Filed: Aug. 12, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4397 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. LARRY RODGERS, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00218-H-1) Submitted: April 16, 2013 Decided: August 12, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Diaz wrote a s
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4397 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. LARRY RODGERS, JR., Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00218-H-1) Submitted: April 16, 2013 Decided: August 12, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Diaz wrote a se..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4397
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LARRY RODGERS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00218-H-1)
Submitted: April 16, 2013 Decided: August 12, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Judge Diaz wrote a
separate concurring opinion.
Kelly L. Greene, GREENE & WILSON, P.A., New Bern, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larry Rodgers, Jr., appeals his conviction after a
jury convicted him of one count of conspiracy to commit armed
bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); one count
of armed bank robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) (2006), and 2 (2006); and one count of
using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime
of violence and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) and 2. Rodgers was sentenced to 209
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Rodgers argues that the
district court erred in allowing him to represent himself
because he was not competent to act as his own counsel, and
denied him a fair trial in its management of courtroom
proceedings.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees not only the right to
be represented by counsel but also the right to
self-representation. Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 819
(1975). The decision to represent oneself must be knowing and
intelligent, id. at 835, and courts must entertain every
reasonable presumption against waiver of counsel. Brewer v.
Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). Because Rodgers contends he
was not competent to waive counsel, we review the record to
ensure that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
United States v. Bernard,
708 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2013).
2
This issue, raised for the first time on appeal, is reviewed for
plain error. United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993);
Bernard, 708 F.3d at 587-88.
While a trial court must determine if a waiver of
counsel is knowing and intelligent, no particular interrogation
of the defendant is required, so long as the court warns the
defendant of the dangers of self-representation so that “‘his
choice is made with his eyes open.’” United States v. King,
582
F.2d 888, 890 (4th Cir. 1978) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at
835). “The determination of whether there has been an
intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of
the accused.” Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); see
United States v. Singleton,
107 F.3d 1091, 1097-98 (4th Cir.
1997).
We conclude that the district court did not err in
granting Rodgers’ request to waive counsel and proceed pro se.
Our examination of the record as a whole demonstrates that
Rodgers’ election to proceed pro se was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. At the time he elected to proceed pro se,
Rodgers was fully aware of the nature of the charges against him
and the potential punishments he faced if convicted. The
district court also informed Rodgers of the perils of
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self-representation and stated its belief that he was making a
mistake.
Rodgers contends that his history of depression and
learning disabilities, combined with the fact that he spent his
school years in special education classes, made him incompetent
to represent himself, and argues that the district court erred
in failing to sua sponte terminate his self-representation when
it became apparent he was unqualified to represent himself. To
support this argument, Rodgers points to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Indiana v. Edwards,
554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008), and
states that “the right of self-representation is not absolute.”
Unlike the defendant in Edwards, however, Rodgers did not suffer
from a severe mental illness, but merely displayed some
difficulty communicating with the court and jury. We conclude
that these difficulties were insufficient to require the court
to terminate Rodgers’ self-representation.
Rodgers next contends that he was deprived of a fair
trial by the district court’s allegedly prejudicial conduct. He
asserts that the court interfered with his ability to put on a
case, truncated his cross-examination of witnesses as well as
his own testimony, and ultimately forced him to rest his case.
We review these allegations for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Castner,
50 F.3d 1267, 1272 (4th Cir. 1995).
4
Generally, “[q]uestions of trial management are
quintessentially the province of the district courts.” United
States v. Smith,
452 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 2006). The
district court has two responsibilities in trial oversight —
ensuring that “matters are clearly presented to the jury” and
preventing “trials from becoming protracted and costly affairs.”
Id. The court “must exercise reasonable control over the
interrogation of witnesses and the presentation of evidence in
order to ensure the effective determination of the truth [and]
to avoid needless waste of time in the presentation of a case.”
Castner, 50 F.3d at 1272 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
will grant a new trial only if the district court’s actions
denied the appellant “a fair, as distinguished from a perfect,
trial.” United States v. Villarini,
238 F.3d 530, 536 (4th Cir.
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court did not excessively interfere
with Rodgers’ exercise of his right to proceed pro se, but
properly required Rodgers to observe the rules of criminal
procedure and evidence and exercised its discretion to limit
repetitive and cumulative examination of witnesses. Thus, the
district court’s interventions into Rodgers’ case were for the
purpose of clarifying the evidence for the jury and ensuring
that evidence was properly presented without undue delay.
5
Therefore, we conclude that Rodgers has failed to demonstrate
that the district court’s conduct resulted in an unfair trial.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6
DIAZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I continue to doubt the wisdom of applying plain error
review to the appeal of a pro se defendant alleging a defective
Faretta waiver on the basis of mental incompetency, for “it is
paradoxical to expect a defendant to recognize his own ‘gray
area’ competency, and then object to his own motion to proceed
pro se.” United States v. Bernard,
708 F.3d 583, 596 (4th Cir.
2013) (Diaz, J., dissenting). But because the facts of this
case demonstrate no error in Rodgers’s Faretta waiver under any
standard of review, I concur in the judgment.
7