Filed: May 09, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1813 EARNEST PARISH, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SIEMENS MEDICAL SOLUTIONS USA, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (5:08-cv-00622-BR) Submitted: April 14, 2011 Decided: May 9, 2011 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished p
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-1813 EARNEST PARISH, III, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. SIEMENS MEDICAL SOLUTIONS USA, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge. (5:08-cv-00622-BR) Submitted: April 14, 2011 Decided: May 9, 2011 Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished pe..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1813
EARNEST PARISH, III,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SIEMENS MEDICAL SOLUTIONS USA, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:08-cv-00622-BR)
Submitted: April 14, 2011 Decided: May 9, 2011
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Angela Newell Gray, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Patricia L. Holland, Nicola A.L. Prall, JACKSON LEWIS LLP, Cary,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Earnest Parish appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Appellee Siemens Medical Solutions USA
(“Siemens”) on Parish’s racial discrimination, retaliation, and
disparate treatment claims. We affirm.
Parish, an African-American, was hired by Siemens in
1998, and by 2004, had been promoted to the level of Call Center
Supervisor. He was promoted by Operations Manager Freda
Kuhfahl, and on her retirement she was replaced by Chloe
Mazuroski. Prior to retiring, Kuhfahl prepared a 2004-2005
performance evaluation for Parish, indicating performance
deficiencies in a number of areas. Within a few months of
assuming the position of Operations Manager, Mazuroski placed
Parish on a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) in order to
address several complaints from other supervisors and from
Parish’s subordinates, and remedy what she saw as continuing
performance issues.
In the course of the PIP, Parish requested that his
staff be able to meet with a representative from Human Resources
(“HR”), without him present, in order to raise whatever concerns
they might have about his management. Parish’s subordinates met
with Kelly Walsh, a human resources (“HR”) Business Partner, and
they verbally shared their concerns with her regarding Parish’s
management technique and ability. During meetings with Walsh,
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members of Parish’s staff indicated that they did not feel that
he gave them appropriate recognition, that his training was
“horrendous,” that he held them to “ridiculous expectations,”
that they were not treated fairly by Parish, and that he was
“hard to trust” because he did not follow through with
communications. Walsh reported these findings to Parish and to
Siemens.
While he was on the PIP, Parish complained of
discrimination to HR representatives at Siemens. He stated that
she only singled out African-American employees for harsh
treatment. Other African-American employees echoed Parish’s
concerns about Mazuroski.
In light of Parish’s continued performance issues
despite the PIP, Mazuroski informed Parish that he could either
accept a demotion, or he would have thirty days to resolve the
issues or face termination. Parish chose to accept a demotion
rather than face termination. In addition, while he was on the
PIP, Parish applied for another position at Siemens, but was not
selected. The position was filled by a Caucasian woman.
Parish ultimately brought suit against Siemens in the
district court. He claimed that Siemens violated Title VII, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010), and 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). He alleged discrimination, retaliation,
and disparate treatment. Siemens moved for summary judgment,
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and the district court granted the motion. The court concluded
that Parish was not performing his job at a satisfactory level
and thus could not sustain a discrimination claim. The court
also concluded that there was no basis for a retaliation claim
because Parish had shown no causal relationship between his
protected activity and the decision not to hire him for the
other position. Finally, with respect to Parish’s claim of
disparate treatment, the court concluded that Parish had adduced
no evidence in support of the claim. This appeal followed.
This court reviews a district court’s order granting
summary judgment de novo. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d
686, 694 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “At the summary judgment
stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those
facts.” Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Summary judgment “should be rendered if the
pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]here is no issue
for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986);
see also
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (“Where the record taken as a
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whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”)
Absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination,
Title VII and § 1981 claims are analyzed under the burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973). See Bryant v. Bell Atl. Md.,
Inc.,
288 F.3d 124, 133 n.7 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that
the elements of a discrimination claim are the same under both
Title VII and § 1981). Under McDonnell Douglas, once a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the defendant to come forward with a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
decision. If the defendant meets this burden, the onus returns
to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason is pretextual
and that discrimination was the motivating force behind the
decision. McDonnell
Douglass, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
Parish had to prove:
(1) [he] is a member of a protected class; (2) [he]
suffered adverse employment action; (3) [he] was
performing [his] job duties at a level that met [his]
employer’s legitimate expectations at the time of the
adverse employment action; and (4) the position
remained open or was filled by similarly qualified
applicants outside the protected class.
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285
(4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
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We conclude that the district court did not err in
concluding that Parish failed to make a prima facie showing of
discrimination. While Parish is a member of a protected class,
and did suffer an adverse employment action, he was not
performing his duties at a level that met Siemens’s legitimate
expectations. The record is replete with examples of management
dissatisfaction with Parish’s performance. Kuhfahl, Mazuroski,
and Walsh received frequent and harsh complaints from Parish’s
subordinates, his colleagues, and other groups in the
organization. Mazuroski offered specific performance
improvement guidelines, and Parish was simply unsuccessful at
improving his performance to a level that met his employer’s
expectations. Under these facts, we see no error in the
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Siemens.
Parish argues that he was meeting his employer’s
expectations, and offers statements from one of his subordinates
and a fellow supervisor in support of his claim. As the
district court noted, however, this evidence is not relevant to
the question of whether, from the perspective of the employer,
Parish was adequately performing his job duties. See Holland v.
Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2007) (“it
is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant”).
Because Parish has not made out a prima facie case, we
affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with
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oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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