Filed: Dec. 01, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2286 ANNETTE REDDICK; TASHA REDDICK; ARLENE CARTER; TIESE MITCHELL; CRYSTAL LEWIS; J.M., Infant, by his next friend Tiese Mitchell; J.M., Infant, by her next friend Tiese Mitchell; J.J., Infant, by his next friend Crystal Lewis; R.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter; Z.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter, Plaintiffs – Appellants, v. WILLIAM A. WHITE, Respondent – Appellee, and JOHN CROCKETT HENRY, a/k/a Jo
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 08-2286 ANNETTE REDDICK; TASHA REDDICK; ARLENE CARTER; TIESE MITCHELL; CRYSTAL LEWIS; J.M., Infant, by his next friend Tiese Mitchell; J.M., Infant, by her next friend Tiese Mitchell; J.J., Infant, by his next friend Crystal Lewis; R.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter; Z.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter, Plaintiffs – Appellants, v. WILLIAM A. WHITE, Respondent – Appellee, and JOHN CROCKETT HENRY, a/k/a Joh..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2286
ANNETTE REDDICK; TASHA REDDICK; ARLENE CARTER; TIESE
MITCHELL; CRYSTAL LEWIS; J.M., Infant, by his next friend
Tiese Mitchell; J.M., Infant, by her next friend Tiese
Mitchell; J.J., Infant, by his next friend Crystal Lewis;
R.C., Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter; Z.C.,
Infant, by her next friend Arlene Carter,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
WILLIAM A. WHITE,
Respondent – Appellee,
and
JOHN CROCKETT HENRY, a/k/a John Crockett Henry, Jr., a/k/a
James Crockett Henry, a/k/a J.C. Henry; HENRY LLC OF
VIRGINIA BEACH,
Defendants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff.
------------------------------
NEAL LAWRENCE WALTERS,
Amicus Supporting Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Rebecca Beach Smith, District
Judge. (2:07-cv-00342-RBS-FBS)
Submitted: October 17, 2011 Decided: December 1, 2011
Before SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and William L. OSTEEN,
Jr., United States District Judge for the Middle District of
North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Anthony F. Troy, William H. Hurd, Stephen C. Piepgrass, Robert
M. Luck, III, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellants. Neal L. Walters, Joshua M. Friedman, Third Year Law
Student, F. Daphne Li, Third Year Law Student, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW, Appellate Litigation Clinic,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Amicus Supporting Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
After William A. White made internet postings about lead-
counsel for the plaintiffs (the Tenants) in a Fair Housing Act
case, the Tenants moved for sanctions against White. The
district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who
held an evidentiary hearing and entered an order denying the
Tenants’ motion. Applying clear error review, the district
court affirmed. Because the district court was required to
perform a de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636, we vacate and
remand for further proceedings.
I.
The Tenants, as plaintiff-intervenors, were part of a Fair
Housing Act proceeding brought against an apartment complex
owner in Virginia Beach. In May 2007, White — who was not a
party to the action — mailed letters to the Tenants using
racially abusive language. The Tenants responded by issuing
subpoenas to White, seeking to determine if he had some
connection to the apartment complex owner. In February 2008,
White moved to quash the subpoenas. However, prior to the
hearing on that motion, White posted publicly available
information about the Tenants’ counsel on an internet message
board coupled with a warning that “no one” was to contact or
disturb the attorney or his wife during the litigation. (J.A.
3
333). The posting also stated that “[a]fter we are done with
our legal dispute, they are open game, but while we are involved
in this legal dispute, there is to be nothing done.” Id.
The Tenants responded to White’s posting by filing a motion
for sanctions against him, citing the district court’s inherent
power to sanction bad-faith behavior. See Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc.,
501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). The district court referred the
matter to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hearing. * During
the pendency of this motion, the Tenants settled the underlying
Fair Housing Act litigation. Eventually, the magistrate judge
issued a lengthy order denying the motion for sanctions. The
Tenants filed objections to the magistrate judge’s ruling and
specifically requested a de novo review by the district court.
Reviewing the Tenants’ objections “under the clearly erroneous
standard here applicable,” the district court affirmed the
magistrate judge’s order. (J.A. 724).
II.
On appeal, the Tenants argue that the district court erred
in applying a clearly erroneous standard instead of a de novo
standard in reviewing the magistrate judge’s ruling. We agree.
*
The docket sheet notes the magistrate judge was to enter a
“report and recommendation.” (J.A. 14-15).
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A magistrate judge’s power is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 636,
which provides two general types of referrals by a district
court. Section 636(b)(1)(A) provides that a district court may
“designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial
matter pending before the court,” except for a non-exhaustive
list of motions detailed in the statute. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A). Under this section, a district court reviews a
magistrate judge’s order to determine if it is “clearly
erroneous or contrary to law.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(a). In contrast, § 636(b)(1)(B) provides that, with regard
to the motions excepted from subsection (A), a district court
may “designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including
evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge . . . proposed
findings of fact and recommendations.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). Further, this section authorizes a district
court to issue appropriate “additional duties” to a magistrate
judge so long as they are consistent with the Constitution. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). Because a magistrate judge is only
empowered under this section to make recommendations, a district
court’s review is de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The
Supreme Court has summarized these grants of authority to mean
that “nondispositive” pretrial matters are governed by § 636(a)
and “dispositive” matters are covered by § 636(b). Gomez v.
United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873-74 (1989). Rule 72, which
5
implements § 636, likewise requires a de novo review for
“pretrial matter[s]” that are “dispositive of a claim or
defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1).
On appeal, the Tenants contend that the magistrate judge’s
ruling on sanctions in this case is “dispositive” within the
meaning of § 636 and Rule 72, and the district court was thus
statutorily required to perform de novo review. We agree that
the sanctions ruling in this case — issued pursuant to a
district court’s inherent authority and after the underlying
litigation had ended — was “dispositive” and required de novo
review.
Sanctions are authorized by rule in several instances,
including Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16, and 37. In
Chambers, the Court recognized that federal courts also have an
“inherent” power under Article III to award attorney’s fees when
a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44-46. This inherent
power is “governed not by rule or statute but by the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”
Id. at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
A motion for sanctions under the district court’s
“inherent” power is not a pretrial matter under §636(B)(1)(a).
Magistrate judges have no inherent Article III powers — they
6
have only those powers vested in them by Congress. See N.L.R.B.
v. A-Plus Roofing, Inc., 39 F.3d 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting magistrate judges are “creatures of statute, and so is
their jurisdiction. [Courts] cannot augment it”). Congress has
not created statutory authorization for magistrate judges to
exercise inherent Article III powers. Cf. In re Rainbow
Magazine, Inc.,
77 F.3d 278, 283-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting
bankruptcy judges have inherent power to sanction because
Congress created specific statutory authorization). Assuming a
district court can delegate its inherent powers under § 636(b)’s
“additional duties” clause, de novo review of the exercise of
those powers is required. See United States v. Osborne,
345
F.3d 281, 289-90 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that “additional
duties” clause permitted district court to authorize a
magistrate judge to conduct a plea colloquy, but that such
authorization is consistent with Article III only if de novo
review by an Article III court is available upon request).
In addition, the sanctions order in this case addressed a
non-party and was issued after the conclusion of the underlying
litigation. The magistrate judge’s ruling was thus “dispositive
of a claim,” that is, a claim for sanctions against White. In
fact, as the Tenants note, the sanctions motion was the only
“claim” against White in the case.
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In sum, the motion for sanctions in this case — requested
under the district court’s “inherent” power and issued after the
conclusion of the underlying case — was not a nondispostive
pretrial matter under §636(B)(1)(a), and the magistrate was
permitted only to enter a Report and Recommendation subject to
the district court’s de novo review. The district court’s
failure to apply the proper de novo standard of review is
reversible error. ALCOA v. EPA, 663 F.2d 499, 502 (4th Cir.
1981).
III.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we vacate the
district court’s order and remand the case for the district
court to perform a de novo review of the magistrate judge’s
order denying sanctions. We express no opinion on the merits of
the Tenants’ motion for sanctions.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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