Filed: Oct. 15, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4605 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RONALD EARL RICE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00145-RJC-1) Submitted: October 7, 2009 Decided: October 15, 2009 Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Claire J. Raus
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4605 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RONALD EARL RICE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00145-RJC-1) Submitted: October 7, 2009 Decided: October 15, 2009 Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Claire J. Rausc..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4605
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD EARL RICE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J.
Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:07-cr-00145-RJC-1)
Submitted: October 7, 2009 Decided: October 15, 2009
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Ross Hall Richardson, Peter Adolf, Federal Public
Defenders, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen
C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Adam Morris, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Earl Rice appeals his conviction for possession
of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006).
Before trial, Rice filed a motion to suppress evidence, seeking
to exclude, among other things, the testimony of Rice’s nephew,
detailing repeated instances in which Rice had molested his
nephew, shown him child pornography, and taken sexually explicit
photographs of him. Though the district court excluded other
evidence of Rice’s prior bad acts, the judge allowed the
nephew’s testimony. Rice was convicted after a jury trial and
sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. Rice filed a timely
appeal.
On appeal, Rice challenges the district court’s
admission of the nephew’s testimony. Rice asserts that the
probative value of the evidence was greatly outweighed by its
prejudicial nature, and that the evidence of prior bad acts
improperly shifted the jury’s focus from the facts of the case
“to a more general referendum on Mr. Rice’s character.” We
affirm.
We review the evidentiary rulings of a district court
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Kelly,
510 F.3d 433,
436 (4th Cir. 2007). Rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
allows for the admission of evidence of other molestation
offenses committed by the defendant. Fed. R. Evid. 414. Rule
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414 provides “an exception to the general rule that evidence of
past crimes may not be used ‘to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity therewith.’”
Kelly, 510
F.3d at 436-37 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)). However, like
all other evidence, that admitted under Rule 414 is subject to
the balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403, requiring that the
evidence “‘be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice’ to the defendant.”
Id. at 437 (quoting Rule 403). When applying Rule 403’s
balancing test, a district court should consider several
factors, such as:
(i) the similarity between the previous offense and
the charged crime, (ii) the temporal proximity between
the two crimes, (iii) the frequency of the prior acts,
(iv) the presence or absence of any intervening acts,
and (v) the reliability of the evidence of the past
offense.
Id. When reviewing the district court’s balancing of these and
other factors, we defer to the district court’s determination
“unless it is an arbitrary or irrational exercise of
discretion.”
Id.
Here, the district court engaged in a thorough
examination of the nephew’s proposed testimony regarding Rice’s
past offenses. First, as the district court determined, though
the molestation activity occurred between ten and eighteen years
ago, this was a shorter time period than that present in our
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recent decision in Kelly, where this court allowed the admission
of a rape occurring twenty-two years prior to the offense in
question.
See 510 F.3d at 437.
Second, though there were some differences between the
previous molestation activity and the current charges of child
pornography, the district court noted that the prior offenses
included showing the nephew child pornography, as well as taking
pictures of the nephew’s genitalia. These similarities, as well
as the repeated assaults over a lengthy period of time, were
indicative of the highly probative nature of the testimony on
the issue of Rice’s intent and proclivity toward molestation and
child pornography. Finally, that the nephew testified in court
and was subject to cross examination establishes the reliable
nature of the evidence of past offenses.
When viewing these factors together, it is clear that
while the nephew’s testimony of Rice’s past sexual abuse was
certainly prejudicial to Rice’s defense, it was not unfairly
prejudicial. Instead, “it was prejudicial for the same reason
it is probative-” it tends to prove that Rice has a deviant
sexual attraction towards children. See
Kelly, 510 F.3d at 438.
Therefore, as the record clearly demonstrates that the admission
of this evidence was not an arbitary or irrational exercise of
discretion, we find the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Rice’s motion to suppress this evidence.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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