Filed: May 18, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1135 GERALDINE LAUTURE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SAINT AGNES HOSPITAL; ST. AGNES HOSPITAL, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:08-cv-00943-CCB) Argued: December 9, 2010 Decided: May 18, 2011 Before Sandra Day O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation, an
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1135 GERALDINE LAUTURE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SAINT AGNES HOSPITAL; ST. AGNES HOSPITAL, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:08-cv-00943-CCB) Argued: December 9, 2010 Decided: May 18, 2011 Before Sandra Day O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation, and..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1135
GERALDINE LAUTURE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SAINT AGNES HOSPITAL; ST. AGNES HOSPITAL,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:08-cv-00943-CCB)
Argued: December 9, 2010 Decided: May 18, 2011
Before Sandra Day O’CONNOR, Associate Justice (Retired), Supreme
Court of the United States, sitting by designation, and KING and
DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Justice O’Connor wrote the
opinion, in which Judge King and Judge Davis joined.
Fatai A. Suleman, AMITY, KUM & SULEMAN, PA, Greenbelt, Maryland,
for Appellant. Robert Ross Niccolini, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH,
SMOAK & STEWART, PC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
O’CONNOR, Associate Justice:
Geraldine Lauture appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to her employer, St. Agnes Hospital, on her
race- and national origin-based claims for discrimination,
hostile work environment, and constructive discharge in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. She also appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to St. Agnes on her state law claims
for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I
Appellant Geraldine Lauture, who is black and was born in
Haiti of Haitian parents, was employed by St. Agnes Hospital as
a Medical Laboratory Technician. Lauture holds an associate
degree in Medical Laboratory Technology and a Certificate of
Achievement for completing training in chemistry, hematology,
and microbiology. From July 2004 until December 2005, Lauture
worked the evening shift in the Microbiology Lab without any
direct supervision. In December 2005, Lauture was allowed to
switch to the day shift so that she could spend time with her
children. On the day shift, Lauture was supervised by Jane
Weiger and Margaret Kinch, the Microbiology Lab’s co-Lead
2
Technologists, who had permitted Lauture’s move from the evening
shift. Weiger and Kinch are both white and U.S.-born.
While working the day shift, Lauture began experiencing
interpersonal problems with Stephanie Rutter, a white, U.S.-born
Lab Assistant. On or about January 4, 2006, Kinch and Weiger
gave Lauture and Rutter documented verbal warnings that their
“inability to get along and work together” was interrupting the
work of others in the lab and had impacted patient care. J.A.
84. The warning further stated that the women were “dragging
other co-workers into their Mexican stand-off” and violating St.
Agnes’ Code of Conduct by “not treating co-workers with
respect.” Id.
Lauture was also disciplined for performance problems
stemming from her work on the day shift. On February 2, 2006,
Lauture received a documented verbal warning explaining eight
clinical errors she made between January 2 and January 23. The
counseling report stated that the incidents “indicat[e] lack of
basic [c]linical skills and knowledge needed to perform her
job.” J.A. 336. The report mandated that Lauture be retrained
by an “experienced technologist” from February 16 to March 3.
Lauture signed the report, but wrote above her signature, “I do
not agree with everything that was said on these comments.”
Id.
In her deposition, Lauture did not recall or denied most of the
3
errors and thought that she handled others appropriately by
going to her supervisors with the problem. Supp. J.A. 22–35.
On or about February 7, 2006, 1 Lauture was suspended for
three days for additional performance issues, documented in
another counseling report. J.A. 344–47. The report stated that
the incidents “show a fundamental lack of knowledge and the
resolutions to correcting these issues cannot be imparted by
additional training.” J.A. 345. Among the listed errors was
Lauture’s failure to properly heat a water bath. The report
alleged that the water bath error had resulted in a delay in
testing a specimen that caused many individuals to be exposed to
meningitis. J.A. 345–46. Weiger and Kinch signed the report,
but St. Agnes maintains that Aimee Ringgold, a black female who
is an Employee Relations Consultant at St. Agnes, made the
suspension decision. J.A. 134. Lauture wrote “Refusal to Sign”
on the report instead of her signature. J.A. 344.
Roughly two weeks later, Kinch and Weiger filed an
amendment to the February 7 report, explaining that the test
1
The date on the counseling report and next to the
signatures of Kinch and Weiger is February 7, 2006, but
Lauture’s “refusal to sign” is dated February 8, 2006. J.A. 344.
Lauture’s brief to this Court states that she was suspended on
February 8. Appellant’s Br. at 7. We refer to the date of
suspension as February 7, 2006, merely for the ease of
identifying the counseling report that instituted the
suspension. The precise date and exact order of events does not
influence our assessment of this case.
4
that had been delayed was a cryptococcal antigen test, not a
meningitis test. They therefore “apologize[d] for implying that
Geraldine was involved with the safety issue of notifying the
persons” potentially exposed to meningitis. J.A. 349. They did
not, however, alter Lauture’s suspension because “the issue
still remains that she did not perform proper corrective action
for the maintenance of the [] water bath,” which “caused a delay
in patient testing.” Id.
On February 8, 2006, Lauture met with St. Agnes’ Diversity
Manager, Sherry Buebendorf, a black woman, to complain about the
warning she had received and about her issues with Stephanie
Rutter. Lauture complained that she was being treated unfairly.
Buebendorf’s report on the meeting reflects that she and Aimee
Ringgold spoke to Kinch and Weiger, Lauture’s supervisors, and
concludes that, “After speaking with Ms. Lauture, reviewing
documentation in Ms. Lauture’s employee file and interviewing
Peg Kinch and Jane Weiger, I am unable to state that there were
any instances of discrimination against Ms. Lauture.” J.A. 342.
Lauture asserts that she never heard anything further about her
complaint. J.A. 239.
On February 17, 2006, Lauture submitted a letter to St.
Agnes Hospital, copying Kinch, Weiger, the Director of Human
Resources, and others. The letter addressed the warnings she
had received and explained why she viewed the underlying
5
assertions by her supervisors as false. She also stated, “I
have been discriminated against and my human rights have been
seriously violated.” J.A. 355. Lauture alleges that St. Agnes
did not respond to her letter or investigate its contents. J.A.
239.
Following her suspension, Lauture completed the two weeks
of retraining that the February 7 counseling report required. A
March 9, 2006, report by Mainaki Parikh, the technician who
retrained Lauture, explains that Lauture “knows her duties well”
and “is trying to improve.” J.A. 357. But it also states that
Lauture “is extremely slow,” “cannot perform a couple of tasks
at the same time,” “has a hard time understanding when a doctor
calls for results,” “did not ask . . . very many questions
during her training,” and “has potential to perform her duties
adequately, if she could take them responsibly and seriously.”
J.A. 357.
On March 9, 2006, apparently in response to a complaint by
Stephanie Rutter that Lauture was ignoring her, St. Agnes’ Human
Resources staff convened a meeting that was attended by Lauture,
Rutter, Finch, Weiger, Ringgold, Lab Director Jo Oliver, and
Colleen Meegan, another Human Resources employee. Lauture felt
intimidated and cried during the meeting. J.A. 239; Supp. J.A.
53. All of the other attendees are white and/or U.S.-born.
J.A. 239.
6
The next day Lauture submitted her resignation letter to
St. Agnes, giving two-week notice. Lauture explained in the
letter that her work situation was causing “insomnia, anxiety
and overwhelming stress.” J.A. 371. She stated that St. Agnes
had failed to address the “prejudice, discrimination and blatant
lies” to which she had been subjected and that, “[i]t is
unfortunate that this hospital . . . allows certain of its
employees to show a lack of [“brotherly love”] to myself,
another employee of a different skin color who comes from a
different place of birth.” Id.
St. Agnes made Lauture’s resignation effective immediately,
and security guards then escorted her out of the building.
On April 7, 2006, Lauture filed a Charge of Discrimination
against St. Agnes with the Baltimore Community Relations
Commission. On February 5, 2008, the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission issued Lauture a Notice of Right to Sue,
and Lauture filed suit against St. Agnes in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Maryland on April 15, 2008.
In the district court, Lauture’s initial complaint asserted
claims of discrimination, specifically disparate discipline,
hostile work environment, and constructive discharge under Title
VII. After discovery, St. Agnes moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted Lauture’s motion for leave to file an
amended complaint adding state law claims for breach of contract
7
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and granted
St. Agnes’ motion for summary judgment on all claims. Lauture
v. St. Agnes Hosp., No. CCB-08-943, 2009 WL 5166253, at *1 (D.
Md. Dec. 29, 2009). Lauture appeals.
II
We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de
novo, “‘view[ing] the facts and draw[ing] reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable’ to the nonmoving party,” here
Lauture. EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P.A., 609 F.3d 320, 322
(4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 378
(2007)). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Thus, “the mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment . . . . Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. 242,
247–48 (1986).
8
A
Lauture’s claim of race and national origin discrimination
rests on her contention that she was disciplined more severely
than Caucasian, U.S.-born employees who made laboratory errors
of similar severity. To establish a prima facie case of race or
national origin discrimination in the context of a disparate
discipline claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that he is
a member of the class protected by Title VII, (2) that the
prohibited conduct in which he engaged was comparable in
seriousness to misconduct of employees outside the protected
class, and (3) that the disciplinary measures enforced against
him were more severe than those enforced against those other
employees.” Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th
Cir. 1993) (citing Moore v. City of Charlotte, N.C.,
754 F.2d
1100, 1105–06 (4th Cir. 1985), which adapted the McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), Title VII burden-
shifting framework to a disparate discipline case). If a
plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, then the
burden shifts to the employer, which must articulate a non-
discriminatory reason for the difference in discipline. If the
employer “articulate[s] such a non-discriminatory reason, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
employer’s reasons are not true but instead serve as a pretext
for discrimination.”
Id. The “ultimate burden of proving that
9
the employer intentionally discriminated,” however, remains with
the plaintiff. Id. (citing Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981)).
The district court recognized, and the parties do not
dispute, that Lauture is a member of a protected class. But the
district court held that Lauture could not establish a prima
facie case of discrimination because “even if she could show
that employees outside her protected classes engaged in
misconduct of comparable seriousness, she cannot demonstrate
that they were disciplined less severely than she was.”
Lauture, 2009 WL 5166253, at *5. The district court examined
the discipline records of eight individuals that Lauture put
forward as comparators. It concluded that three—Rutter, Finch,
and Weiger—were not appropriate comparators because they held
different positions than Lauture.
Id. The district court
therefore considered the remaining five individuals: Deborah
Sanchez, Therese Dalrymple, Christina Graves, Sally Turner, and
Jackie Wilson—all of whom are white and/or U.S.-born. See J.A.
631 (List of microbiology associates, July 21, 2004 through Mar.
10, 2006). The district court held that even if, as Lauture
alleges, all five committed lab errors of equivalent seriousness
to Lauture’s, Lauture’s documented verbal warning, retraining,
and three-day suspension “place her squarely within the range of
discipline imposed by the defendant on Medical Technicians
10
committing laboratory errors,” especially given that at least
two St. Agnes employees outside of Lauture’s protected class
were terminated for laboratory errors. Id. at *6. 2
Lauture alleges that the retraining and suspension she
received for laboratory errors are outside the range of
discipline imposed on comparators outside her protected class.
Specifically, she argues that the district court erred in
considering the termination of two comparators who were
terminated in 2007, after Lauture filed her complaint in this
case. Appellant’s Br. at 19–20. Lauture argues that “the
relevant end-time period should be at the time [she] left St.
Agnes,” that is, March 2006. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5.
We note that, save one minor exception not involving a
laboratory error, all of the evidence that Lauture has put forth
to show the allegedly more lenient discipline of her comparators
arises from incidents that occurred after Lauture left St.
Agnes. J.A. 213–15. Thus Lauture’s proposed end date for the
discipline of comparators would eliminate not just the evidence
of the terminations that she seeks to exclude, but all of the
evidence as to the treatment of her comparators. In essence,
her proposed rule would bar her comparator evidence, and her
2
These facts are verified by exhibits filed with the Court
under seal to protect the privacy of third parties.
11
claim would fail on that basis. We decline her invitation to
establish a fixed evidentiary end date.
Although comparators must be similarly situated, we have
recognized that “the comparison will never involve precisely the
same set of work-related offenses occurring over the same period
of time and under the same sets of circumstances.” Cook, 988
F.2d at 511. We therefore consider whether the comparator
discipline evidence in the record, taken as a whole, is
sufficient for Lauture to show that she was more severely
disciplined than comparably situated employees outside her class
who made laboratory errors. We conclude that she has not made
that showing. Even if Lauture is correct that some of the
Caucasian, U.S.-born medical technicians were treated more
favorably and not suspended or retrained for committing
laboratory errors, the termination of two Caucasian, U.S.-born
lab technicians was more severe than the suspension and
retraining imposed on Lauture. Thus, Lauture’s discipline was
within the “range of discipline” that St. Agnes typically
imposed for laboratory errors, and “there was no disparity of
treatment from which one could conclude that [Lauture’s]
discipline was the product of racial [or national-origin]
animus.”
Id. at 512.
Because we hold that Lauture did not proffer a prima facie
case of disparate discipline, we need not reach the district
12
court’s alternative holding that Lauture failed to demonstrate
that St. Agnes’ stated reason for the discipline—Lauture’s poor
job performance—was pretextual. Lauture, 2009 WL 5166253, at
*6–*7.
B
Lauture bases her hostile work environment claim on the
following assertions: (1) she was disciplined more harshly than
similarly situated employees outside her protected classes; (2)
St. Agnes failed to investigate her discrimination complaints;
(3) St. Agnes responded with more attention to complaints of
employees outside her protected classes; (4) St. Agnes falsely
accused her of causing a meningitis exposure; (5) a report used
the phrase “Mexican stand-off” in reference to her disputes with
Stephanie Rutter; and (6) a report stated that she was
untrainable. Appellant’s Br. at 27.
To demonstrate a race- or national origin-based hostile
work environment, Lauture must show that a reasonable jury could
find she was the subject of conduct that was: (1) unwelcome, (2)
based on race or national origin, and (3) “sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive atmosphere,” and that (4) there is some basis for
imposing liability on the employer. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto
Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183–84 (4th Cir. 2001). “Establishing the
third element requires that the plaintiff show that the work
13
environment was not only subjectively hostile, but also
objectively so.” Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir.
2011). That is, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she
subjectively perceived the environment to be hostile and that
“the conduct was such that a reasonable person in the
plaintiff’s position would have found the environment
objectively hostile or abusive.” EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.,
521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).
To determine whether the conduct at issue was objectively
severe, we must examine the totality of the circumstances,
including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
Id. (quoting
Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The plaintiff
may offer either direct evidence of discrimination or evidence
that she was treated differently than similarly situated
employees outside of her protected classes. Gilliam v. South
Carolina Dep’t of Juvenile Justice,
474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir.
2007).
The district court correctly held that Lauture has shown
neither that the alleged discrimination was based on her race or
national origin, nor that the conduct was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to be abusive. Lauture offers no direct evidence of
14
discrimination. 3 For the reasons explained above, she has not
shown that she was disciplined more severely than her white,
U.S.-born coworkers. Further, uncontroverted evidence in the
record shows that contrary to Lauture’s allegation, St. Agnes
did investigate the complaints Lauture made in her February 8,
2006, meeting with Diversity Manager Sherry Buebendorf. J.A.
341–42. The fact that Lauture was unaware of the investigation
is immaterial. Although St. Agnes’ actions, including the
erroneous meningitis accusation, and perceived better treatment
of others clearly upset Lauture, the alleged actions are not
“sufficiently severe and pervasive to create an objectively
abusive atmosphere.” Honor v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 383
F.3d 180, 191 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted); cf. Sunbelt
Rentals, 521 F.3d at 316–18 (reversing
summary judgment to defendant employer where employees, inter
alia, repeatedly called Muslim plaintiff derogatory names,
mocked his attendance at prayer sessions, and defaced his
business cards).
3
The district court correctly noted that the use of the
phrase “Mexican stand-off” is not direct evidence of
discrimination given the common definition of the term, however
unfortunate and inappropriate it may be as a choice of words.
Lauture, 2009 WL 5166253, at *8 n.8 (quoting Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary 1425 (Philip Babcock Gove et al., eds.,
1986), defining “Mexican standoff” as a “draw” or “deadlock”).
15
C
Lauture relies on the same factual allegations to support
her constructive discharge claim as she does to support her
hostile work environment claim. The immediate catalyst for her
resignation was the March 9, 2006 meeting, during which she felt
intimidated and cried.
In this circuit, an employee alleging constructive
discharge must “allege and prove two elements: (1) the
deliberateness of [the employer’s] actions, motivated by racial
[or national origin] bias, and (2) the objective intolerability
of the working conditions.” Honor, 383 F.3d at 187. “To prove
deliberateness, the plaintiff must prove ‘that the actions
complained of were intended by the employer as an effort to
force the employee to quit.’” Whitten v. Fred’s, Inc.,
601 F.3d
231, 248 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Martin v. Cavalier Hotel
Corp.,
48 F.3d 1343, 1354 (4th Cir. 1995)). 4 This court has
4
In dicta in Whitten, we noted that this circuit’s
deliberateness requirement is “arguably in some tension with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders,
542 U.S. 129 (2004).”
Whitten, 601 F.3d at 248 n.8. Lauture
argues on that basis that we should no longer require
constructive discharge plaintiffs in hostile work environment
situations to prove that the employer intended to force the
employee to quit. As we noted in Whitten, circuit precedent
requires the employer intent showing, and one panel of the court
cannot overrule a prior panel.
Id. at 249 n.8. We therefore
decline Lauture’s invitation to do away with the intent
requirement.
16
insisted that constructive discharge claims be “carefully
cabined” because the claim is “so open to abuse.” Honor, 383
F.3d at 187. Our prior cases have explained that
“dissatisfaction with work assignments, a feeling of being
unfairly criticized, or difficult or unpleasant working
conditions are not so intolerable as to compel a reasonable
person to resign.”
Id. (quoting Williams v. Giant Food Inc.,
370 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2004)).
Lauture has shown neither the intolerability of her working
conditions nor deliberateness by St. Agnes intended to force her
to quit. Lauture’s complaints center on her perception that she
was unfairly criticized for her performance and the personal
problems she and Rutter experienced and that her complaints were
not investigated, especially in comparison to those of other
employees. Although these circumstances were unpleasant for
Lauture, they are akin to the “feeling of being unfairly
criticized” and “unpleasant working conditions” that we held
insufficient for a constructive discharge claim in Williams v.
Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d at 434 (finding working conditions not
intolerable where supervisors yelled at the employee, told her
she was a poor manager, gave her poor performance evaluations,
chastised her in front of customers, and once required her to
work with an injury). Taken as a whole Lauture’s allegations do
not rise to the level of intolerability. In addition, Lauture
17
has adduced no evidence that St. Agnes’ actions were
deliberately intended to force her to quit or that the actions
were motivated by race or national origin bias. Honor, 383 F.3d
at 186–87.
We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to St. Agnes on this claim.
D
In addition to her federal Title VII claims, the district
court allowed Lauture to amend her complaint to add Maryland
state law claims for breach of contract and intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
Lauture alleges that St. Agnes is liable for breach of
contract for violating its Associate Handbook by suspending her
and terminating her immediately upon receipt of her resignation
letter. The district court held that the handbook was not a
contract and granted summary judgment to St. Agnes. We agree.
The parties do not dispute that under Maryland law, an
employee handbook can give rise to a breach of contract claim
but that an employer can nonetheless disclaim contractual
liability in the handbook. See Mayers v. Washington Adventist
Hosp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 743, 751 (D. Md. 2001) (citing Bagwell v.
Peninsula Reg. Med. Ctr.,
665 A.2d 297, 309 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995)). They merely disagree over the clarity of the disclaimer
in St. Agnes’ handbook. Lauture does not specify whether she
18
relies on the 2004 or 2005 handbook, but the difference between
the two is minimal. The 2005 version of the handbook states, in
relevant part,
Neither the Handbook nor the personnel policies manual
are intended to set forth either express or implied
contractual obligations of St. Agnes. Any implication
to the contrary is expressly disclaimed. St. Agnes
retains all rights to change the provisions and
contents of this Handbook, including personnel
policies, procedures, benefits, or any other
conditions of employment at any time as circumstances
warrant. J.A. 668.
Lauture asserts that the disclaimer is ambiguous. Appellant’s
Br. at 36. We disagree. The express disclaimer of contractual
liability is sufficiently clear to render the Handbook not a
contract and thus not susceptible to breach. Cf. Mayers, 131 F.
Supp. 2d at 751. Because the Handbook is not a contract,
Lauture’s further contention that it is a contract of adhesion
that should be construed against St. Agnes is also unavailing.
Lauture’s second state law claim was for IIED. She bases
this claim on St. Agnes’ decision to make her resignation
effective immediately and the fact that she was escorted from
the building by security guards. Under Maryland law, “[a] claim
of IIED has four elements: ‘(1) The conduct must be intentional
or reckless; (2) [t]he conduct must be extreme and outrageous;
(3) [t]here must be a causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the emotional distress; (4) [t]he emotional distress
must be severe.’” Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 758 A.2d 95,
19
113 (Md. 2000) (alterations in original) (quoting Harris v.
Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977)). All four of these
elements must be pleaded and proven with specificity.
Id.
Lauture has failed to show that St. Agnes’ conduct was
“extreme and outrageous.” Immediately accepting Lauture’s
resignation and having her escorted out of the building by
security guards simply does not constitute conduct “so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community” as
the Maryland courts have required.
Harris, 380 A.2d at 614
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, comment d (1965)).
St. Agnes’ conduct is unlike that which the Maryland courts have
found to be extreme and outrageous. See, e.g., Batson v.
Shiflett,
602 A.2d 1191, 1216 (Md. 1992) (listing cases of
outrageous and extreme conduct, including, for example, a
psychologist who had sexual relations with the plaintiff’s wife
while acting as the couple’s marriage counselor). It instead
falls within the “mere insults, indignities, . . . annoyances,
[and] petty oppressions” to which Maryland courts have not
extended IIED liability.
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts §46, comment d (1965)).
In addition, Lauture has not shown that she suffered severe
emotional distress. Although we must consider the “personality
20
of the individual to whom the misconduct is directed,” Batson,
602 A.2d at 1216, the burden of showing emotional distress to be
severe is a high one,
Manikhi, 758 A.2d at 114. Lauture’s
amended complaint makes only the conclusory claim she has
suffered severe and extreme emotional distress. Her brief adds
that she has taken acupuncture treatments. The Maryland courts
have described the requisite level of distress as that “of such
substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man
in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.”
Harris, 380 A.2d at 617 (quoting Fletcher v. Western Nat’l Life
Ins. Co.,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)). Lauture’s
allegations are “unaccompanied by any evidentiary particulars,”
id., and insufficient to surmount the high burden for IIED
claims.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to St. Agnes Hospital on all claims.
AFFIRMED
21
