Filed: Jul. 06, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4318 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOEL EUGENE HENRY, a/k/a Sleepy, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00022-RLV-CH-1) Submitted: June 9, 2009 Decided: July 6, 2009 Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Rober
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4318 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JOEL EUGENE HENRY, a/k/a Sleepy, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00022-RLV-CH-1) Submitted: June 9, 2009 Decided: July 6, 2009 Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Robert..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4318
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOEL EUGENE HENRY, a/k/a Sleepy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L.
Voorhees, District Judge. (5:06-cr-00022-RLV-CH-1)
Submitted: June 9, 2009 Decided: July 6, 2009
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas Richard Ascik, Amy Elizabeth
Ray, Assistant United States Attorneys, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joel Eugene Henry pled guilty pursuant to a written
plea agreement to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base and five
kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(2006), and was sentenced to 210 months in prison. Henry timely
appealed.
Counsel for Henry filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Henry has filed
a supplemental pro se letter that also asserted his trial
counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
Henry’s counsel argues that trial counsel was
ineffective for withdrawing his objections to two enhancements
in the presentence report when the objections could have
resulted in a four-level decrease in offense level. At
sentencing, counsel explained that he withdrew the objections
because the seven-level departure that the Government was
recommending for Henry’s substantial assistance resulted in a
much a larger sentence decrease.
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
generally not cognizable on direct appeal. United States v.
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King,
119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). Instead, ineffective
assistance claims are appropriately brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2008) to allow for adequate
development of the factual record.
Id. A defendant may raise
an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal only if the
record conclusively demonstrates that defense counsel did not
provide effective representation. United States v. Baldovinos,
434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). To prove ineffective
assistance a defendant must show both: (1) “that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and (2) “that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v.
Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Here, the sentencing record does not conclusively
demonstrate that counsel was ineffective. Counsel’s decision to
withdraw the objections to the enhancements was tactical, and
thus is entitled to a strong presumption of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Nor does Henry demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the court would have lowered his
sentencing guidelines range any further if counsel had not
withdrawn the objections. Because the record does not
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conclusively demonstrate ineffective assistance, this claim is
not cognizable on direct appeal. *
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Henry, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Henry requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Henry.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
*
Under like reasoning, Henry’s pro se contention that his
trial counsel afforded ineffective representation must be raised
in an appropriate post-conviction proceeding rather than on
direct appeal. We find no merit to the remaining issues Henry
raises in his pro se submission.
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