Filed: Nov. 06, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4428 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. TROY WEST-BEY, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:97-cr-00175-WDQ-3) Submitted: September 30, 2009 Decided: November 6, 2009 Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Jame
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4428 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. TROY WEST-BEY, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:97-cr-00175-WDQ-3) Submitted: September 30, 2009 Decided: November 6, 2009 Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4428
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TROY WEST-BEY,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:97-cr-00175-WDQ-3)
Submitted: September 30, 2009 Decided: November 6, 2009
Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Martin G. Bahl, Staff
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Robert R. Harding, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Troy West-Bey appeals the eight-month sentence he
received after the district court revoked his supervised
release. He argues that the sentence was plainly unreasonable
because the district court failed to explain how the sentence
satisfied the sentencing goals set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006), did not identify a proper basis for the sentence, and
prevented him from receiving the medical care he needed. We
affirm.
West-Bey pled guilty in 1997 to conspiracy to
distribute cocaine, served his federal sentence and began
serving his supervised release term in April 2007. In
October 2007, he was ordered to participate in a drug and
alcohol treatment program. In March 2008, the district court
considered new Maryland state charges for assault and disorderly
conduct that West-Bey had incurred, but took no action because
the state indefinitely stayed his case.
In July 2008, West-Bey was ordered to complete an
inpatient drug treatment program. In January 2009, the district
court considered his relapse into cocaine use, but took no
action as he was about to begin an intensive drug treatment
program. West-Bey subsequently violated the terms of his
supervised release when he failed to attend his intensive drug
treatment sessions on February 23, March 2, and March 4, 2009,
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and also failed to submit to a random urinalysis test on
March 2, 2009. Consequently, the probation officer filed a
petition for revocation. West-Bey failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing, and a warrant for his arrest was issued.
At the revocation hearing in April 2009, West-Bey
admitted the four violations. The Chapter 7 policy statements
established a sentencing range of 8-14 months. U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, § 7B1.4(a) (2008). The government
recommended a sentence of eight months imprisonment with no
further supervision, asserting that West-Bey was uncooperative
and unsupervisable. West-Bey asked for a one-month term of
imprisonment, to be followed by a new term of supervised
release. He maintained that his difficulties were caused by
mental illness, and that he benefitted from supervision and
wished to continue it. In addition, defense counsel informed
the district court that West-Bey had recently been granted
social security disability and medical benefits which he might
lose if he received a sentence of more than one month, and would
then be forced to reapply. However, counsel presented no
concrete evidence that West-Bey would necessarily lose his
benefits, and the district court expressed some uncertainty
about it.
The court indicated that it was inclined to give
West-Bey an eight-month sentence, which it hoped would “get his
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attention.” The court discussed West-Bey’s mental problems and
need for supervision and assistance during West-Bey’s
allocution, and then imposed an eight-month term of imprisonment
and a new two-year term of supervised release.
In United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 437
(4th Cir. 2006), we held that “revocation sentences should be
reviewed to determine whether they are ‘plainly unreasonable’
with regard to those § 3553(a) factors applicable to supervised
release revocation sentences.” Review of a revocation sentence
involves both procedural and substantive considerations. Id. at
438. A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the court
considered the Chapter 7 policy statements and the pertinent
factors in § 3553(a). Id. at 440. It is substantively
reasonable if the court stated a proper basis for its decision
to impose the sentence. Id.
Here, the district court considered the Chapter 7
policy statements, that is, the sentencing range. Although the
court did not refer to § 3553(a), it is apparent from the record
that the district court considered the nature and circumstances
of West-Bey’s violations, the need to deter him from future
criminal conduct (particularly drug and alcohol offenses and
related misconduct), and his need for supervision. A sentencing
court is presumed to have considered the factors set out in
§ 3553(a) unless the record indicates otherwise, and it need not
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specifically address each factor. United States v. Legree,
205 F.3d 724, 728-29 (4th Cir. 2000) (addressing denial of
motion to reduce sentence); see United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating a district court need
not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” or
“explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the record”)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has held that “[w]here a [sentencing] matter is .
. . conceptually simple” and the record makes clear that the
sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments, “we do
not believe the law requires the judge to write more
extensively.” Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, ___, 127 S.
Ct. 2456, 2469 (2007).
West-Bey also contends that the district court
committed substantive error by failing to state a proper basis
for the sentence. He argues that the court provided no
explanation for the sentence and that no applicable factors
supported it. The court’s only explanation for the eight-month
sentence was its initial comment that it was prepared to accept
the government’s recommendation and its later statement that it
hoped the sentence would get West-Bey’s attention. West-Bey is
correct that the court gave only the briefest explanation for
its decision to impose an eight-month sentence instead of the
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one-month sentence he requested. This lack of specificity may
constitute substantive error.
Even if West-Bey has identified a substantive error,
the sentence was not “plainly unreasonable.” West-Bey claims
that the sentence was plainly unreasonable because it was
greater than necessary to satisfy the goals of sentencing under
§ 3553(a) and kept him from receiving in the most effective
manner the medical care and other corrective treatment that he
needed. He also maintains that an eight-month sentence was
disproportionate punishment for minor violations that occurred
within a ten-day period. However, his violations followed
months of less-than-compliant behavior. Moreover, the sentence
was at the bottom of the Chapter 7 sentencing range, and far
below the statutory maximum that the court had broad discretion
to impose. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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