Filed: Aug. 14, 2009
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4161 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHANE LAWRENCE LUERS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:07-cr-00224-JFM-1) Submitted: July 21, 2009 Decided: August 14, 2009 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public De
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4161 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. SHANE LAWRENCE LUERS, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge. (1:07-cr-00224-JFM-1) Submitted: July 21, 2009 Decided: August 14, 2009 Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Wyda, Federal Public Def..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4161
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHANE LAWRENCE LUERS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00224-JFM-1)
Submitted: July 21, 2009 Decided: August 14, 2009
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Sapna Mirchandani, Staff
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Richard C. Kay, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shane Lawrence Luers was convicted in 2000 in the
Southern District of Florida of stealing government property, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 641 (West 2000 & Supp. 2009), robbery
and conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2006), and carrying a firearm during a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000 &
Supp. 2009). His case was transferred to the District of
Maryland to serve his period of supervised release. After
violating his conditions of release on numerous occasions, Luers
was ultimately sentenced to two years of imprisonment.
Luers appeals alleging that his sentence was plainly
unreasonable because the district court failed to calculate his
applicable advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 7-13 months,
failed to determine whether a sentence within that range would
satisfy 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009), and
failed to provide compelling reasons for nearly doubling the
high end of the sentencing range. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and is not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). District courts ultimately
have “broad discretion” to revoke a previous sentence and impose
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a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.
Id. at 439.
The district court did not need to calculate Luers’
advisory sentencing range, as it was common knowledge by his
fifth supervised release hearing that the range was 7-13 months.
Moreover, defense counsel had reiterated that range at the final
hearing. The district court’s reasons for not sentencing Luers
within his advisory sentencing range, and instead sentencing him
to two years of imprisonment, are clear from the record:
(1) despite numerous chances, Luers failed to follow his
conditions of supervised release (and thus a longer sentence
would promote respect for the law); (2) Luers clearly needed
help with his addiction to alcohol and his two-year sentence
might provide him eligibility for an intensive substance abuse
program while in prison; and (3) the public needed protection
from a man who refused to stop drinking alcohol and follow other
basic supervised release conditions, despite the best efforts of
the district judge, the probation officer, and others.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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