Filed: Nov. 07, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-1 RANDY LYNN ATKINS, Petitioner – Appellant, v. KENNETH E. LASSITER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:06-cv-00372-MR) Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: November 7, 2012 Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Timothy M. CAIN, United State
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-1 RANDY LYNN ATKINS, Petitioner – Appellant, v. KENNETH E. LASSITER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North Carolina, Respondent – Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger, District Judge. (1:06-cv-00372-MR) Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: November 7, 2012 Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Timothy M. CAIN, United States..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-1
RANDY LYNN ATKINS,
Petitioner – Appellant,
v.
KENNETH E. LASSITER, Warden, Central Prison, Raleigh, North
Carolina,
Respondent – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Martin K. Reidinger,
District Judge. (1:06-cv-00372-MR)
Argued: September 19, 2012 Decided: November 7, 2012
Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and Timothy M. CAIN,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Jonathan Lee Megerian, Asheboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Sandra Wallace-Smith, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Paul
M. Green, OFFICE OF THE APPELLATE DEFENDER OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Roy Cooper, Attorney
General of North Carolina, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
On November 18, 1993, in the Superior Court of Buncombe
County, North Carolina, Randy Lynn Atkins pled guilty to first-
degree murder in the death of his eight-month-old son, Lyle
James Atkins. On December 8, 1993, following a capital
sentencing hearing, a jury unanimously recommended that Atkins
be sentenced to death. The presiding judge imposed the
recommended sentence.
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
Atkins’s sentence, and the United States Supreme Court denied
Atkins’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Thereafter, he
unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief. He then
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254, in the Western District of North Carolina. On August
16, 2011, the district court denied Atkins’s petition, and we
subsequently granted a certificate of appealability. We now
address Atkins’s claims that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel and that the State failed to disclose materially
favorable evidence.
I.
A.
The facts underlying Atkins’s conviction are as follows:
The State presented evidence at the sentencing
proceeding tending to show that, on 16 March 1993,
3
defendant inflicted fatal injuries to his son, Lyle.
Defendant, Lyle, and Lyle’s mother were living
together at the time at the Lazywood Mobile Home Park
in Buncombe County.
Lyle’s mother, Ms. Colleen Shank, testified that
on the morning of 16 March 1993, she asked defendant
to watch Lyle while she washed some clothes. Ms.
Shank stated that she heard a “bang.” Following the
“bang,” Ms. Shank heard Lyle begin to cry, and she
rushed to the living room. Ms. Shank testified that
she then observed defendant hitting Lyle’s head
against the trailer wall a “few times.” She testified
further that she saw defendant “swing him [Lyle] very
strong” and that “Lyle hit the wall very hard.” Ms.
Shank tried to comfort Lyle and attempted to lay the
child down to rest. However, Lyle soon began to cry,
and Ms. Shank noted that he was turning blue. The
mother administered CPR and requested that defendant
go to a neighbor’s home to call 911 for emergency
assistance.
Defendant then went to the home of a neighbor and
called 911. The 911 operator testified that defendant
responded to her questions concerning medical history
related to Lyle’s emergency by replying[,]
“it . . . may have been sick two or three days, but no
other.” Lyle’s mother testified that while waiting
for emergency personnel to arrive, defendant told her,
“Don’t say anything, because I will hurt you too.”
Following the arrival of emergency medical
personnel, Lyle was transported by helicopter to
Mission Memorial Hospital in Asheville. Upon
admission to the hospital, Lyle was noted to be limp,
not moving, and exhibiting a slow heart rate. The
admitting physician noted numerous injuries to the
small child, including bruising on both sides of his
head, an older bruise on his left elbow, bruising on
his right wrist and right hand, a deformation of his
pelvis, and an improperly healed fracture of his right
lower leg.
A detective from the Woodfin Police Department
questioned defendant and Ms. Shank in the waiting room
of the hospital. Defendant initially told the officer
that Lyle had stopped breathing “because of the Ker–O–
Sun heater.” Defendant responded to the officer’s
further inquiry by adding that “a couple of days ago I
was holding him, and he slipped and fell, and he hurt
his arm.” The officer subsequently arrested both
4
defendant and Ms. Shank and transported them to the
Buncombe County jail. Later that day, while in police
custody, defendant issued a written statement in which
he admitted the following:
Today Lyle was crying as I was holding
him, and my temper and patience snapped
again, as he was crying and crying no matter
how soothing and gentle I was. He just kept
crying, and I couldn’t handle him any more,
and I started hitting him on the side of his
head and trying to get him to stop crying,
and he wouldn’t. I kept telling him to stop
it, and he wouldn’t, and I kept on hitting
him with my hand on his head.
Despite aggressive medical efforts to save Lyle’s
life, he died at Asheville’s Mission Memorial Hospital
on 18 March 1993.
State v. Atkins, 505 S.E.2d 97, 105 (N.C. 1998).
B.
The State indicted Atkins for first-degree murder and for
first-degree sexual assault. As a condition of his guilty plea
for murder, the State dismissed the sexual assault charge and
agreed not to reference that charge or other alleged sexual
assaults during the sentencing hearing.
At the sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence
supporting one statutory aggravating circumstance—namely, that
the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A–2000(e)(9). An experienced pediatric
radiologist testified that
5
the eight-month-old infant exhibited the following
injuries upon admission to Mission Memorial Hospital
on 16 March 1993: healing fracture of the right
clavicle, healing bone along the midshaft of the right
upper arm, extensive injury of the left upper arm,
dislocation of the left elbow, healing bone indicative
of a fracture of the right hip, skull fractures and
bruising on both the left and right sides, and a
compression fracture of the spine. Further testimony
indicated that the injuries occurred in at least two
episodes of injury to Lyle. The pediatric radiologist
estimated that the time of the origin of injuries
ranged from four weeks prior to the hospital admission
up to within a day of the admission. Several treating
physicians also testified at the sentencing proceeding
that Lyle exhibited symptoms of “battered child
syndrome.” . . . Dr. Cynthia Brown, a pediatrician,
. . . defined a “battered child” as a “child that
presents with multiple purposely inflicted injuries
that are of varying ages.”
Atkins, 505 S.E.2d at 106.
Atkins responded with twenty-five potential mitigating
circumstances and a statutory “catchall” mitigating
circumstance, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–2000(f)(9). He
presented mitigating evidence via testimony from psychologist
Dr. Joseph Horacek, social worker Audrey Bryant, former employer
Jesse Carr, and an investigator from the public defender’s
office, David Waites.
After weighing the mitigation against the aggravation, the
jury found as aggravation that the murder was “especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel,” see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
2000(e)(9), and as mitigation that (1) Atkins “qualifie[d] as
having a learning disability due to his IQ variations,” and (2)
6
Atkins “was diagnosed . . . in April of 1993 as having a
personality disorder and adjustment disorder with a mixed
disturbance of emotions and conduct.” Ultimately, the jury
unanimously recommended a death sentence, and the court followed
the jury’s recommendation.
II.
A.
On direct appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld
Atkins’s capital sentence, Atkins, 505 S.E.2d at 131, and the
United States Supreme Court denied Atkins’s petition for a writ
of certiorari, Atkins v. North Carolina,
526 U.S. 1147 (1999).
B.
Atkins next filed several motions for appropriate relief
(MAR) in the Superior Court of Buncombe County. After summary
denial of many of Atkins’s claims, Judge Winner of the Superior
Court granted an evidentiary hearing on two issues: (1) whether
Atkins was “denied his right to the effective assistance of
counsel by counsel’s failure to adequately investigate or to
present sentencing phase [mitigating] testimony regarding [his]
childhood history of neglect, abuse[,] and trauma,” and (2)
whether the prosecution withheld materially favorable evidence
in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7
On January 12, 2001, the State moved for summary denial of
Atkins’s ineffectiveness claim. On April 2, 2001, Judge Guice
of the Superior Court conducted a motions hearing, ultimately
denying Atkins an evidentiary hearing on his ineffectiveness
claim and granting the State’s motion for summary denial. In
denying an evidentiary hearing on the ineffectiveness claim,
Judge Guice noted that, at the time Judge Winner initially
granted such a hearing, the State had not yet filed a response
to the claim.
On December 1, 2005, Judge Winner conducted an evidentiary
hearing on Atkins’s Brady claim and denied relief. The North
Carolina Supreme Court then denied Atkins’s petition for a writ
of certiorari to appeal the denial of his MAR claims. State v.
Atkins, 636 S.E.2d 811 (N.C. 2006).
C.
Atkins next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to § 2254(d) in the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina. Atkins sought relief on
the following grounds:
(1) that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in the capital sentencing proceeding (Claim
I); (2) that the [S]tate failed to disclose evidence
materially favorable to him with respect to capital
sentencing (Claim II); (3) that he was denied a full
and fair opportunity to impeach his co-defendant’s
testimony by the [S]tate’s failure to disclose its
8
deal with her and by the trial court’s limitation of
counsel’s cross-examination of her (Claim III); (4)
that he was shackled without cause during the capital
sentencing hearing (Claim IV); and (5) that he was
tried at the capital sentencing hearing without
adequate measures to compensate for his hearing
impairment (Claim V).
Atkins v. Polk, No. 1:06cv372, 2011 WL 3608234, at *6 (W.D.N.C.
Aug. 16, 2011). On August 16, 2011, the district court denied
Atkins’s request for an evidentiary hearing, granted the State’s
motion for summary judgment, and declined to issue a certificate
of appealability.
Id. at *38. Atkins then filed a motion to
alter or amend the judgment purusant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 59(c). On January 17, 2012, the district court denied
Atkins’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. Atkins filed a
notice of appeal on February 12, 2012, and on May 31, 2012, we
granted a certificate of appealability.
III.
Atkins raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether he
received ineffective assistance of counsel in his capital
sentencing hearing and (2) whether the State failed to disclose
materially favorable evidence with respect to his capital
sentencing. We review de novo a district court’s denial of
habeas corpus relief. Deyton v. Keller, 682 F.3d 340, 343 (4th
Cir. 2012).
9
A.
We analyze Atkins’s ineffectiveness claim under the
framework outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). 1 To succeed under Strickland, Atkins must demonstrate
(1) that his counsel rendered deficient performance and (2) that
such deficiency was prejudicial.
Id. at 687.
We adopt a deferential posture in our examination of
defense counsel’s performance. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.
Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (“An ineffective-assistance claim can
function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and
raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland
standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest ‘intrusive
1
We acknowledge that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)), limits the federal review of
habeas claims adjudicated on the merits in state court,
Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012).
Moreover, we are aware of this Court’s recent discussion of
whether a state court proceeding constituted a merits
adjudication. See Winston v. Pearson (Winston II),
683 F.3d
489, 496–97 (4th Cir. 2012); Winston v. Kelly (Winston I),
592
F.3d 535, 555–56 (4th Cir. 2010).
Here, the parties offer conflicting views regarding whether
the state court conducted a merits adjudication of Atkins’s
ineffectiveness claim. If it did, then we would give AEDPA
deference to the state court’s application of Strickland. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). But, if not, then we are to conduct a de
novo review of the claim under Strickland. See Cone v. Bell,
556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009). We need not make a determination on
this point, however. As discussed below, even under a de novo
review, which here is more advantageous to Atkins, Strickland
does not accord Atkins relief.
10
post-trial inquiry’ threaten the integrity of the very adversary
process the right to counsel is meant to serve.” (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90)). Indeed, we consider
representation effective unless it “fall[s] below an objective
standard of reasonableness,”
id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted), asking simply
“whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence
under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not whether it deviated
from best practices or most common custom,”
id. at 788 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). In sum, we are concerned
primarily with whether “counsel made errors so serious that [it]
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment.”
Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A defendant is prejudiced by ineffective representation
when “a reasonable probability [exists] that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Id. at 787 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, merely identifying
“some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding” is
insufficient.
Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693)
11
(internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put, a defendant
must show that “[t]he likelihood of a different result [is]
substantial, not just conceivable.” Id. at 792.
Notably, when applying Strickland, we “need not determine
whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Rather, because
“[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade
counsel’s performance[,] [i]f it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient
prejudice,” we should do so.
Id.
1.
Here, Atkins alleges that his defense counsel failed to
adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence regarding
his background and that such failure resulted in his counsel’s
reliance on an alternate, futile defense. Before examining the
evidence Atkins maintains his counsel should have investigated
and presented, we chronicle the mitigating evidence that his
counsel did present.
a.
Dr. David Horacek
12
Psychologist Dr. David Horacek testified that he evaluated
Atkins for approximately twenty-two hours between July 1993 and
November 1993 and that he gave Atkins a primary diagnosis of
disassociative identity disorder, also known as multiple
personality disorder. Horacek indicated that Atkins may also
suffer from Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder.
Horacek explained that the main feature of multiple
personality disorder is “an impairment in the normal ability to
integrate memory, identity and perceptions into one
personality.” Individuals suffering from this disorder have
several personalities that “endure over time, and at various
points of time the alter[nate] personality will assume control
of the [individual’s] consciousness and behavior.” Horacek
avowed that during his evaluation of Atkins, two alternate
personalities were evident.
Horacek further stated that development of a multiple
personality disorder can arise from severe physical or sexual
abuse that occurs for a length of time or from painful trauma
that occurs when an individual is a child. An individual
develops alternate personalities as a means of coping and
creating distance from the experiences. Horacek attested that,
while evaluating Atkins, he learned that Atkins was sexually
abused at least three times as a child by his older half-brother
13
Butch and other boys in the neighborhood. He briefly testified
that victims of child abuse often become abusers themselves.
Horacek also averred that he believed Atkins had killed his
son while one of Atkins’s alternate personalities was in control
and that Atkins was mentally or emotionally disturbed during the
crime’s commission. Such disturbance, Horacek opined, impaired
both Atkins’s ability to conform his conduct to the law’s
requirements and his ability to appreciate the criminal nature
of his conduct.
Audrey Bryant
Social worker Audrey Bryant interviewed Atkins in jail and
affirmed that (1) Atkins admitted he had inflicted the bruises
his son received, (2) Atkins had his head in his hands during
most of the interview, and (3) Atkins wished he could tell the
mother of the child that he was sorry.
Jesse Carr
Atkins worked full-time for Jesse Carr at Minico Cleaners
and Laundry for approximately a year and worked intermittently
on a part-time basis for an additional six months. Carr
indicated that Atkins was a good worker and that he left the
cleaners to find employment with higher pay.
14
David Waites
David Waites, an investigator for the public defender’s
office, testified regarding Atkins’s childhood, parents, and Air
Force service. He stated that, although Atkins’s parents were
in fragile heath and unable to attend the sentencing hearing,
they had provided two letters for presentation at the hearing.
The letters indicated that Atkins suffered from childhood
illnesses that caused a loss of hearing in his right ear. The
letters also indicated that Atkins joined the Air Force at
seventeen.
Additionally, Waites presented several photographs and
newspaper clippings: (1) a high school graduation photograph of
Atkins, (2) a newspaper clipping indicating that Atkins had
received an Air Force recruiting award, (3) a photograph of
Atkins in his Air Force uniform, (4) three newspaper clippings
noting that Atkins provided music for a veterans’ party, (5) a
newspaper clipping signifying that Atkins was a Military
Security Specialist in an Air Force squadron serving in England,
and (6) a newspaper clipping showing that Atkins was the winner
of a Cub Scout Pack derby.
Finally, Waites averred that Atkins was involved in three
alcohol-related incidents during his time in the Air Force, that
he received an honorable discharge from the Air Force due to his
“apparent inability to comprehend his misconduct,” and that
15
twelve days prior to Lyle’s admission to the hospital due to
Atkins’s abuse, Atkins had been the victim of an armed robbery.
As noted above, the jury ultimately credited only two
mitigating circumstances to Atkins: (1) that he suffered from a
learning disability and (2) that he suffered from “a personality
and adjustment disorder with a mixed disturbance of emotions and
conduct.”
b.
Atkins contends that he received ineffective representation
because his counsel focused on Dr. Horacek’s testimony and
belief that Atkins committed the murder while under the control
of another personality. Atkins argues that the “‘multiple
personality’ sentencing defense was a disaster [because] [i]t
was based on inaccurate, unreliable statements made by Atkins
while he was under the influence of sodium amytal, and was not
backed up with any independent documentary or testimonial
evidence.”
Further, Atkins maintains that by focusing on Dr. Horacek’s
opinions regarding the reasons he murdered his son, his counsel
failed to adequately investigate his childhood. He argues that
an adequate investigation would have revealed the “abject
circumstances of [his] childhood” and would have resulted in a
decision to present “credible expert mental health testimony
16
explaining the relationship between such a personal history and
[Atkins’s] capital offense.”
Specifically, Atkins asserts in his opening brief to this
Court that his counsel could have investigated and possibly
presented the following evidence:
• Testimony from Atkins’s half-brother Butch,
corroborating and elaborating on details from an
affidavit that indicated severe abuse by Atkins’s
parents. The affidavit notes that, when the defendant
was born, he became the favored child and his parents
began to physically and mentally abuse Butch and
another brother, Ronald. Such abuse included beatings
and the requirement that they live in an outhouse and
eat outside. Butch and Ronald also suffered sexual
abuse at the hands of another half-brother, Floyd.
The abuse eventually led to the removal of Butch and
Ronald from the Atkins’ home.
• Testimony from Atkins’s school guidance counselor
Deane Passmore that the physical circumstances he
observed when he visited Atkins’s home in 1968 were
“among the very worst that [he] ha[d] seen in [his] 35
years as [g]uidance [c]ounselor” and that such
circumstances “must have [had] a severe impact on
[Atkins].”
17
• Pennsylvania family court records documenting the
severe abuse occurring in the home of the Atkins
family and the permanent removal of Ronald and Butch
from the home due to such abuse.
• Pennsylvania criminal court records showing that
Atkins’s mother was arrested for forging prescriptions
for a type of methamphetamine.
• Proffered witness statements showing that Atkins’s
mother was addicted to prescription medication.
• Testimony from Atkins’s schoolmates that he was a
social outcast and was subjected to regular emotional
and physical abuse.
• Testimony from Atkins’s shop teacher Bob Carlson that
Atkins suffered “extraordinary cruelty and
humiliation” at school.
• Testimony from Ann Blair, former director of the
Senior Center in Sheffield, Pennsylvania, that she
witnessed Atkins’s father “using [Atkins] ‘as bait’ to
elicit sympathy and handouts from the elderly
residents at the Senior Center” and that she believed
Atkins’s father used him “to help con other vulnerable
people and shoplift from stores.”
18
• Testimony from social worker Joan Podkul, who “could
have conducted an adequate sentencing investigation,
provided its results to trial counsel, and testified
to Atkins’[s] social history, drawing together all of
the available information for a coherent presentation
to the jury.”
• Testimony from forensic psychiatrist Dr. Seymour
Halleck that a “significant relationship [existed]
between Atkins’[s] dismal social history and his
mental state and behavior at the time of the offense,”
that Atkins’s mental state was not attributable to
multiple personality disorder, and that multiple
personality disorder is viewed with skepticism and not
supported by the evidence in this case.
2.
Nevertheless, regardless of whether Atkins’s counsel
rendered deficient performance, we are unconvinced that his
counsel’s failure to uncover or present the evidence outlined
above prejudiced him. “In assessing prejudice, we reweigh the
evidence in aggravation against the totality of available
mitigating evidence,” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534
(2003), asking whether “there is a reasonable probability that,
19
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,” the jury would have
recommended a different sentence, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
a.
First, we are unconvinced that the evidence Atkins offers
would have provided further mitigation. Testimony from Atkins’s
half-brother Butch and from his guidance counselor would have
detailed the horrific physical conditions of the home of the
Atkins family. Nevertheless, contrary to the implications that
Atkins makes in his brief, these sources focus on the conditions
and abuse that Butch and Ronald suffered, not on damaging
treatment that Atkins received. Indeed, Butch’s affidavit
indicates that Atkins did not suffer the abuse that he and
Ronald did because his parents favored Atkins over him and
Ronald. Further, although the additional testimony indicates
that Atkins was sexually abused, the jury was already aware, via
Dr. Horacek’s testimony, that Atkins had been sexually abused by
his half-brother and neighborhood boys.
Atkins’s contention that the investigation and presentation
of details of his childhood would have allowed for “credible
expert mental health testimony explaining the relationship
between such a personal history and [Atkins’s] capital offense”
also lacks merit. We have reviewed Halleck’s actual testimony
and affidavits, noting that he testified that Atkins was
20
severely neglected and abused as a child and that children who
have experienced such treatment often suffer from depression and
personality disorders. Moreover, he diagnosed Atkins with
intermittent explosive disorder; personality disorder not
otherwise specified; antisocial, borderline, and narcissistic
traits; and a substance abuse disorder. He declared that a
“significant relationship [existed] between Atkins’[s] dismal
social history and his mental state and behavior at the time of
the offense” but that his mental state was not attributable to
multiple personality disorder.
Most notably, however, Halleck did not explain how Atkins’s
childhood circumstances would have caused him to abuse his own
son. Consequently, although his testimony might have
enlightened the jury regarding Atkins’s background and
tendencies, we are unconvinced that it would have proved
mitigating. Indeed, as the district court recognized, Halleck’s
lack of explanation regarding the connection between Atkins’s
exposure to abuse and the murder of his son may have actually
proved detrimental--
At best, [Dr. Halleck] would have left the impression
that [Atkins’s] mental state was impaired because he
was abused as a child, which would have invited
obvious, but not necessarily beneficial, comparisons
to the level of abuse that Butch had suffered and to
the relatively positive course that Butch’s life
ultimately had taken.
Atkins, 2011 WL 3608234, at *17.
21
b.
Second, there is no reasonable probability that any
additional mitigation provided by the evidence Atkins cites
would have overcome the aggravating circumstances of the murder
and altered the jury’s recommended sentence. The jury found
that the murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”
Indeed, evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing revealed that
Atkins hit Lyle’s head against the wall of his mobile home
multiple times. Medical exams revealed that Atkins physically
abused Lyle so severely that nearly every extremity of his body
evidenced either a fracture or other notable injury. Lyle
exhibited
[a] healing fracture [on] the right clavicle, [a]
healing bone along the midshaft of the right upper
arm, extensive injury of the left upper arm,
dislocation of the left elbow, [a] healing bone
indicative of a fracture of the right hip, skull
fractures and bruising on both the left and right
sides [of the skull], and a compression fracture of
the spine.
The pediatric radiologist that examined Lyle testified that
“[i]n the twenty-two years that [he] ha[d] been doing pediatric
radiology and in the nine years that [he] practiced pediatrics
before becoming a pediatric radiologist, [he] ha[d] never seen
as extensive bone injuries as [Lyle] had.” Furthermore,
testimony from several witnesses indicated that Lyle did not
22
immediately lose consciousness and that he would have felt and
suffered from the pain associated with his injuries.
Given these atrocities, we cannot conclude that there is
any reasonable probability a jury would have recommended a
different sentence if presented with the additional mitigating
evidence Atkins offers. Accordingly, we hold that his counsel’s
failure to investigate and present such evidence did not
prejudice him, and thus, we affirm the district court’s award of
summary judgment on this claim.
B.
Atkins also alleges that the State violated Brady by
withholding a statement that his former sister-in-law made to
law enforcement regarding the physical conditions of his
childhood home and the abuse his mother inflicted on his
brothers. Because the state court adjudicated Atkins's Brady
claim on the merits, we review his allegations “through the dual
lens of the AEDPA standard and the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in Brady.” Richardson v. Branker, 668 F.3d 128,
144 (4th Cir. 2012). Per AEDPA, once a state court has
adjudicated the merits of a claim, a federal court may not grant
a writ of habeas corpus on that claim unless the state court’s
adjudication:
23
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the [s]tate court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Under Brady, the prosecution deprives a criminal defendant
of due process when it suppresses evidence that is both
favorable to the defendant and “material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of” whether it suppressed the evidence
in good faith. 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence qualifies as material
“if there is a reasonable probability that the proceeding would
have resulted in a different outcome had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense.”
Richardson, 668 F.3d at 145; see
also Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999). Thus, the
key question is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably
be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to
undermine confidence in the verdict.” Kyles v. Whitley,
514
U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
1.
Here, Atkins contends that the State violated Brady by
failing to disclose the following statement that his former
sister-in-law, Katherine Whipple, made to law enforcement:
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She stated that [Atkins] appeared to be a nice kid but
had a lot of family problems. Two other brothers[,]
Butch and another brother[,] ran away from home when
they were teenagers. She believes that this was due
to Floyd’s mother having Floyd beat them and then
making them sleep in the outside to[ilet]. To her
knowledge the [Atkins] still don’t have a[n] indoor
to[ilet].
Atkins avers that, had Whipple’s statement been disclosed, “it
would have alerted defense counsel to the critical importance of
thoroughly investigating Atkins’[s] childhood family
circumstances and provided contact information for two witnesses
with useful information and further investigative leads.”
2.
Employing AEDPA, we consider whether the state court
“unreasonabl[y]” applied clearly established federal law when it
concluded that Atkins failed to prove that “any of the evidence
[he] might have developed if [he] had known of [Katherine
Whipple’s statement]” would have with any reasonable probability
resulted in a different sentence. We conclude that the state
court’s determination was both reasonable and correct.
Simply put, Atkins has failed to show that Whipple’s
statement is material. Even if its disclosure would have
induced defense counsel to further investigate Atkins’s
childhood, such investigation would have disclosed only the
additional mitigating evidence that we have already examined
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under Atkins’s ineffectiveness claim. As we concluded above, no
reasonable probability exists that the presentation of such
evidence would have altered the jury’s recommended sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the State on this claim.
IV.
We have reviewed the district court proceedings on the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim de novo and concluded
that Atkins has failed to prove that he suffered prejudice from
that alleged ineffective assistance. Upon our review of
Atkins’s Brady claim under the standard imposed by AEDPA, we
conclude that Atkins’s claim is meritless. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition.
AFFIRMED
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