Filed: May 18, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4901 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. SAMUEL MELVIN, SR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:92-cr-00222-NCT-1) Submitted: May 5, 2011 Decided: May 18, 2011 Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James B. Craven, II
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-4901 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. SAMUEL MELVIN, SR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:92-cr-00222-NCT-1) Submitted: May 5, 2011 Decided: May 18, 2011 Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James B. Craven, III..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4901
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SAMUEL MELVIN, SR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:92-cr-00222-NCT-1)
Submitted: May 5, 2011 Decided: May 18, 2011
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Samuel Melvin, Sr., appeals from the district court’s
imposition of a twelve-month sentence following revocation of
his supervised release. On appeal, Melvin contends that the
district court imposed a plainly unreasonable sentence because
the court failed to provide adequate reasoning and relied too
heavily on the probation officer’s recommendation. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
A sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release should be affirmed if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United
States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438-39 (4th Cir. 2006). In
making this determination, we first consider whether the
sentence is unreasonable.
Id. at 438. “This initial inquiry
takes a more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of
fact and the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review
for guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In making the review, we “follow
generally the procedural and substantive considerations that
[are] employ[ed] in [the] review of original sentences, . . .
with some necessary modifications to take into account the
unique nature of supervised release revocation sentences.”
Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39.
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We will affirm if the sentence is not unreasonable.
Id. at 439. Only if a sentence is found procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will we “decide whether the sentence
is plainly unreasonable.”
Id. “[T]he court ultimately has
broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a
term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.”
Id.
When imposing sentence, the district court must
provide individualized reasoning:
The sentencing judge should set forth enough to
satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority. . . . Where the defendant . . . presents
nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence
than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a
district judge should address the party’s arguments
and explain why he has rejected those arguments.
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The
Carter rationale applies to revocation hearings; however, “[a]
court need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a
revocation sentence as it must be when imposing a
post-conviction sentence.” United States v. Thompson,
595 F.3d
544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting that a district court’s
reasoning may be “clear from context” and the court’s statements
throughout the sentencing hearing may be considered). In fact,
in a case of supervised release revocation, an appellate court
“may be hard-pressed to find any explanation for within-range,
revocation sentences insufficient given the amount of deference
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. . . afford[ed to] district courts when imposing these
sentences; but a district court may not simply impose sentence
without giving any indication of its reasons for doing so.” Id.
We conclude that Melvin’s revocation sentence was
reasonable. While the district court’s explanation was brief,
its rationale is clear — it imposed a sentence at the top of
Melvin’s Guidelines range because of his history of supervised
release violations and repeated criminal conduct. It is clear
from a review of the record that the court listened attentively
to Melvin’s arguments and rejected his request for release based
upon Melvin’s inability to conform his actions to the law.
Despite Melvin’s allegations to the contrary, we further
conclude that the court did not cede sentencing authority to the
probation officer. Instead, the court merely requested the
probation officer’s opinion and concurred with his conclusions.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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