Filed: Jul. 10, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4945 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM FELTON HARRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (5:08-cr-00083-F-1) Submitted: June 15, 2009 Decided: July 10, 2009 Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curi
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-4945 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. WILLIAM FELTON HARRIS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (5:08-cr-00083-F-1) Submitted: June 15, 2009 Decided: July 10, 2009 Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished per curia..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4945
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM FELTON HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:08-cr-00083-F-1)
Submitted: June 15, 2009 Decided: July 10, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, J.
Gaston B. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Felton Harris pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006). He received a sentence of forty-six months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Harris contends the district court
failed to adequately consider the arguments made during
sentencing regarding his ties to his family and did not
adequately explain its rationale for the sentence imposed.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
128 S. Ct.
586, 597 (2007). This review requires appellate consideration
of both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a
sentence.
Id.
In determining whether a sentence is procedurally
reasonable, we first assess whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s advisory guideline range.
Id. at
596-97. A sentence within the properly calculated guideline
range may be afforded an appellate presumption of
reasonableness. Rita v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459,
2462 (2007). We then determine whether the district court
failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors and
any arguments presented by the parties, selected a sentence
based on “clearly erroneous facts,” or failed to sufficiently
explain the selected sentence.
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
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When rendering a sentence, the district court “must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.” That is, the sentencing court must apply
the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the specific
circumstances of the case before it. Such
individualized treatment is necessary “to consider
every convicted person as an individual and every case
as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes
mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the
punishment to ensue.”
United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597-98) (internal citations
omitted). Under Carter, the sentencing judge is required to
“state in open court the particular reasons supporting its
chosen sentence.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). In so doing, the district court must “‘set forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his
own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
Id. (quoting Rita, 127 S.
Ct. at 2468).
Finally, assuming no procedural infirmity, we review
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “taking into
account the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent
of any variance from the Guidelines range.’” United States v.
Pauley,
511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 128 S.
Ct. at 597). When reviewing the district court’s application of
the sentencing guidelines, this court reviews findings of fact
for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v.
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Osborne,
514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct.
2525 (2008).
It is clear from the record that the district court
correctly calculated Harris’s advisory guidelines range, and
Harris does not argue otherwise. However, despite the
presumption of reasonableness that Harris’s within-guidelines
sentence may be afforded, we conclude that Harris’s sentence is
procedurally unreasonable. The district court failed to state
the reasons supporting Harris’s sentence, or otherwise indicate
that it “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468; see also
Carter, 564 F.3d at 330.
Harris’s attorney gave a lengthy statement regarding
Harris’s close family ties and the importance of family in
Harris’s successful rehabilitation. Despite this, the district
court’s explanation for the selected sentence was wholly
conclusory: “The court has considered [the advisory guideline
range] as well as other relevant factors set forth in the
advisory sentencing guidelines and those set forth in 18 United
States Code Section 3553(a).” J.A. 33. Thus, the court failed
to indicate what factors in particular supported the sentence,
and the manner in which they did so. In neglecting this step,
the court did not give Harris the individualized assessment
required by Carter. Similarly, the judge made no reference to
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the arguments made by Harris’s counsel during sentencing, and
gave no indication that such arguments were considered. Thus,
because “the record here does not demonstrate that the district
court conducted . . . an [individualized] assessment and so does
not reveal why the district court deemed the sentence it imposed
appropriate, we cannot hold the sentence procedurally
reasonable.”
Carter, 564 F.3d at 330.
Accordingly, while we affirm Harris’s conviction, we
vacate the sentence imposed by the district court and remand for
resentencing. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and further argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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