Filed: Jun. 07, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2449 MONTE DEXTER PEPPER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. PRECISION VALVE CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (6:10-cv-02532-MGL) Submitted: May 31, 2013 Decided: June 7, 2013 Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Melvin Hutso
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2449 MONTE DEXTER PEPPER, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. PRECISION VALVE CORPORATION, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge. (6:10-cv-02532-MGL) Submitted: May 31, 2013 Decided: June 7, 2013 Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Melvin Hutson..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2449
MONTE DEXTER PEPPER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
PRECISION VALVE CORPORATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge.
(6:10-cv-02532-MGL)
Submitted: May 31, 2013 Decided: June 7, 2013
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Melvin Hutson, MELVIN HUTSON, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Reginald W. Belcher, TURNER PADGET GRAHAM &
LANEY, PA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Monte Dexter Pepper appeals the district court’s order
accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and
granting summary judgment in favor of Precision Valve
Corporation on Pepper’s discrimination and retaliation claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (West 2012). We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment will
be granted unless “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party” on the evidence presented. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Conclusory or
speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of [the nonmoving party’s]
case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649
(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because Pepper did not produce direct evidence that
racial discrimination motivated Precision Valve’s adverse
actions against him, we analyze his claims under the burden-
2
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). See Hill v. Lockheed Martin
Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 284-85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee is
first required to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, showing that (1) he is a member of a protected
class; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he
suffered this adverse action despite performing his job in
accordance with the employer’s legitimate expectations; and
(4) the circumstances gave rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. * Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.– Wilmington,
640 F.3d 550, 558 (4th Cir. 2011). If the employee makes this
showing, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action.”
Hill, 354 F.3d at 285. If the employer provides
evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the
presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the employee, who
bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, must show by a
*
We decline Pepper’s invitation to adopt the holding of
Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493-94 (D.C.
Cir. 2008). See Stallworth v. Singing River Health Sys., 469 F.
App’x 369, 372 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (declining to adopt
Brady); Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co.,
523 F.3d 1187, 1202
n.12 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to adopt Brady and “reserv[ing]
the right to undertake each step of the Supreme Court’s
McDonnell Douglas framework in analyzing discrimination and
retaliation claims on summary judgment”).
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preponderance of evidence that the proffered reason was a
pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 146-49 (2000).
Here, Precision Valve provided ample evidence
demonstrating that Pepper failed to meet its legitimate
expectations, including documentation showing that Pepper
received multiple warnings for producing defective parts,
unexcused absences, tardiness, improperly clocking in or out,
and not being at his machine at the beginning of his shift.
Pepper argues on appeal that Precision Valve cannot logically
claim that his performance was unsatisfactory prior to his
termination because Precision Valve continued to employ him for
a time after recognizing deficiencies in his performance. We
find this argument unpersuasive. Because Pepper’s self-serving
statements regarding his job performance are insufficient to
show that he met Precision Valve’s legitimate performance
expectations, see King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 149-50 (4th
Cir. 2003), we conclude that he cannot make a prima facie
showing of discrimination. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court did not err in granting summary judgment on
Pepper’s racial discrimination claims.
Pepper next argues that the district court erred in
granting Precision Valve’s motion for summary judgment on his
retaliation claims. To establish a prima facie case of
4
retaliation, Pepper “must prove that (1) []he engaged in a
protected activity, (2) the employer acted adversely against
[him], and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the asserted adverse action.” Hoyle v.
Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011). Pepper
argues that the district court erred in determining that the gap
of ten months between the filing of his lawsuit and his
termination was too long to establish causation between the two.
Pepper contends that his protected activity was not his filing
of the lawsuit but, rather, his continuing pursuit of the
lawsuit, and, thus, that there was sufficient temporal proximity
to establish causation. He identifies no authority for this
contention.
We conclude that Pepper’s protected activity was the
filing of his lawsuit against Precision Valve. “[A] causal
connection for purposes of demonstrating a prima facie case
exists where the employer takes adverse employment action
against an employee shortly after learning of the protected
activity.” Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.
2004). Generally, however, the passage of time alone cannot
provide proof of causation unless the “temporal proximity
between an employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an
adverse employment action” was “very close.” Clark County Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden,
532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam)
5
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Pepper was
terminated ten months after he filed his lawsuit against
Precision Valve, we conclude that Pepper cannot establish a
causal connection between his filing of the lawsuit and his
termination. See id. (suggesting that three-to-four-month gap
was insufficient to prove causal connection). Accordingly, we
hold that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment on Pepper’s retaliation claims.
We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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