Filed: Jul. 07, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2169 SELOME MEGERSA NEGAWO, Petitioner, v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Submitted: June 9, 2009 Decided: July 7, 2009 Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Fitsum Alemu, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2169 SELOME MEGERSA NEGAWO, Petitioner, v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. Submitted: June 9, 2009 Decided: July 7, 2009 Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Fitsum Alemu, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C. P..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2169
SELOME MEGERSA NEGAWO,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: June 9, 2009 Decided: July 7, 2009
Before MICHAEL, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Fitsum Alemu, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Michael F.
Hertz, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Anthony C. Payne,
Senior Litigation Counsel, Ali Manuchehry, Office of Immigration
Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Selome Megersa Negawo, a native and citizen of
Ethiopia, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming without opinion the
immigration judge’s order denying her applications for asylum,
withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention
Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review.
The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer
asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2006). It defines a
refugee as a person unwilling or unable to return to her native
country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). “Persecution involves the
infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s
person or freedom, on account of one of the enumerated grounds.
. . .” Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2008), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
(2008). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
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establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004). The well-founded fear standard contains both a
subjective and an objective component. The objective element
requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a
reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales,
445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2006). “The subjective component can be met through the
presentation of candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . [It] must
have some basis in the reality of the circumstances and be
validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it cannot be
mere irrational apprehension.”
Li, 405 F.3d at 176 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,
an alien must show a clear probability that, if she were removed
to her native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened”
on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see
Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear
probability” means that it is more likely than not the alien
would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic,
467 U.S. 407,
429-30 (1984).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
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evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of
fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the
contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are
reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.”
Lin v. Mukasey,
517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This
court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . .
presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could
fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS,
296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
For asylum applications filed after the passage of the
REAL ID Act of 2005, a trier of fact, “considering the totality
of the circumstances and all relevant factors,” may base a
credibility determination on any inconsistency, inaccuracy, or
falsehood “without regard to whether [it] goes to the heart of
the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).
“[I]n evaluating an asylum applicant’s credibility, an IJ may
rely on omissions and inconsistencies that do not directly
relate to the applicant’s claim of persecution as long as the
totality of the circumstances establish that the applicant is
not credible.” Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 164 (2d Cir.
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2008); see also Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 787-88 (7th
Cir. 2008) (noting that the new statute abrogates decisions that
focus on whether the inconsistency or omission goes to the heart
of the applicant’s claim for relief). The immigration judge’s
order is the final decision for this court’s review as a result
of the Board’s affirmance without opinion. Khattak v. Ashcroft,
332 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2003).
We find substantial evidence supports the adverse
credibility finding. An immigration judge’s assessment of an
applicant’s demeanor merits “great deference.” See Tu Lin v.
Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 400 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Singh-
Kaur v. INS,
183 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 1999). Under 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006), “a trier of fact may base a
credibility determination on the demeanor, candor, or
responsiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent
plausibility of the applicant’s or witness's account . . .” We
also find the record does not compel a different result with
respect to the denial of relief under the CAT.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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