
claims his deposition answer meant the company regained
profitability three and a half years before the December 2006
deposition, in June 2003, the first quarter of the 2004 fiscal
year.
Hardin’s explanation about his deposition answer is not
entirely satisfactory. But the record is otherwise clear.
Several company officials testified that the 2004 fiscal year,
which ended on March 31, 2004, was the first time since 2000
that the company had earned a profit. Hardin filed suit on
October 25, 2005, within two years after this milestone.
For these reasons, we find that the district court erred in
determining that the statute of limitations barred Hardin’s
claim under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act. 3
3
Belmont argues that the Act does not apply to Hardin’s
claim because the voluntary salary reductions do not qualify as
wages under the statutory definition. However, the statute
broadly defines wages to include “other amounts promised when
the employer has a policy or a practice of making such
payments,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.2(16) (2007), which would
include Hardin’s claim.
Of course, Belmont contends that the voluntary salary
reductions are not yet due because the company has not obtained
“sufficient” profitability to pay them. The correct construction
of Belmont’s promise and whether it has been broken are issues
for determination after remand.
14
E.
Hardin’s last assignment of error is that the district
court should have remanded the state claims to state court
instead of dismissing them after the court had dismissed his
federal claims.
Federal courts may have supplemental jurisdiction over a
state cause of action if both the state and federal claims arise
from the same transaction or occurrence. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367
(West 2006); UMWA v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The
supplemental jurisdiction doctrine “indicates that federal
courts generally have discretion to retain or dismiss state law
claims when the federal basis for an action drops away.”
Shanaghan v. Cahill,
58 F.3d 106, 109 (4th Cir. 1996). Once a
trial court extinguishes all federal claims, it has broad
discretion in deciding whether to retain jurisdiction.
Id. at
110.
The federal issues before the district court were closely
connected to Hardin’s state claims. And, the district court
also had a long and close familiarity with the facts. Given
these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it ruled on all of the issues raised by
Belmont’s summary judgment motion.
15
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s
determination as to Hardin’s unpaid wage claim is reversed and
that claim is remanded for further proceedings. The district
court’s judgment as to the remaining claims is affirmed.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART
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