Filed: Nov. 24, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: Vacated by Supreme Court, June 21, 2010 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4065 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TERRANCE ANTWAN WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00160-D-1) Submitted: October 26, 2009 Decided: November 24, 2009 Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished
Summary: Vacated by Supreme Court, June 21, 2010 UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4065 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TERRANCE ANTWAN WILLIAMS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:08-cr-00160-D-1) Submitted: October 26, 2009 Decided: November 24, 2009 Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished ..
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Vacated by Supreme Court, June 21, 2010
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4065
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE ANTWAN WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:08-cr-00160-D-1)
Submitted: October 26, 2009 Decided: November 24, 2009
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne
M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance Antwan Williams appeals his conviction of
possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006), and his 322-month sentence.
Williams pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to possession
with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (2006) (Count
One), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006)
(Count Two), and the felon-in-possession charge (Count Three).
On appeal, Williams argues that his conviction and sentence must
be vacated because the predicate crimes used to determine that
he was a felon and that he qualified for sentencing as a career
offender were not punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment. He also argues that the district court committed
procedural error in failing to adequately consider his request
for a downward variance based on the sentencing disparity
between powder and crack cocaine. We affirm.
In the presentence report (PSR), the probation officer
concluded that Williams qualified for sentencing as a career
offender based on two prior North Carolina state court
convictions for possession with intent to sell and deliver
marijuana. After he received the PSR, Williams filed a motion
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to withdraw his guilty plea. In the motion, he asserted that he
was actually innocent of the felon-in-possession charge in Count
Three, and did not have the required predicate felony
convictions for career offender sentencing, because his prior
state drug convictions were not punishable by more than one year
of imprisonment. He based this argument on the then-recent
decision in United States v. Pruitt, 545 F.3d 416 (6th Cir.
2008), which interpreted the North Carolina sentencing statutes
to require examining each defendant’s prior record level to
determine if a particular crime was punishable by more than one
year of imprisonment. The Government opposed Williams’ motion,
relying on this court’s decisions in United States v. Harp,
406
F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Jones,
195 F.3d
205 (4th Cir. 1999).
At sentencing, the district court concluded that Harp
and Jones remained controlling in the Fourth Circuit, and denied
the motion to withdraw Williams’ guilty plea to the felon-in-
possession count. The court also overruled Williams’ objections
to career offender status and adopted the Guidelines
calculations in the PSR. The court sentenced Williams to the
bottom of the Guidelines range of 262 months on Count One, a
consecutive sixty months on Count Two, and a concurrent 120
months on Count Three, for a total of 322 months of
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imprisonment, five years of supervised release, and a $300
special assessment.
Williams first asserts that the district court erred
in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, based on the
same arguments asserted in the district court. He argues that
his conviction on Count Three and his career offender sentence
must be reversed, because he had not previously been convicted
of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. He
again relies on Pruitt, and argues that the decisions in Jones
and Harp are no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S. Ct. 1783 (2008).
A district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). The
defendant has the burden of demonstrating “a fair and just
reason” for withdrawal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e);
Ubakanma, 215
F.3d at 424. A “fair and just reason” is one that challenges
the fairness of the guilty plea colloquy conducted pursuant to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United
States v. Puckett,
61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995).
In determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, six
factors are considered. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245,
248 (4th Cir. 1991). Williams asserts that he is factually and
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legally innocent of the felon-in-possession count because he has
not been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year
of imprisonment. Using the same legal basis, Williams also
argues that he was improperly sentenced as a career offender.
In considering the district court’s application of the
Guidelines, this court reviews factual findings for clear error
and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Allen, 446 F.3d
522, 527 (4th Cir. 2006).
Williams argues that Pruitt correctly interpreted and
applied Rodriquez to the North Carolina sentencing scheme, and
therefore his two drug convictions were not punishable by more
than one year of imprisonment. This court has repeatedly
rejected Williams’ argument. Jones rejected analysis of the
sentencing situation faced by a particular North Carolina
defendant in favor of looking at the maximum sentence that could
be imposed on any defendant convicted of a particular crime.
Jones, 195 F.3d at 207. Harp rejected a challenge to the Jones
methodology and held that the crime of which Williams was
convicted, possession with intent to distribute marijuana in
North Carolina, is punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment and thus constitutes a controlled substance offense
for purposes of career offender sentencing.
Harp, 406 F.3d at
245-47. Further, “a panel of this court cannot overrule,
explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of
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this court. Only the Supreme Court or this court sitting en
banc can do that.” Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d
264, 271-72 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). We conclude that the district court
properly denied Williams’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
overruled his objection to career offender status.
Williams also argues that the district court committed
procedural error in failing to address his request for a
downward variance based on the crack-powder cocaine disparity.
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse
of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, __,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). This review requires appellate
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence.
Id. After determining whether
the district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory
Guidelines range, this court must then consider whether the
district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006)
factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence.
Id. at 596-97;
see United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(holding that, while the “individualized assessment need not be
elaborate or lengthy, . . . it must provide a rationale tailored
to the particular case . . . and [be] adequate to permit
meaningful appellate review”). Finally, this court reviews the
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substantive reasonableness of the sentence. United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the
district court fully and adequately considered Williams’ request
for a variance as well as his request that the court calculate
his offense level using the powder cocaine Guidelines. The
district court made “‘an individualized assessment based on the
facts presented.’” Carter, 564 F.3d at 328 (quoting
Gall, 128
S. Ct. at 597). We are also satisfied that the court complied
with our instruction that “‘[t]he sentencing judge should set
forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has
considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
Id.
(quoting Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)); see
United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007).
Accordingly, we affirm Williams’ convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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