Filed: Apr. 28, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-7081 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LENORIS WILLARD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Senior District Judge. (4:03-cr-00474-CWH-29) Submitted: April 8, 2009 Decided: April 28, 2009 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lenoris Willard, Appellant Pr
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-7081 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LENORIS WILLARD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Senior District Judge. (4:03-cr-00474-CWH-29) Submitted: April 8, 2009 Decided: April 28, 2009 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Lenoris Willard, Appellant Pro..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-7081
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LENORIS WILLARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Senior District
Judge. (4:03-cr-00474-CWH-29)
Submitted: April 8, 2009 Decided: April 28, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lenoris Willard, Appellant Pro Se. Alfred William Walker
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lenoris Willard appeals a district court order denying
his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)
(2006) based on Amendments 706 and 711 to the Sentencing
Guidelines. We affirm.
Willard pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A); 846 (West 1999 & Supp.
2006). Based on a total offense level of thirty-five and a
criminal history category of III, his resulting Guidelines range
of imprisonment was 210 to 260 months’ imprisonment. However,
his statutory mandatory minimum sentence was 240 months, which
became the low end of the Guidelines sentence. At sentencing,
based on the Government’s motion for a downward departure, the
district court departed downward and sentenced Willard to 100
months’ imprisonment. The court subsequently denied Willard’s
motion for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c), finding the
statutory mandatory minimum sentence was not affected by the
Guidelines amendments. The court noted Willard was not eligible
for the reduction because he was subject to a statutory
mandatory minimum sentence from which the court previously
departed based on his substantial assistance.
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The legal interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines
and the amendments are reviewed de novo. Factual findings are
reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Turner,
59 F.3d
481, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1995). We review the denial of a motion
for a reduction in the sentence under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Goines,
357 F.3d 469, 478 (4th
Cir. 2004).
We find the district court properly found it was
without authority to modify Willard’s sentence pursuant to
Amendments 706 and 711 of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United
States v. Hood,
556 F.3d 226, 235-36 (4th Cir. 2009). In Hood,
the court held that Amendment 706 did not lower the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence and did not have the effect of
lowering Hood’s Guidelines range of imprisonment. Id.
Likewise, because Willard’s sentence was not based on a
sentencing range authorized by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2D1.1, which Amendments 706 and 711 amended, it was not
subject to a modification under § 3582(c). See Hood, 556 F.3d
at 235-36.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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