Filed: Jun. 07, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-5176 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ROBERT FINCH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00644-MBS-1) Submitted: May 8, 2012 Decided: June 7, 2012 Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, vacated in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. Katherine E. Evat
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 11-5176 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ROBERT FINCH, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Chief District Judge. (1:11-cr-00644-MBS-1) Submitted: May 8, 2012 Decided: June 7, 2012 Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part, vacated in part by unpublished per curiam opinion. Katherine E. Evatt..
More
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-5176
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBERT FINCH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Chief District
Judge. (1:11-cr-00644-MBS-1)
Submitted: May 8, 2012 Decided: June 7, 2012
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Katherine E. Evatt, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Dean A. Eichelberger, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Finch appeals the district court’s imposition
of a life term of supervised release following imprisonment,
coupled with numerous special conditions, after he pled guilty
to one count of failing to register as a sex offender, in
violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). Finch argues that the district court
failed to explain the length and conditions of the selected term
of supervision. 1 We conclude that the district court failed to
adequately explain the length and conditions of supervision and
that the sentence is thus procedurally unreasonable.
A term of supervised release is part of the sentence
and is reviewed for reasonableness, both procedurally and
substantively. Because Finch requested a lesser sentence than
the one he received, review is for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Hayes, 404 Fed. App’x 753, 756 (4th Cir. 2010). A
district court must provide an individualized assessment of its
selected sentence. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328
1
Finch also contends that certain conditions were not
warranted and that the district court improperly delegated its
authority to the probation office. We conclude that the
district court did not improperly delegate its authority.
Because the sentence is procedurally unreasonable, we do not
address Finch’s substantive arguments.
2
(4th Cir. 2009). Failure to do so constitutes procedural error.
Id.
Here, although the district court was statutorily
permitted to impose a term of supervised release up to life, the
court failed to explain why it was denying Finch’s specific
request for a lesser term of supervision. While the court
announced its consideration of the appropriate sentencing
factors, it did not articulate its application of those factors
to Finch’s case or explain why those factors necessitated a term
of lifetime supervision.
Further, the district court failed to sufficiently
explain the special conditions it imposed on the term of
supervision. Because “district courts have broad latitude to
impose conditions on supervised release,” this court reviews
such conditions only for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009). The district court
may impose any condition that is reasonably related to the
relevant statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006).
Armel, 585 F.3d at 186. The sentencing court must
ensure that the condition involves no greater deprivation of
liberty than is reasonably necessary to afford adequate
deterrence, protect the public, and provide the defendant with
training, care, or treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); United
States v. Dotson,
324 F.3d 256, 260-61 (4th Cir. 2003). A
3
particular restriction does not require “an offense-specific
nexus,” United States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 70 (1st
Cir. 2009), but the court must explain its reasons for imposing
the conditions.
Armel, 585 F.3d at 186.
The district court did not provide an adequate basis
for appellate review of its sentencing rationale in this
instance. Critically, the court failed to articulate the
necessity of the sex offender conditions, including sex offender
treatment and severe limitations on Finch’s use of computers.
See Armel, 585 F.3d at 186 (because the district court did not
provide an adequate explanation, the court could not “determine
the reasonableness of the challenged special conditions” on
appeal). We therefore conclude that the district court abused
its discretion because it failed to explain its rationale for
the conditions of supervision it imposed.
Accordingly, we conclude that the sentence of
supervised release is procedurally unreasonable. 2 We therefore
vacate the judgment as to the sentence of supervised release and
remand for reconsideration. We affirm the remainder of the
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
2
Finch does not challenge his conviction or the sentence of
imprisonment.
4
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART
5
