Filed: Jul. 09, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4093 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. HENRY LAMONT REID, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (4:07-cr-00057-F-1) Submitted: June 23, 2010 Decided: July 9, 2010 Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. R. Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FI
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4093 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. HENRY LAMONT REID, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (4:07-cr-00057-F-1) Submitted: June 23, 2010 Decided: July 9, 2010 Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. R. Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIR..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4093
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HENRY LAMONT REID,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (4:07-cr-00057-F-1)
Submitted: June 23, 2010 Decided: July 9, 2010
Before AGEE, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
R. Clarke Speaks, SPEAKS LAW FIRM, PC, Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Henry Lamont Reid pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine and more than 50
grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006),
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). Shortly
after entering his plea, Reid filed a pro se motion to withdraw
his guilty plea and for appointment of new counsel.
In his motion to withdraw, Reid asserted that he was
“pressured” into pleading guilty and led to believe he would
receive a sentence of three years based on his cooperation with
the Government. Reid further argued that trial counsel
inadequately prepared for a suppression hearing and for trial.
The district court appointed new counsel, who filed a
supplemental brief in support of Reid’s motion to withdraw. The
Government opposed the motion, arguing that Reid failed to
proffer a fair and just reason for withdrawal. After a hearing,
the district court denied Reid’s motion to withdraw his plea.
The district court sentenced Reid to 262 months for
the conspiracy conviction and a mandatory consecutive 60 months
for the firearm conviction, for an aggregate sentence of 322
months. Reid timely appealed. On appeal, Reid argues that the
district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
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This court reviews the district court’s denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). A
defendant may withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing if he
“can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). A defendant “does not have an
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, even before
sentencing,” and he “bears the burden of demonstrating to the
district court’s satisfaction that a ‘fair and just reason’
supports his request to withdraw.” United States v. Moore,
931
F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
A fair and just reason to withdraw a plea is “one that
essentially challenges the fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding.”
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The most important
consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is
an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy at which the guilty plea
was accepted,” and a properly conducted Rule 11 proceeding
“raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding”
and “leaves a defendant with a very limited basis upon which to
have his plea withdrawn.” United States v. Bowman,
348 F.3d
408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This Court has articulated the following nonexclusive
list of factors for consideration by the district court in
deciding whether to grant a withdrawal motion:
(1) whether the defendant has offered
credible evidence that his plea was not
knowing or not voluntary; (2) whether the
defendant has credibly asserted his legal
innocence; (3) whether there has been a
delay between the entering of the plea and
the filing of the motion; (4) whether the
defendant has had close assistance of
competent counsel; (5) whether withdrawal
will cause prejudice to the government; and
(6) whether it will inconvenience the court
and waste judicial resources.
Moore, 931 F.2d at 248.
Reid has not presented any evidence or argument that
demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion in
denying the motion. As to the first Moore factor, we conclude
that the district court did not clearly err when it concluded
that Reid failed to present credible evidence showing that his
plea was not knowing and voluntary. See Moore, 931 F.2d at 250
(clear error standard applies to district court’s findings).
Indeed, the record before this court reflects that Reid’s plea
was knowing and voluntary, that he understood the rights he was
giving up by pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that
he committed the offenses to which he was pleading guilty. Reid
also attested during the hearing that he fully understood the
ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises
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to him outside those made by the Government in his plea
agreement.
As to the second factor, although Reid now claims that
he is legally innocent of the charges underlying his guilty
plea, nothing in the record before this court supports this
claim. Reid’s bald assertion of innocence is insufficient to
undermine his guilty plea or undercut the district court’s
exercise of discretion in denying the motion to withdraw.
The district court found the third factor, promptness
of filing in Reid’s favor. As to the fourth factor, although
Reid claimed that he lacked close assistance of competent
counsel, the district court concluded that this argument lacked
merit. The district court heard testimony from Reid’s trial
counsel concerning counsel’s contact with Reid leading up to the
trial date, counsel’s preparation for trial, and counsel’s
advice to Reid concerning the Government’s plea offer.
Specifically, trial counsel testified that he was aware of and
concerned about the possibility of the Government filing a 21
U.S.C. § 851 (2006) notice in the matter.
Although Reid’s motion before the district court
argued that he was unaware of the possibility of the Government
filing a § 851 notice, trial counsel testified that he relayed
his concerns about the notice to Reid. Moreover, counsel
testified that although he and Reid discussed the option of
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entering a guilty plea several times, counsel fully anticipated
going to trial. The district court found trial counsel to be
credible and concluded that Reid was assisted by competent
counsel. Finally, the district court concluded that the fifth
and sixth Moore factors, prejudice to the Government and
inconvenience to the court, weighed against Reid as well. Thus,
the district court denied Reid’s motion.
We find that the district court properly evaluated the
Moore factors in denying the motion to withdraw. On appeal,
Reid presents nothing to contradict the district court’s
exercise of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm Reid’s
conviction. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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