Filed: Jan. 17, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4283 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JONATHAN A. MELENDEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00114-WDQ-1) Submitted: December 28, 2012 Decided: January 17, 2013 Before KING, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William L. Welch, III, Balt
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4283 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. JONATHAN A. MELENDEZ, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00114-WDQ-1) Submitted: December 28, 2012 Decided: January 17, 2013 Before KING, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. William L. Welch, III, Balti..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4283
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JONATHAN A. MELENDEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:10-cr-00114-WDQ-1)
Submitted: December 28, 2012 Decided: January 17, 2013
Before KING, GREGORY, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William L. Welch, III, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod
J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Christopher J. Romano,
Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop, Jonathan
Melendez pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to possess
with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Melendez was sentenced to 120 months in
prison. He now appeals. We affirm.
I
Melendez first challenges the district court’s denial
of his suppression motion. In considering this claim, “we
review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its
factual determinations for clear error.” United States v.
Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012).
Using the analytic framework of Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), we determine first whether the officer’s actions
were justified at the inception of the traffic stop. If they
were, we then address “whether the continued stop was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration.”
Vaughan, 700 F.3d
at 709 (internal quotation marks omitted).
At the suppression hearing, Maryland State Trooper
Jeremiah Gussoni testified that he initiated a traffic stop of
Melendez’s vehicle because Melendez was traveling seventy-six
miles per hour — eleven miles over the posted speed limit — and
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because he observed Melendez make an unsafe lane change, cutting
off a vehicle that Melendez had just passed. Because “[a]s a
general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred,” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
810 (1996), we conclude that Gussoni’s initial stop of
Melendez’s vehicle based upon the infractions was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
Following a traffic stop, an officer may:
detain the offending vehicle for as long as it takes
to perform the traditional incidents of a routine
traffic stop. . . . [The] officer may request a
driver’s license and vehicle registration, run a
computer check, and issue a citation. . . . [O]nce the
driver has demonstrated that he is entitled to operate
his vehicle, and the police officer has issued the
requisite warning or ticket, the driver must be
allowed to proceed on his way. . . . If a police
officer wants to detain a driver beyond the scope of a
routine traffic stop, . . . he must possess a
justification for doing so other than the initial
traffic violation. . . . Thus, a prolonged automobile
stop requires either the driver’s consent or a
reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here, eleven minutes elapsed between the initial
traffic stop and the discovery of cocaine in the trunk of
Melendez’s car. We do not consider this length of time
unreasonable, especially because Gussoni did not receive the
results of a requested license check until after the cocaine was
found.
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Even if the delay was unreasonable, we conclude, based
on the totality of the circumstances, that Gussoni had ample
reason to suspect that criminal activity was afoot and that,
consequently, the extended detention was not unreasonable.
Among other things, Gussoni testified that Melendez appeared
exceptionally nervous: an artery in his neck was visibly
pounding; his breathing was rapid; and his hand trembled as he
handed his license and car rental contract to Gussoni.
Additionally, the vehicle had a “lived-in” look — its interior
was strewn with coffee cups, partially consumed food, snack
wrappers, and cigarettes. This signifies to experienced
officers such as Gussoni that the vehicle’s occupant does not
want to leave the vehicle for any reason, often because the
vehicle contains money, drugs, or weapons. Further, the car was
a “one-way rental,” and Melendez was driving from Fort
Lauderdale, a known source city for drugs, to New York City, a
known destination city for drugs.
Accordingly, we hold that neither the initial traffic
stop nor the subsequent detention violated the Fourth Amendment.
The motion to suppress was properly denied.
II
Melendez contends that the district court improperly
denied him the benefit of the safety valve, which permits a
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sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines range without
regard to any statutory minimum sentence. To benefit from the
safety valve, the defendant bears the burden of showing that he
meets the five requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)
(2006) and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5C1.2(a) (2011). United
States v. Henry, 673 F.3d 285, 292-95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 182 (2012). We review the district court’s
determination concerning eligibility for safety valve relief for
clear error.
Id. at 292.
It is undisputed that Melendez met the first four
requirements. The issue before us is whether he also met the
fifth requirement of truthful and complete disclosure. See 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5), USSG § 5C1.2(a)(5). To satisfy this
requirement, the defendant must truthfully disclose all
information he has “about the offense of conviction and any
other crimes that constitute relevant conduct.” United States
v. Aidoo,
670 F.3d 600, 610 (4th Cir. 2012).
We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in denying Melendez the benefit of the safety valve.
Melendez, who claimed to be a truck driver without the $3000
needed to repair his truck, was not forthcoming about the source
of $29,000 he sent to the Dominican Republic. Nor was he
truthful about the locations of his meetings with Julio, his
contact in New York, or his physical descriptions of Julio. He
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therefore failed to satisfy the requirement that the defendant
truthfully disclose all information he has about the offense and
relevant conduct. See USSG § 5C1.2(a)(5); United States v.
Aidoo, 670 F.3d at 610.
III
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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