Filed: Mar. 13, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-7918 HAMMEL J. CLARK, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES; PHILIP M. ANDREWS INCORPORATED CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES; ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE; MARY BROWN; DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES; SERGEANT SAMPSON; NURSE BROWN; NURSE PARZ; SERGEANT BELL, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-7918 HAMMEL J. CLARK, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES; PHILIP M. ANDREWS INCORPORATED CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES; ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE; MARY BROWN; DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES; SERGEANT SAMPSON; NURSE BROWN; NURSE PARZ; SERGEANT BELL, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. R..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-7918
HAMMEL J. CLARK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES; PHILIP M. ANDREWS INCORPORATED CORRECTIONAL
MEDICAL SERVICES; ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE; MARY BROWN;
DIRECTOR OF CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES; SERGEANT SAMPSON;
NURSE BROWN; NURSE PARZ; SERGEANT BELL,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:07-
cv-00019-RWT)
Submitted: January 29, 2009 Decided: March 13, 2009
Before TRAXLER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Hammel J. Clark, Appellant Pro Se. Rex Schultz Gordon, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Philip
Melton Andrews, Katrina J. Dennis, KRAMON & GRAHAM, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Hammel J. Clark, a Maryland prisoner, filed this 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) action against the Maryland Department of
Public Safety and Correctional Services, alleging deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Clark contended he received an electric shock
when he plugged in a fan to help ventilate a kitchen area he was
instructed to paint. He was rendered unconscious and
transported to a local hospital, where he remained for three
days. After his discharge from the hospital, Clark allegedly
continued to suffer serious health problems. He alleged that
the prison medical staff made “little or no effort to address
[his] physical pain and suffering,” and hampered his
rehabilitative efforts.
Clark specifically detailed incidents involving
Sergeants Bell and Sampson and Nurses Parz and Brown, two nurses
employed at the Maryland House of Corrections. First, Clark
alleged that Parz knowingly left him sitting in a wheelchair in
his own excrement, informing him that “the next shift would see
[him].” Next, Clark contended that Sergeant Bell fired him for
failing to report to work while on physician-ordered bed rest.
Clark also alleged that on April 3, 2006, he passed out in his
cell and hit his head. He reported this injury to Sergeant
Sampson, who called the infirmary, and returned to tell Clark
2
that Nurse Parz said Clark should submit a “sick call” slip.
Clark further alleged that two days later, Nurse Brown refused
to see him when he visited the infirmary about his head
injuries.
In his original Complaint, Clark named only the
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services
as a defendant. However, in a subsequent motion Clark sought to
add eight additional defendants. The district court added five
defendants to the suit: Sergeant Sampson, Nurse Brown, Nurse
Parz, Sergeant Bell, and the Director of Correctional Medical
Services. The court declined to add the remaining three
putative defendants, Secretary Mary Ann Saars, Commissioner of
Corrections Frank Sizer, and Warden Williams, because Clark
failed to allege their personal involvement in the underlying
events.
Determining that the Maryland Department of Public
Safety and Correctional Services enjoyed Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in federal court, the district court granted
the Department’s motion to dismiss. The district court granted
summary judgment for Correctional Medical Services, Inc.
(“CMS”), the Director of CMS, and Brown, and dismissed the
complaint as to Parz. The court reasoned that, as vicarious
liability does not provide a basis for § 1983 actions, CMS was
not liable, and Brown, Parz, and the Director of CMS had not
3
acted with deliberate indifference to Clark’s medical needs.
Further, as Clark failed to effect service upon Parz, the action
against her was dismissed on this basis.
The district court also granted summary judgment for
Bell and Sampson. Regarding Bell, the district court found
that, as prisoners do not have a constitutionally protected
right to work while incarcerated, termination from a prison job
does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Next, as
“Sampson did not observe any visible injury to [Clark] and saw
[Clark] communicate clearly with no sign of distress,” he did
not act with indifference to a serious medical need of Clark’s.
Clark appeals, and we affirm. 1
Clark first challenges the district court’s dismissal
of his action against the Maryland Department of Public Safety
and Correctional Services and the individual administrators of
the prison, and its grant of summary judgment for CMS.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Giarratano v. Johnson,
521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). “[W]hen ruling on a
1
In his informal brief, Clark contends that Appellee Bell
was incorrectly added as a defendant, as she is a female, and
the guard who allegedly wronged him was a male. Thus, Clark
does not appeal the grant of summary judgment to Appellee Bell,
and any issues raised in Clark’s appeal with regard to the
“male” Bell are not properly before us because that individual
is not a party to this action.
4
defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all
of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, ;
127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200
(2007). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and have “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, , ;
127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1974
(2007).
We review an award of summary judgment de novo,
drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt.,
Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 283 (4th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c).
The Eleventh Amendment immunizes states from suits
brought in federal court, absent waiver from the state or a
clear congressional exercise of its power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 66 (1989). Though the Supreme Court has found that
municipalities are “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983, see
5
Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978), state departments and agencies considered to be
“arm[s] of the state” are not, Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd.
of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977). As the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services is
undoubtedly an arm of the state for purposes of § 1983, see id.
at 280-81, the district court did not err in finding it immune
from a suit under § 1983.
Similarly, the district court did not err in declining
Clark’s effort to add as defendants three representatives of the
state prison administration: Secretary Mary Ann Saar,
Commissioner of Corrections Frank Sizer, and Warden Williams.
To the extent that Clark sought to add these individuals in
their official capacities, they are afforded immunity by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Alternatively,
because there is no doctrine of respondeat superior in § 1983
claims, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94, these administrators are
liable in their individual capacities only for their personal
wrongdoing or supervisory actions that violated constitutional
norms. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). As
Clark failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate any
personal or supervisory wrongdoing by the administrators, we
find that the district court did not err in declining to add
them as name defendants.
6
The district court likewise did not err in its
resolution of Clark’s claim against CMS. As previously noted,
principles of respondeat superior have no application to § 1983
actions. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-94. Though Monell
involved governmental entities, this court has found this rule
equally applicable to private corporations. See Rodriguez v.
Smithfield Packing Co., 338 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
Because Clark failed to allege any specific wrongful action on
the part of CMS, the district court did not err in granting
summary judgment for CMS.
We next address the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Sampson. For a prison inmate to prevail on a claim
of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the
prisoner must demonstrate that the injury suffered is both
apparent and serious. Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th
Cir. 1999). A plaintiff “must also show the subjective
component – deliberate indifference. An officer is deliberately
indifferent only when he ‘knows of and disregards’ the risk
posed by the serious medical needs of the inmate.” Iko v.
Shreve,
535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Here, it is clear that Clark failed to demonstrate
Sampson’s deliberate indifference to Clark’s serious medical
need. First, the record does not reflect any sufficiently
7
serious medical condition suffered by Clark at the time of
Sampson’s alleged indifference. As noted by the district court,
Sampson did not notice any visible injury to Clark, and observed
that Clark was able to communicate clearly with no outward sign
of distress. An examination conducted the next day by medical
personnel lent further support to this conclusion, as it failed
to reveal any sign of injury.
Despite this lack of visible injury, Sampson took
Clark at his word and called the infirmary to report Clark’s
alleged injury. Nurse Parz, who was on duty, informed Sampson
that Clark should submit a sick call slip in order to be seen at
the infirmary. Sampson returned to Clark, relayed the nurse’s
information, and again observed no sign of injury, distress, or
discomfort. Accordingly, we find that Clark failed to allege
facts sufficient to demonstrate Sampson’s deliberate
indifference to a serious medical condition.
Next, we turn to the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for Brown. Clark alleged that Brown refused to examine
him two days after he fell and hit his head. Even accepting
this as true, the allegation alone fails to support a claim of
deliberate indifference. The day after his fall, Clark was
evaluated by prison medical staff, who found no evidence of
injury. Thus, even if Clark was injured by his fall, the injury
8
was not sufficiently apparent to support an action for
deliberate indifference. See Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695.
Clark detailed only two incidents specifically
involving Nurse Parz in his complaint: she did not immediately
see him after he allegedly fell and struck his head, and she did
not clean him up after he defecated on himself. Clark failed to
demonstrate deliberate indifference to serious medical need by
Nurse Parz, as the complaint failed to allege a sufficiently
serious medical condition at the time of Parz’s alleged
indifference. Similarly, leaving Clark sitting in his own
waste, though offensive, does not amount to deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. 2
Accordingly, we deny Clark’s motion for adequate
medical care and affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
Though a prisoner’s exposure to human waste may give rise
to an Eighth Amendment claim, see, e.g., DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264
F.3d 965, 974-75 (10th Cir. 2001) (listing cases where exposure
to human waste violated Eighth Amendment), this was not the
theory relied on by Clark in his complaint before the district
court. As Clark raises this argument for the first time on
appeal, it is not properly before this court. See Muth v.
United States,
1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993).
9
