Filed: Aug. 17, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-5049 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ARNELL JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-5050 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. VAUGHN BARKSDALE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-cr-00447-RWT-2; 8:10-cv-00447-RWT-3) Submitted: June 22, 2012 Decided: August 17, 2012 Before TRAXLE
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-5049 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ARNELL JOHNSON, Defendant - Appellant. No. 11-5050 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. VAUGHN BARKSDALE, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-cr-00447-RWT-2; 8:10-cv-00447-RWT-3) Submitted: June 22, 2012 Decided: August 17, 2012 Before TRAXLER..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5049
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARNELL JOHNSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 11-5050
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VAUGHN BARKSDALE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:10-cr-00447-RWT-2; 8:10-cv-00447-RWT-3)
Submitted: June 22, 2012 Decided: August 17, 2012
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph J. Gigliotti, Sr., Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellant
Vaughn Barksdale; Ron Earnest, LAW OFFICE OF RON EARNEST, Takoma
Park, Maryland, for Appellant Arnell Johnson. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Arun G.
Rao, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Appellants Arnell Johnson and Vaughn Barksdale appeal
their convictions arising out of a bank robbery, asserting that
the district court erred in denying their motions to suppress
evidence obtained during an inventory search of the vehicle in
which they were traveling. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I.
On June 29, 2010, Officer Philip Johnson of the Prince
George’s County Police Department (“PGPD”) was observing traffic
traveling on Riggs Road in Adelphi, Maryland, from his marked
police cruiser. Officer Johnson observed a Toyota Solara
operated by Barksdale fail to stop at a stop sign, and the
officer then initiated a traffic stop of the Solara.
Officer Johnson parked his vehicle behind the Solara
in a manner designed to protect himself and the Solara from the
busy roadway. He then approached Barksdale and requested his
driver’s license and vehicle registration. Arnell Johnson and
Lamar Pannell were passengers in the vehicle. Barksdale gave
Officer Johnson his driver’s license and a vehicle registration
in the name of Dana Allison Hicks.
Officer Johnson returned to his cruiser to conduct a
license check and discovered that Barksdale’s license had been
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suspended. He wrote traffic citations to Barksdale for failure
to stop at a stop sign, driving with a suspended license, and
driving without a license. Officer Johnson then returned to the
Solara and asked Barksdale to exit. After performing a quick
pat down of Barksdale to ensure that he had no weapons, Officer
Johnson asked Barksdale to step to the front of his cruiser
where he explained the citations and informed him that the
vehicle would be impounded. Barksdale was not properly
licensed, the registered owner was not present, and the vehicle
presented a road hazard. Specifically, Officer Johnson
testified that “[t]he vehicle impeded the flow of traffic. From
where it was positioned, it actually stuck out in the roadway
being a road hazard. So if left there on the scene, it could be
struck by a vehicle.” J.A. 89. Officer Johnson also requested
the assistance of a second officer.
The PGPD General Order Manual provides for the
immediate impoundment of vehicles “[p]arked or standing impeding
the movement of traffic” or “[p]arked or standing unattended on
any road, highway, alley, or parking lot in a manner
constituting a threat to public safety.” J.A. 154. The Manual
contains a general checklist for impounding vehicles, including
the directive that the officer record the vehicle identification
number (“VIN”) and “[i]nclude an inventory list.” J.A. 151.
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Prior to beginning the inventory search, Officer
Johnson asked Barksdale if there was anything inside the vehicle
that he should be concerned about, such as weapons or drugs.
Barksdale replied that there was not. Officer Johnson then
asked the two passengers to exit the vehicle, patted them down
for safety, and asked them to sit on the curb with Barksdale.
The men were not handcuffed or otherwise restrained prior to the
search. Officer Johnson testified that it is consistent with
PGPD policy for an inventory search to begin at the scene of a
vehicle stop, before the vehicle is turned over to the towing
company, and that the occupants of the vehicle are typically
present while the search is conducted in order to safeguard
against subsequent claims of missing property.
Officer Johnson began his inventory search by checking
the glove compartment of the vehicle, where he found an
identification card for Arnell Johnson. He then reached under
the front passenger seat, where he discovered a loaded Smith &
Wesson .357 Magnum revolver. Officer Johnson immediately drew
his service weapon and ordered the men to lie on the ground.
Barksdale complied, but Johnson and Pannell fled the scene.
Officer Johnson’s backup officer, who had by then arrived,
handcuffed Barksdale while Officer Johnson alerted the police
dispatcher of the situation.
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While waiting for additional units to respond, Officer
Johnson resumed the search of the vehicle. He discovered a
backpack containing a sawed-off shotgun, $13,560 in wrapped U.S.
currency, a wig with braids, latex gloves, two pairs of
sunglasses, and a floppy blue hat. These items alerted the
officers to a bank robbery that had taken place earlier that day
in Montgomery County, Maryland. The PGPD contacted the
Montgomery County Police Department, whose robbery units
responded and took charge of the evidence, including the Solara.
In the meantime, the PGPD officers, with the assistance of a K-9
team, located Pannell. Johnson escaped, but was apprehended
several months later.
Johnson and Barksdale were subsequently indicted for
armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d).
Johnson was additionally indicted for using and carrying a
firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c). Prior to trial, Johnson and Barksdale each moved to
suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, claiming
that the search was conducted without a warrant or probable
cause, in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. At the
conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the district court held
that the search was a valid inventory search and denied the
motions. Both Johnson and Barksdale entered conditional pleas
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of guilty, preserving their right to appeal the denial of their
suppression motions. *
II.
In considering an appeal from the denial of a
suppression motion, we review a district court’s findings of
fact for clear error, and its legal conclusions de novo. See
United States v. Matthews, 591 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2009).
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government. See
id.
A.
“The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to
secure a warrant before conducting a search.” Maryland v.
Dyson,
527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (per curiam). However, an
exception to the warrant requirement arises when an inventory
*
The government argues, as it did below, that Appellants
lack standing to contest the validity of the search. With
regard to Barksdale, the government argued that he was not an
authorized user of the vehicle. With regard to Johnson, the
government argued that he was a mere passenger in the vehicle
and abandoned any privacy interest by fleeing the vehicle. The
district court initially ruled that both Appellants lacked
standing, but later indicated that Barksdale may have had
standing based upon a police report summarizing an interview
with Hicks, the registered owner of the vehicle. We assume for
the purposes of this appeal that Appellants have standing to
contest the validity of the search.
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search is properly conducted. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 372 (1976); United States v. Banks,
482 F.3d 733, 738-
39 (4th Cir. 2007). “Police officers frequently perform
inventory searches when they impound vehicles or detain
suspects.”
Matthews, 591 F.3d at 235. “Such searches ‘serve to
protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the
police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized
property, and to guard the police from danger.’”
Id. (quoting
Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)); see also Whren
v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 811 n.1 (1996) (“An inventory
search is the search of property lawfully seized and detained,
in order to ensure that it is harmless, to secure valuable items
(such as might be kept in a towed car), and to protect against
false claims of loss or damage.”).
To be valid, an inventory search must be “conducted
according to standardized criteria, such as a uniform police
department policy, and performed in good faith.” Matthews, 591
F.3d at 235 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Such criteria “curtail the discretion of the searching officer
so as to prevent searches from becoming ‘a ruse for a general
rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’”
Banks,
482 F.3d at 739 (quoting Florida v. Wells,
495 U.S. 1, 4
(1990)). “[N]othing prohibits the discretion of police officers
in making inventory searches so long as that discretion is based
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on standard criteria and on the basis of something other than
the suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Ford, 986
F.2d 57, 60 (4th Cir. 1993).
B.
Appellants do not contest the validity of the traffic
stop. However, they contend that the search was not a properly
conducted inventory search, and was instead a warrantless search
for incriminating evidence. The district court found that
Officer Johnson acted in good faith when he made the decision to
impound and search the vehicle, and that the search was
performed in accordance with PGPD standardized criteria. The
record provides sufficient evidence to support these findings.
The PGPD Manual provides for the immediate impoundment
of vehicles that are “impeding the movement of traffic” or
parked or standing unattended on a road “in a manner
constituting a threat to public safety.” J.A. 154. The Solara
was parked on the side of a heavily-traveled road and was
partially impeding traffic. Barksdale was operating the vehicle
without a valid driver’s license, and the registered owner of
the vehicle was not present. See Ford, 986 F.2d at 60
(upholding validity of inventory search of vehicle obstructing
traffic where driver had a suspended license). Hence, the
vehicle was subject to immediate impoundment, even though the
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driver had not been placed under arrest. See Opperman, 428 U.S.
at 369 (“The authority of police to seize and remove from the
streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety
and convenience is beyond challenge.”);
Matthews, 591 F.3d at
235 (“Police officers frequently perform inventory searches when
they impound vehicles or detain suspects.”). Contrary to
Appellants’ contention, Officer Johnson was not required to
arrest Barksdale before conducting the search or contact the
registered owner of the vehicle prior to impounding the vehicle,
which was obstructing traffic in a busy roadway. Nor was
Officer Johnson required to ascertain whether one of the
passengers had a valid driver’s license, where the registered
owner was not present to give consent to such a third party.
See United States v. Brown,
787 F.2d 929, 932-33 (4th Cir. 1986)
(holding that police officer “could reasonably have impounded
[defendant’s] vehicle either because there was no known
individual immediately available to take custody of the car, or
because the car could have constituted a nuisance in the area in
which it was parked”).
We also reject Appellants’ contention that Officer
Johnson’s search was not in accordance with the standardized
PGPD criteria because he did not record the VIN or complete an
inventory form or list. Officer Johnson’s failure to complete
these tasks is understandable given that his search was
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unexpectedly and almost immediately interrupted by the discovery
of the revolver under the front passenger seat, and by the
flight of Pannell and Johnson. In fact, these events resulted
in the vehicle not being impounded by Officer Johnson at all.
The vehicle was instead turned over to the Montgomery County
Police Department, which had jurisdiction over the bank robbery.
In other words, the search began as a normal and appropriate
inventory search during which incriminating evidence was found
and two occupants of the vehicle fled. The occurrence of these
events caused a disruption in the process and resulted in the
assumption of responsibility for the vehicle being switched from
one law enforcement agency to another, but it did not invalidate
the inventory search or the discovery of the evidence.
Finally, there is nothing in the record to support
Appellants’ claim that Officer Johnson acted in bad faith and
engaged in an inventory search as a ruse to conduct an
investigatory search for incriminating evidence. As a result of
the traffic stop, Officer Johnson was informed about Barksdale’s
prior offenses, but had no information regarding either
passenger’s criminal history. He conducted a brief pat down of
the vehicle occupants for his own safety, prior to beginning the
vehicle search, but did not restrain the men while he conducted
the search. Officer Johnson testified that it is standard
practice for inventory searches to occur at the scene before the
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vehicle is turned over to the towing company, and for the
vehicle occupants to remain present while the search is
conducted, in order to safeguard against subsequent claims of
missing property. This practice falls squarely within the
purposes of inventory searches. See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372;
Matthews, 591 F.3d at 235. In sum, the record is devoid of
evidence that Officer Johnson used the inventory search as a
ruse to search for evidence of criminal activity and, on the
contrary, the record supports the conclusion that Officer
Johnson had no reason to believe that the search would yield
such incriminating evidence.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district
court did not err in concluding that the evidence was seized
during a lawful inventory search, and we affirm the district
court’s order denying the suppression motions.
AFFIRMED
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