Filed: Apr. 18, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4617 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. RUDY AMILCAR MARROQUIN-ZUNIGA, a/k/a Rudy Amilicar Marroquin-Zuniga, a/k/a Rudy Marroquin, a/k/a Ilder Martinez Catreras, a/k/a Rudi Marroquin, a/k/a Rudy Amilca Marroqui Zuniga, a/k/a Amilcar Marroquin, a/k/a Ilder Martinez- Cortreras, a/k/a Amilicar Marrorquin, a/k/a Acero Marroquin Gonzalez, a/k/a Amilcar Martinez Marroquin, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the Un
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4617 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. RUDY AMILCAR MARROQUIN-ZUNIGA, a/k/a Rudy Amilicar Marroquin-Zuniga, a/k/a Rudy Marroquin, a/k/a Ilder Martinez Catreras, a/k/a Rudi Marroquin, a/k/a Rudy Amilca Marroqui Zuniga, a/k/a Amilcar Marroquin, a/k/a Ilder Martinez- Cortreras, a/k/a Amilicar Marrorquin, a/k/a Acero Marroquin Gonzalez, a/k/a Amilcar Martinez Marroquin, Defendant – Appellant. Appeal from the Uni..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4617
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RUDY AMILCAR MARROQUIN-ZUNIGA, a/k/a Rudy Amilicar
Marroquin-Zuniga, a/k/a Rudy Marroquin, a/k/a Ilder Martinez
Catreras, a/k/a Rudi Marroquin, a/k/a Rudy Amilca Marroqui
Zuniga, a/k/a Amilcar Marroquin, a/k/a Ilder Martinez-
Cortreras, a/k/a Amilicar Marrorquin, a/k/a Acero Marroquin
Gonzalez, a/k/a Amilcar Martinez Marroquin,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:10-cr-00021-TSE-1)
Submitted: March 29, 2011 Decided: April 18, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Geremy Kamens,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, Research
and Writing Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil
H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Elizabeth A. Gerlach,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Rudy Amilcar Marroquin-Zuniga, a citizen of Guatemala,
appeals his sentence at the low end of his advisory guideline
range to eighteen months in prison after pleading guilty to
unlawful reentry of a deported alien following an aggravated
felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2)
(2006). On appeal, Marroquin-Zuniga contends that his sentence
is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by the district court
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this
review requires us to ensure that the district court committed
no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating
the guideline range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence.
United States v. Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). We
then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed, taking into account the totality of the circumstances.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. On appeal, we presume that a sentence
within a properly calculated guideline range is reasonable.
United States v. Allen,
491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007).
In sentencing, the district court should first
calculate the guideline range and give the parties an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem
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appropriate. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th
Cir. 2007). The district court should then consider the
relevant § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the
sentence requested by either party.
Id. When rendering a
sentence, the district court must make and place on the record
an individualized assessment based on the particular facts of
the case before the court.
Carter, 564 F.3d at 328, 330. “Such
individualized treatment is necessary to consider every
convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique
study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes
magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.”
Id. at 328
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In explaining the chosen sentence, the “sentencing
judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court
that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,”
but when the judge decides simply to apply the guidelines,
“doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.”
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). This is
“because guidelines sentences themselves are in many ways
tailored to the individual and reflect approximately two decades
of close attention to federal sentencing policy.” United States
v. Hernandez,
603 F.3d 267, 271 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). While a district court
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must consider the statutory factors and explain its sentence, it
need not explicitly reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor
on the record, particularly when the district court imposes a
sentence within a properly calculated guideline range. United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
Marroquin-Zuniga contends his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not address one of
the disparity arguments he made in writing before the sentencing
hearing. While the district court noted it had counsel’s brief,
asked about and then addressed the disparity argument he made at
the hearing, and gave him several opportunities to make whatever
argument he wanted, he did not address this argument at the
hearing. In any event, having reviewed the record, we conclude
that the district court adequately explained its decision to
sentence Marroquin-Zuniga at the low end of his guideline range.
He next contends that his sentence at the low end of
his guideline range is unduly harsh and therefore substantively
unreasonable for three reasons. First, while he concedes his
offense level was correctly enhanced under the guidelines based
on his prior aggravated felony, he contends the enhancement is
not warranted simply because he received a suspended sentence
for the aggravated felony of 365 days rather than 364 days.
Second, he argues his sentence is also unwarranted when compared
to sentences of offenders in fast-track districts. Finally, he
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contends that since the longest sentence he ever received before
was only seven months, a lower sentence would have been
sufficient to deter him from returning to the United States.
Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Marroquin-Zuniga has not rebutted the presumption
that his sentence is reasonable, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in sentencing him to eighteen months.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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