Filed: Jan. 25, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4993 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEONTRAYVIA ADAMS, Defendant – Appellant. No. 11-4035 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEONTRAYVIA ADAMS, Defendant – Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge. (5:07-cr-00006-FL; 5:07-cr-00006-FL-1) Argued: October 26, 2011 Decided: Januar
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4993 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEONTRAYVIA ADAMS, Defendant – Appellant. No. 11-4035 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DEONTRAYVIA ADAMS, Defendant – Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan, Chief District Judge. (5:07-cr-00006-FL; 5:07-cr-00006-FL-1) Argued: October 26, 2011 Decided: January..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4993
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEONTRAYVIA ADAMS,
Defendant – Appellant.
No. 11-4035
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEONTRAYVIA ADAMS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at New Bern. Louise W. Flanagan,
Chief District Judge. (5:07-cr-00006-FL; 5:07-cr-00006-FL-1)
Argued: October 26, 2011 Decided: January 25, 2012
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Diaz wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Niemeyer and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
ARGUED: Paul K. Sun, Jr., ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
DIAZ, Circuit Judge:
Deontrayvia Adams was convicted of firearm and drug charges
based on evidence seized after officers stopped him for failing
to wear a seatbelt. Adams moved to suppress the evidence,
contending that the traffic stop was invalid because it occurred
on a private drive where the seatbelt ordinance did not apply.
Adams also sought suppression of post-arrest statements he made
admitting to possession of the firearm and drugs. The district
court denied Adams’s motion.
We conclude that the stop was justified because, regardless
of whether they stopped Adams on a private drive, officers
possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that a seatbelt
violation had occurred or was about to occur. We also hold that
Adams waived his Miranda 1 rights prior to making the inculpatory
statements. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Adams’s motion
to suppress.
I.
A.
Officers J.S. McCann and Shawn Thompson of the Raleigh
Police Department (“RPD”) were patrolling the southeast district
of Raleigh, North Carolina at 4:00 a.m. when they saw Adams
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
driving a green GMC Yukon sports utility vehicle (“SUV”). The
officers observed Adams stop at a stop sign and then idle there
rather than proceed through the intersection. Driving in a
marked police car, the officers rounded a corner and approached
Adams at the intersection. As the officers neared the SUV,
Adams quickly turned and drove away. McCann found this behavior
suspicious and radioed Officer Christopher Clark, who was also
patrolling the area, to advise him to be on the lookout for the
green SUV.
Shortly thereafter, Clark saw Adams and began following
him. From a distance, Clark watched as Adams made a series of
turns on public streets, resulting in a u-shaped path. The
circuitous route coupled with Adams’s pattern of accelerating
after making each turn aroused Clark’s suspicion. Adams
eventually turned onto Angelus Drive, a circular road lined with
parking spaces that runs through an apartment complex.
According to Clark, Angelus Drive is “basically a big parking
lot.” J.A. 106.
Clark followed the SUV onto Angelus Drive, where he
observed Adams make a three-point turn. Clark watched as
Adams’s SUV approached his car from the front on its way back to
the public road. When the SUV was within twenty to twenty-five
feet of Clark’s police car, he noticed that Adams was not
wearing a seatbelt and turned on his blue lights to initiate a
4
traffic stop. The stop occurred near the end of Angelus Drive,
where the road adjoins the public street. Although it was still
dark, Angelus Drive was well lit by streetlights and the lights
on the surrounding apartment buildings.
Clark approached Adams, who remained seated in the SUV, and
requested his license and registration. Clark found Adams
nervous during their initial conversation. After obtaining
Adams’s identification, Clark returned to his police car to
conduct a background check. At that point, McCann and Thompson
arrived, and McCann assumed the lead role in the stop. McCann
approached Adams, who was still seated in the SUV, and asked him
what he was doing in the neighborhood. Adams explained that he
was looking for a female friend whom he recently met. During
the conversation, Adams provided conflicting descriptions of
where the woman lived, initially indicating she lived to the
west of Angelus Drive and later stating that she lived to the
southeast.
While talking with McCann, Adams leaned out the driver’s
window with his arms somewhat outside the vehicle. Adams was
chatting nervously and loudly chewing gum, behavior that led
McCann to suspect Adams was trying to divert his attention.
McCann ordered Adams out of the vehicle. Adams initially
resisted but eventually complied after several additional
requests.
5
After Adams exited the SUV, McCann instructed him to place
his hands on the vehicle to allow McCann to conduct a pat-down
search for weapons. During the pat-down, McCann twice ordered
Adams to keep his hands raised after Adams lowered them to his
waist. McCann found a folding knife in Adams’s back pocket and
felt what he believed to be marijuana in his front left pocket.
Adams initially ignored McCann’s questions about the suspected
substance but eventually confirmed that it was marijuana.
McCann retrieved the contraband and discovered a single bag
containing four small units of marijuana.
McCann then placed Adams under arrest and searched Adams
and his vehicle. Officers found $2365 in Adams’s pocket and a
nine-millimeter handgun in the center console of the SUV. The
officers then transported Adams to the Raleigh police station.
On the way to the station, McCann notified Sergeant Craig Haines
of the arrest.
At the station, Haines and McCann met with Adams in an
interview room. Haines read Adams his Miranda rights using a
standard RPD form. Adams acknowledged that he understood his
rights but refused to sign the form. After reading Adams his
rights, Haines asked McCann to leave the interview room. Haines
was concerned that the presence of the uniformed arresting
officer was preventing Haines from building rapport with Adams.
6
Haines did not videotape or record the interview but did
take contemporaneous handwritten notes. According to Haines,
there was an RPD policy at the time that prohibited audiovisual
recordings of interviews in noncapital cases. Haines attempted
to question Adams about the marijuana and firearm, but Adams
repeatedly interrupted Haines with his own questions about the
legality of the stop and the charges he faced. After
approximately five minutes of unproductive conversation, Haines
left the interview room to assist the other officers with
paperwork.
Less than five minutes after Haines’s departure, Adams
called out for Haines to return. After Haines reentered the
interview room, Adams said he was not trying to be difficult and
was willing to talk. During the second interrogation, Adams
confirmed that he regularly smoked marijuana and possessed the
firearm for protection from a man who shot at him following a
dispute over a female.
B.
A federal grand jury charged Adams in a two-count
indictment with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a
convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924,
and possession of a quantity of marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 844(a). Eleven days after the deadline for pretrial
7
motions expired, Adams filed a motion to suppress. The district
court denied Adams leave to file an untimely motion and ordered
the motion to suppress stricken. Adams was convicted by a jury
on both counts and subsequently sentenced by the district court.
Adams appealed. Among the issues Adams raised in his first
appeal was the district court’s decision to strike his motion to
suppress as untimely. This court vacated that ruling and
remanded for the district court to consider Adams’s motion. On
remand, a federal magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing.
At the hearing, Adams argued that the stop was invalid
because he was not required to wear a seatbelt on a private road
like Angelus Drive. Adams also contended there was no basis for
the stop because the officers could not have seen whether he was
wearing a seatbelt. Finally, Adams maintained that he did not
voluntarily waive his Miranda rights during his custodial
interrogation. Adams offered evidence from a private
investigator, describing the characteristics of Angelus Drive.
The evidence included photographs and videos depicting Angelus
Drive and the surrounding area at various times, including at
approximately 4:30 a.m. Based in part on the fact that it was
not maintained by the city, the investigator classified Angelus
Drive as a private circular road designed to serve residents of
the surrounding apartment complex.
8
The magistrate judge issued a memorandum and recommendation
to deny Adams’s motion to suppress. The magistrate judge
reasoned that, regardless of whether Angelus Drive is a public
or private road, officers had a reasonable suspicion that Adams
had committed or was about to commit a seatbelt violation by
driving on the adjoining public roads. The magistrate judge
found Clark’s testimony regarding his observation of the
seatbelt violation credible and gave little weight to the
evidence presented by Adams’s private investigator. Finally,
the magistrate judge credited Haines’s testimony that he advised
Adams of his Miranda rights, finding that Adams waived those
rights by responding to questions after receiving Miranda
warnings. Adams objected to the magistrate judge’s factual
findings and conclusions of law.
The district court overruled Adams’s objections and adopted
the findings of fact outlined in the magistrate judge’s
memorandum and recommendation. Upon de novo review of the
record, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge’s
conclusion regarding Clark’s credibility and the limited value
of the private investigator’s testimony. The district court
concluded that Clark was in fact able to see that Adams was not
wearing his seatbelt. With respect to the interrogation, the
district court agreed that Haines testified credibly and
concluded that Adams’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing
9
and voluntary. The district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation and denied the motion to suppress.
Adams appealed, challenging the district court’s holding
both with respect to the validity of the traffic stop and the
voluntariness of his custodial statements. We consider each
claim in turn, reviewing the district court’s factual findings
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United
States v. Blauvelt, 638 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 2011).
II.
The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. When a police
officer stops an automobile and briefly detains the occupants,
the stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996).
The primary directive of the Fourth Amendment is that all such
seizures must be reasonable. Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U.S. 927,
931 (1995).
We analyze a traffic stop under the standard established in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), applying a two-part test to
evaluate the constitutionality of the stop. United States v.
Digiovanni,
650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2011). Under this “dual
inquiry,” we first consider whether the officer’s initial action
in executing the stop was justified. United States v. Rusher,
10
966 F.2d 868, 875 (4th Cir. 1992). Next, we analyze whether the
officers’ subsequent actions were “reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances that justified the stop.”
Digiovanni, 650
F.3d at 506 (citing
Rusher, 966 F.2d at 875).
An investigatory stop is justified based on an officer’s
“reasonable suspicion of illegal activity” and does not require
a finding of probable cause. United States v. Harris, 39 F.3d
1262, 1269 (4th Cir. 1994). We evaluate the justification for
an investigatory stop on an objective basis. Illinois v.
Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Thus, “if sufficient
objective evidence exists to demonstrate reasonable suspicion, a
Terry stop is justified regardless of a police officer’s
subjective intent.” United States v. Branch,
537 F.3d 328, 337
(4th Cir. 2008).
On appeal, Adams focuses his argument on the first part of
the Terry dual inquiry, contending that the officers lacked an
initial justification for the traffic stop. Adams offers two
alternative arguments in support of this contention. First, he
argues that the law and the facts do not support the district
court’s conclusion that he had violated or was about to violate
the seatbelt ordinance. Second, Adams challenges the district
court’s factual finding that Clark was able to see that Adams
was not wearing a seatbelt at the time of the stop. We find
11
Adams’s arguments unpersuasive and conclude that the stop was
lawful.
A.
Adams argues that the officers lacked justification for the
traffic stop because any failure to wear a seatbelt on Angelus
Drive did not violate the North Carolina seatbelt ordinance.
According to Adams, the ordinance did not apply at the time of
the stop because Angelus Drive is a private road. The district
court sidestepped this issue, holding instead that Clark had a
reasonable belief Adams had recently committed a seatbelt
offense while driving on the indisputably public roads adjoining
Angelus Drive or was about to commit such an offense by
returning to those roads. We agree.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may conduct a
brief investigatory stop if he has “a reasonable suspicion
grounded in specific and articulable facts that the person he
stopped has been or is about to be involved in a crime.” United
States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1107 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
United States v. Hensley,
469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985);
Terry, 392
U.S. at 21). Observation of a traffic violation justifies
stopping a vehicle to issue a citation.
Branch, 537 F.3d at
337. The North Carolina seatbelt ordinance requires occupants
of a motor vehicle to wear a seatbelt “at all times when the
12
vehicle is in forward motion on a street or highway.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-135.2A(a). The distinguishing feature of a street or
highway under North Carolina law is that it must be “open to the
use of the public as a matter of right for the purposes of
vehicular traffic.” Id. § 20-4.01(13).
Here, the officers observed Adams driving on several public
roads immediately prior to his turn onto Angelus Drive. Once on
Angelus Drive, Adams did not attempt to park or exit his vehicle
but instead turned around and proceeded back toward the
adjoining public roads. At the time of the stop, Adams was near
the end of Angelus Drive at a point where he would have to turn
back on to one of the public roads. Accordingly, upon seeing
Adams on Angelus Drive without a fastened seatbelt, an officer
in Clark’s position could reasonably conclude that Adams either
had just committed a traffic violation moments earlier by
driving on the adjoining roads without a seatbelt or was about
to commit such an offense by returning to those public roads.
Based on this rational inference, the officers had reasonable
suspicion to conduct the stop. See United States v. Seidman,
156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1998) (explaining that we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the
prevailing party below).
Adams contends, however, that Clark did not rely on a prior
or future violation of the seatbelt ordinance as justification
13
for the stop. Instead, in Adams’s view, Clark initiated the
stop based on a perceived violation on Angelus Drive. 2 According
to Adams, the conclusion that he violated the seatbelt ordinance
based on his earlier travel on the public roads around Angelus
Drive or that he was about to commit such a violation by
returning to those roads represents an unlawful post hoc
justification. In support, Adams relies on our recent decision
in United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2011), in
which we stated that “the Government cannot rely upon post hoc
rationalizations to validate those seizures that happen to turn
up contraband.”
Id. at 249. Adams’s argument fails to
recognize, however, the objective nature of the reasonable
suspicion inquiry and misreads our decision in Foster.
2
The parties dispute whether a mistaken conclusion by Clark
that Angelus Drive was a public “street or highway” for purposes
of the seatbelt ordinance would constitute a mistake of law or a
mistake of fact. Courts generally hold that reasonable mistakes
of fact do not warrant suppression, whereas mistakes of law
often do result in suppression. Compare United States v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A traffic
stop based on an officer’s incorrect but reasonable assessment
of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”) with United
States v. Raney,
633 F.3d 385, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2011) (vacating
denial of a motion to suppress and finding that “[b]ecause the
government did not establish that [the defendant] committed a
traffic violation on any of the argued grounds, we find that as
a matter of law there was no objective basis justifying the
traffic stop”). Because our analysis of the merits of the
traffic stop in this case does not turn on the characteristics
of Angelus Drive, we need not resolve this dispute.
14
Supreme Court precedent “foreclose[s] any argument that the
constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the
actual motivations of the individual officers involved.” Whren,
517 U.S. at 812–13. Applying this principle, we have explained
that an “otherwise valid stop does not become unreasonable
merely because the officer has intuitive suspicions that the
occupants of the car are engaged in some [other] criminal
activity.” United States v. Hassan El,
5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th
Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Cummins,
920 F.2d 498, 500–
01 (8th Cir. 1990)). In Foster, this court adhered to prior
Supreme Court precedent by properly applying this objective
basis
test. 634 F.3d at 246 (“[A] court must look to the
totality of the circumstances in determining whether the officer
had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal
activity.” (citing United States v. Arvizu,
534 U.S. 266, 273
(2002))). Our concern in Foster was not with the objective
nature of the inquiry but instead, related to the government’s
attempt to string together “whatever facts are present, no
matter how innocent, as indicia of suspicious activity.”
Id. at
248. In contrast, the objective facts in this case are more
than sufficient to support the officer’s decision to initiate a
traffic stop.
After following Adams’s SUV on several public roads, Clark
observed Adams on Angelus Drive without a fastened seatbelt on
15
his way back toward the public roads. Putting any subjective
intentions aside—as we must under the objective test articulated
by the Supreme Court—this observation supports the rational
inference that Adams had recently committed or was about to
commit a traffic violation. Accordingly, Clark had an objective
justification for stopping Adams.
B.
We next consider Adams’s challenge to Clark’s testimony
that he observed Adams not wearing a seatbelt. According to
Adams, Clark could not have seen whether Adams was wearing a
seatbelt “in the dark with the Yukon’s lights glaring in his
eyes, fatigued from having been on patrol since 9 p.m. the prior
evening, with the additional distortion produced by an unwashed
windshield and movement of his vehicle.” Appellant’s Br. 33.
The district court disagreed and concluded that Clark had in
fact observed Adams driving without a seatbelt. We discern no
clear error in the court’s finding.
In evaluating Clark’s demeanor and credibility, the
magistrate judge found that Clark “answered the questions put to
him forthrightly and without evasion.” J.A. 465. The district
court rejected Adams’s objection to the magistrate judge’s
credibility determination, concluding under de novo review that
his conclusion was supported by the record. In addition to the
16
credibility finding, the magistrate judge and district court
concluded that the characteristics of the site of the traffic
stop supported Clark’s testimony. In findings adopted by the
district court, the magistrate judge concluded that the area was
well lit by streetlights and lighting from the surrounding
apartment buildings. The district court rejected as speculative
Adams’s arguments related to the angle of the headlights,
officer fatigue, and the unwashed windshield. Finally, the
court gave little weight to the testimony and evidence presented
by Adams’s witness—finding that the private investigator lacked
training with video and photographic equipment and that the
evidence depicted the scene as “substantially darker than in
real life.” Id. 467.
We afford particular deference to the trial court’s
credibility determinations, “for ‘it is the role of the district
court to observe witnesses and weigh their credibility during a
pre-trial motion to suppress.’ ” United States v. Abu Ali,
528
F.3d 210, 232 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Murray,
65 F.3d 1161, 1169 (4th Cir. 1995)). Here, the magistrate judge
carefully analyzed the witnesses’ credibility and the evidence
presented, and thoroughly explained his factual findings. The
district court in turn conducted a de novo review of the record
and adopted the magistrate judge’s factual findings. Under our
deferential clear error standard, we affirm the district court’s
17
conclusion that Clark saw Adams driving without a fastened
seatbelt on Angelus Drive.
Having found that the officers had an objective basis for
the stop and that the district court did not clearly err in
crediting Clark’s testimony, we affirm the district court’s
denial of the motion to suppress the evidence seized from the
traffic stop.
III.
Finally, we consider Adams’s claim that his statements
admitting possession of the drugs and firearm should be
suppressed. Adams contends both that the district court clearly
erred in crediting Haines’s testimony related to Adams’s
interrogation and statements, and that it incorrectly held that
Adams waived his Miranda rights.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court required that “[p]rior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444.
“[F]ailure to give the prescribed warnings and obtain a waiver
of rights before custodial questioning generally requires
exclusion of any statements obtained.” Missouri v. Seibert,
542
U.S. 600, 608 (2004).
18
In order for a waiver of Miranda rights to be valid, it
must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Waiver, however, need not be express
but may be inferred from the actions and words of the person
interrogated. North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369, 373
(1979). Thus the issue of waiver under Miranda is “not one of
form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and
voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case.”
Id.
A defendant’s willingness to answer questions after
acknowledging he understands his Miranda rights constitutes an
implied waiver of those rights. United States v. Cardwell,
433
F.3d 378, 389–90 (4th Cir. 2005). Additionally, “[t]he mere
passage of time . . . does not compromise a Miranda warning.”
United States v. Frankson,
83 F.3d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1996). In
Frankson, we held that the defendant’s “initial Miranda warning
was in no way compromised by the passage of two and one-half
hours between the issuance of his warning and the point at which
he began to confess his crimes and cooperate with the police.”
Id.
In support of his contention that the district court erred
in its factual findings, Adams highlights that Haines cleared
the room prior to the interrogation and did not record the
conversation. The evidence shows, however, that Haines had
19
legitimate reasons for these actions. McCann was in uniform and
had just arrested Adams. Haines testified that he wanted to
build rapport with Adams and had never conducted an interview
alongside McCann. Thus it was reasonable for Haines to ask
McCann to leave. With respect to the failure to record the
conversation, Haines testified that there was an RPD policy not
to record interviews in noncapital cases.
These facts coupled with the magistrate judge’s finding—
adopted by the district court—that Haines’s “demeanor at the
hearing conveyed trustworthiness,” J.A. 474, support the
district court’s conclusion that Haines advised Adams of his
Miranda rights and that Adams reinitiated the interview on his
own free will prior to his admissions. Accordingly, we find no
clear error in the version of events found by the district
court.
Adams contends that even if we believe Haines’s testimony,
the undisputed evidence shows that Adams did not voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. In
support, Adams explains that he did not sign the Miranda waiver,
initially refused to discuss the drugs and firearm, and did not
receive additional warnings prior to his second conversation
with Haines. We are not persuaded.
As Adams acknowledges, failure to sign a waiver form does
not invalidate a subsequent waiver of Miranda rights. United
20
States v. Thompson, 417 F.2d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 1969) (per
curiam) (holding that defendant’s “refusal to sign a written
waiver did not render the confession inadmissible” (citing
United States v. Hayes,
385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967)). Haines
and McCann both testified that Adams acknowledged that he
understood his rights despite his refusal to sign the waiver
form. And the evidence shows that although Adams was initially
uncooperative, he subsequently reinitiated the interview on his
own accord and admitted to possession of the drugs and firearm.
Haines testified that at most five minutes elapsed between his
departure from the interview room and Adams’s request for him to
return. Courts have found that much longer periods of time
between the administration of Miranda warnings and a defendant’s
admissions have not affected the validity of a Miranda waiver.
Frankson, 83 F.3d at 83 (cataloging cases in which several hours
did not invalidate the waiver).
Accordingly, we find that Adams voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his Miranda rights when he responded to
Haines’s questions after earlier acknowledging that he
understood his rights.
21
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED
22
