Filed: Jan. 21, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4415 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. DAVID MBOM, Defendant – Appellant. No. 09-4416 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ROBERT TATAW, Defendant – Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:08-cr-00069-RWT-1; 8:08-cr-00069-RWT-3) Submitted: December 28, 2010 Decided: January 21, 2011 Before SHEDD and
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 09-4415 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. DAVID MBOM, Defendant – Appellant. No. 09-4416 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ROBERT TATAW, Defendant – Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:08-cr-00069-RWT-1; 8:08-cr-00069-RWT-3) Submitted: December 28, 2010 Decided: January 21, 2011 Before SHEDD and ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4415
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID MBOM,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 09-4416
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT TATAW,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:08-cr-00069-RWT-1; 8:08-cr-00069-RWT-3)
Submitted: December 28, 2010 Decided: January 21, 2011
Before SHEDD and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lindsay N. Warnes, LAW OFFICE OF LINDSAY N. WARNES, LLC,
Rockville, Maryland; David W. Lease, SMITH, LEASE & GOLDSTEIN,
LLC, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. Rod J. Rosenstein,
United States Attorney, Bryan E. Foreman, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Following a joint jury trial, David Mbom and Robert
Tataw were convicted of conspiracy to commit bank larceny, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), and bank larceny, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (2006). They each received
sentences of sixty-three months’ imprisonment and were ordered
to jointly and severally pay restitution of $435,902. In these
consolidated appeals, Mbom and Tataw challenge the district
court’s denial of their respective motions for judgment of
acquittal, and Mbom challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion to suppress. We affirm in both appeals.
Mbom challenges the search of his person following the
stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. He argues that
officers did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
initiate a traffic stop, and even if they did, they lacked
probable cause to extend the investigatory scope of the stop.
Accordingly, he contends that all the evidence seized from him
should have been excluded from trial under the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine. We disagree.
This court reviews factual findings underlying a
district court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error
and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Blake, 571 F.3d
331, 338 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1104 (2010).
We construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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Government, the party prevailing below. United States v.
Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2009).
Automobile stops constitute “seizures” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and are thus “subject to the
constitutional imperative” that they be reasonable under the
circumstances. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10
(1996). Passengers of vehicles stopped by law enforcement are
detained for the Fourth Amendment purposes, just as the drivers
are. Brendlin v. California,
551 U.S. 249, 257 (2007).
We have found that “[o]bserving a traffic violation
provides sufficient justification for a police officer to detain
the offending vehicle for as long as it takes to perform the
traditional incidents of a routine traffic stop.” United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008). The
officer may “request a driver’s license and vehicle
registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation.”
United States v. Foreman,
369 F.3d 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2004). A
police officer may also request identification and run computer
checks on passengers. United States v. Soriano-Jarquin,
492 F.3d 495, 500 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, officers clearly were justified in stopping the
vehicle in question for speeding. Once they discovered the
outstanding warrant for Mbom, they were permitted to take him
into custody and to conduct a search of his person pursuant to
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that arrest. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009).
Accordingly, the district court properly denied Mbom’s
suppression motion.
Mbom and Tataw each argue that Government failed to
present sufficient evidence to convict them of either bank
larceny or conspiracy to commit bank larceny. Having reviewed
the record and applicable law, however, we find sufficient
evidence to support the convictions.
This court reviews de novo the denial of a Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Kingrea, 573 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2009). When a Rule 29
motion is based on a claim of insufficient evidence, the jury’s
verdict must be sustained “if there is substantial evidence,
taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support
it.” United States v. Abu Ali,
528 F.3d 210, 244
(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
Kingrea, 573 F.3d at 194-95 (4th Cir. 2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing for substantial evidence, this court
considers both circumstantial and direct evidence and allows the
Government “all reasonable inferences that could be drawn in its
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favor.” United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333
(4th Cir. 2008). We may not weigh the evidence or review the
credibility of the witnesses. United States v. Allen,
491 F.3d
178, 185 (4th Cir. 2007). If the evidence “supports different,
reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which
interpretation to believe.” United States v. Murphy,
35 F.3d
143, 148 (4th Cir. 1994).
In order to convict a defendant of conspiracy to
commit bank larceny pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Government
must establish: first, an agreement between two or more people
to commit the underlying crime; second, willing participation by
the defendant; and third, an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy. United States v. Tucker, 376 F.3d 236, 238
(4th Cir. 2004). An overt act by one conspirator fulfills the
requirement as to all. United States v. Cardwell,
433 F.3d 378,
391 (4th Cir. 2005).
The Government asserts that sufficient evidence
supports Mbom’s and Tataw’s convictions of bank larceny,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), under either aider and abettor
liability or the Pinkerton doctrine. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)
(providing for aider and abettor liability; Pinkerton v. United
States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). “Aiders and abettors are
liable to the same extent as the principal.” United States v.
Akinkoye,
185 F.3d 192, 201 (4th Cir. 1999). A defendant is
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guilty of aiding and abetting if he has “knowingly associated
himself with and participated in the criminal venture.”
Kingrea, 573 F.3d at 197 (internal quotation marks omitted).
”The Pinkerton doctrine makes a person liable for substantive
offenses committed by a co-conspirator when their commission is
reasonably foreseeable and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
United States v. Ashley,
606 F.3d 135, 142-43 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 131 S. C. 3245 (2010).
Mbom argues that the Government failed to produce
sufficient evidence to conclude that he knew about the
conspiracy and its objectives, and that he intended to
participate in it.
The evidence linking Mbom with the conspiracy is more
than sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Mbom is
guilty of conspiracy to commit bank larceny. Substantial,
albeit circumstantial, evidence linked Mbom to the conspiracy.
See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (noting conspiracy may be proven “wholly by
circumstantial evidence” and providing examples of such
evidence). While Mbom offered innocent explanations for the
evidence adduced by the Government, the evidence also supported
the conclusion that Mbom was involved in a conspiracy to commit
bank larceny. After weighing the credibility of the witnesses,
the jury properly elected to accept the Government’s version of
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events. Further, because the Government established that Mbom
was guilty of conspiracy, conviction of bank larceny was
supported by sufficient evidence under the Pinkerton doctrine.
See Ashley, 606 F.3d at 142-43.
Tataw also argues that the Government failed to
produce sufficient evidence to support his convictions for bank
larceny and conspiracy to commit bank larceny. Like Mbom, Tataw
had an explanation as to the evidence against him. However,
weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the jury had
sufficient evidence to find Tataw was guilty of conspiring to
commit bank larceny. In addition, Tataw’s conviction for bank
larceny is supported under the Pinkerton doctrine.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Mbom and Tataw’s
convictions and sentences. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid in
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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