Filed: Sep. 08, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-5299 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MARSHALL MONROE, Defendant – Appellant. 11-4024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER RONDELL ROGERS, Defendant – Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:08-cr-00043-CMH-1; 1:08-cr-00043-CMH-3) Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: Sept
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 10-5299 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. MARSHALL MONROE, Defendant – Appellant. 11-4024 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER RONDELL ROGERS, Defendant – Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:08-cr-00043-CMH-1; 1:08-cr-00043-CMH-3) Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: Septe..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-5299
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MARSHALL MONROE,
Defendant – Appellant.
11-4024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER RONDELL ROGERS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:08-cr-00043-CMH-1; 1:08-cr-00043-CMH-3)
Submitted: July 29, 2011 Decided: September 8, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Douglas A. Steinberg, Alexandria, Virginia, Paul P. Vangellow,
Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellants. Neil H. MacBride,
United States Attorney, Michael E. Rich, Assistant United States
Attorney, Erin Creegan, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Marshall Monroe and Christopher Rogers were convicted
of numerous offenses related to a series of convenience store
robberies that occurred in October 2007. Monroe received an
aggregate sentence of 300 months — considerably above his
advisory Guidelines range of 63-78 months. Rogers was sentenced
to 240 months in prison — also well above his advisory
Guidelines range of 97-121 months. We previously vacated both
sentences because the district court failed to make the
individualized assessments required by Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38 (2007). United States v. Monroe, 396 F. App’x 33
(4th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-5050). Monroe and Rogers now appeal
their respective terms of imprisonment imposed at resentencing.
We affirm.
I
At Monroe’s resentencing, the district court rejected
defense counsel’s request for a sentence within the advisory
Guidelines range. The court determined that an upward variance
was necessary. In this regard, the court stated:
The upward departure is appropriate here because of
the circumstances of the offense. Mr. Monroe . . .
was involved in four . . . armed robberies. Two of
the . . . robberies resulted in an assault of the
victim, one which he even dragged through the door of
the store, inside the store, and assaulted. . . .
3
[I]t is true . . . that you’re relatively young and
the circumstances of your upbringing should be
considered, but I don’t believe that that outweighs
the depravity and the viciousness of these crimes and
the number of them that were committed within such a
short period of time. It’s necessary to impose a
substantial sentence to protect the public and to
deter you and others from such kind of conduct.
The court sentenced Monroe, as it originally had, to an
aggregate 300-month term of imprisonment.
At Rogers’ resentencing, defense counsel asked the
court to take into consideration the fact that, since his
incarceration, Rogers had completed his GED, a parenting class,
and an educational program in carpentry skills, and was working
in the prison’s carpentry department. Additionally, counsel
asked the court to consider that Rogers did not enter any of the
stores that were robbed but instead served as his codefendants’ 1
driver.
The court sentenced Rogers to 210 months in prison.
In imposing sentence, the court stated:
[I have considered] the nature and circumstances of
this offense, the fact of these three robberies, [and
that] both of [Rogers’ codefendants] were using
firearms and . . . engaging in some very reckless
conduct which you knew about. I understand that you
drove the car, but you knew what was going on and you
provided the means for them to go ahead and to do
that.
For that I find that there should be a fairly
substantial upward departure from the guidelines to
1
James Tyer was the third codefendant.
4
meet the needs of punishment and deterrence, not only
punishment for you but deterrence for others that do
this kind of conduct.
However, you’ve come here with something the other
codefendants didn’t, some record of some
accomplishments. It has been some time since you were
sentenced previously, and you’ve come here and
demonstrated that you’ve been doing something
constructive during that time and I believe that you
ought to get credit for that.
II
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we
review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. at 51. We
vacated the sentences originally imposed because the district
court committed procedural error when it failed “to adequately
explain the chosen sentence — including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.” See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In evaluating a district court’s explanation for the
sentence imposed, we have held that, although a district court
must consider the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing
factors and explain the sentence, it need not explicitly refer
to § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record. United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). However,
the district court “must make an individualized assessment based
on the facts presented,” and apply the “relevant § 3553(a)
factors to the specific circumstances of the case before it.”
5
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The district
court must also “state in open court the particular reasons
supporting its chosen sentence” and “set forth enough to
satisfy” us that it has “considered the parties’ arguments and
has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In other words, the reasons articulated by
the district court need not be “couched in the precise language
of § 3553(a),” as long as the reasons “can be matched to a
factor appropriate for consideration under that statute and
[are] clearly tied to [the defendant’s] particular situation.”
United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007).
Both Monroe and Rogers argue that the district court
inadequately justified the upward variances and failed to
mention § 3553(a) when imposing sentence. Separately, Monroe
contends that his sentence was not supported by a sufficiently
extensive individualized assessment. We reject these arguments.
In Monroe’s case, the court found that an upward
variance was warranted for several reasons. First, Monroe
committed four robberies — two of which involved assaults on the
victims — in a short period of time. The court also stated that
Monroe’s crimes exhibited “depravity and viciousness.” These
factors, as well as the need to protect the public and to deter
6
further criminal behavior, outweighed the fact that Monroe was
“relatively young” and had experienced a difficult childhood. It
is irrelevant that the court did not specifically refer to
§ 3553(a) because the court considered several pertinent
§ 3553(a) factors when imposing sentence. We conclude that the
court, contrary to Monroe’s argument, sufficiently explained the
variance and made an adequate individualized assessment under
Gall and Carter.
Similarly, in Rogers’ case, the decision to impose a
variant sentence was based on a variety of § 3553(a) factors.
Rogers participated in three robberies by driving his
codefendants to the various stores, and he was fully aware of
what his codefendants were doing. The court also stated that
the “substantial upward departure . . . [would] meet the needs
of punishment and deterrence.” Finally, the court found that
these factors were tempered somewhat by Rogers’ accomplishments
in prison. We conclude that the court adequately explained its
reasons for the variance and performed an appropriate
individualized assessment. 2
2
The contention that the court “sentence[d] Rogers to the
exact same sentence as his codefendants” has no merit,
especially because Rogers was sentenced to 210 months in prison.
7
III
We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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