Filed: Apr. 04, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4411 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ERASMO ALVARADO-IBARRA, a/k/a Chiquilin, Defendant – Appellant, and HECTOR HERNANDEZ-FERNANDEZ, Material Witness. No. 12-4413 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. SILVESTRE CASTRO-SANDOVAL, a/k/a Silver, Defendant – Appellant, and HECTOR HERNANDEZ-FERNANDEZ, Material Witness. No. 12-4660 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. JOSE ZUNIGA-RUI
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4411 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. ERASMO ALVARADO-IBARRA, a/k/a Chiquilin, Defendant – Appellant, and HECTOR HERNANDEZ-FERNANDEZ, Material Witness. No. 12-4413 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. SILVESTRE CASTRO-SANDOVAL, a/k/a Silver, Defendant – Appellant, and HECTOR HERNANDEZ-FERNANDEZ, Material Witness. No. 12-4660 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff – Appellee, v. JOSE ZUNIGA-RUIZ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4411
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ERASMO ALVARADO-IBARRA, a/k/a Chiquilin,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
HECTOR HERNANDEZ-FERNANDEZ,
Material Witness.
No. 12-4413
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SILVESTRE CASTRO-SANDOVAL, a/k/a Silver,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
HECTOR HERNANDEZ-FERNANDEZ,
Material Witness.
No. 12-4660
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JOSE ZUNIGA-RUIZ, a/k/a Tio Tony,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
HECTOR HERNANDEZ-FERNANDEZ,
Party Below.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00281-JCC-4; 1:11-cr-00281-JCC-6;
1:11-cr-00281-JCC-8)
Submitted: February 20, 2013 Decided: April 4, 2013
Before KEENAN, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harry A. Dennis, III, DENNIS & STEWART, PLLC, Arlington,
Virginia; Kimberly J. Phillips, GARRETSON PHILLIPS, PC, Fairfax,
Virginia; John A. Keats, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellants.
Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Shane N. Cralle,
Special Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Erasmo Alvarado-Ibarra, Silvestre Castro-Sandoval, and
Jose Zuniga-Ruiz (collectively, “Defendants”) were charged with
conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture
containing a detectible amount of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. At a consolidated jury trial, all
three Defendants were convicted. The district court sentenced
Alvarado-Ibarra to 120 months’ imprisonment for conspiring to
distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine base. The district
court also sentenced Castro-Sandoval and Zuniga-Ruiz to 63
months’ and 70 months’ imprisonment, respectively, for
conspiring to distribute more than 500 grams but less than 5
kilograms of cocaine. Defendants appealed, arguing that the
district court erred in denying their motions for judgment of
acquittal, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing
all reasonable inferences in favor of the government. United
States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 571-72 (4th Cir. 2011),
cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 564 (2011). Where the motion alleges
insufficient evidence, we will affirm if the conviction is
supported by “substantial evidence in the record,” where
“[s]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
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fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). We will not make
credibility determinations, instead assuming that the jury
resolved conflicting evidence in the government’s favor.
Penniegraft, 641 F.3d at 572. A defendant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden,” as reversal
is limited to “cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.”
United States v. Foster,
507 F.3d 233, 244-45 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To establish each Defendant’s guilt of the drug
conspiracy charge, the Government was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt “(1) an agreement between two or more persons
to engage in conduct that violates a federal drug law, (2) the
defendant’s knowledge of the conspiracy, and (3) the defendant’s
knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy.” United
States v. Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 139 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The government may rely on
circumstantial evidence and “need not exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence, provided the summation of the evidence
permits a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Burgos,
94 F.3d 849, 858 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc). “Once the Government proves a conspiracy, the evidence
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need only establish a slight connection between a defendant and
the conspiracy to support conviction.” Green, 599 F.3d at 367.
A mere buy-sell transaction is insufficient to prove a
drug conspiracy. United States v. Edmonds, 679 F.3d 169, 174
(4th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 133 S.
Ct. 376 (2012), reissued in part,
700 F.3d 146, 147 (4th Cir.
2012); United States v. Hackley,
662 F.3d 671, 679 (4th Cir.
2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1936,
132 S. Ct. 2703 (2012).
However, any agreement beyond the buy-sell transaction--
including “an agreement that the buyer will resell the cocaine
in the marketplace”--will support the existence of a conspiracy
between the parties. Edmonds, 679 F.3d at 174.
We previously have recognized that a buy-sell
transaction involving a substantial quantity of drugs or money
supports a jury’s inference that the parties to the transaction
implicitly agreed to distribute together. See United States v.
Yearwood, 518 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2008). “[E]vidence of
continuing relationships and repeated transactions can support
the finding that there was a conspiracy, especially when coupled
with substantial quantities of drugs.” United States v. Reid,
523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). Additionally, “the
‘fronting’ of drugs indicates conspiracy to engage in drug
trafficking beyond the immediate distribution transaction, as
the consignment implies a credit agreement that looks to further
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transactions to secure income to complete the original
transaction.” Edmonds, 679 F.3d at 174.
Alvarado-Ibarra argues that his conviction was
supported by the testimony of several alleged coconspirators,
which he claims was not worthy of belief. However, “[t]he
settled law of this circuit recognizes that the testimony of a
defendant’s accomplices, standing alone and uncorroborated, can
provide an adequate basis for conviction.” United States v.
Burns, 990 F.2d 1426, 1439 (4th Cir. 1993). To the extent
Alvarado-Ibarra challenges the jury’s credibility
determinations, we will not review such determinations in
considering the sufficiency of the evidence. See Penniegraft,
641 F.3d at 572. Although he also challenges two pieces of
evidence--a Facebook profile and a controlled purchase--we
conclude, viewing the remaining evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government, that ample evidence existed to
support Alvarado-Ibarra’s conviction regardless of the contested
evidence. See Kellam, 568 F.3d at 139.
Castro-Sandoval argues that the Government’s evidence
of his involvement in a single transaction was insufficient to
demonstrate his knowing participation in the conspiracy and, in
fact, revealed that he was never permitted to join the
conspiracy. We disagree. A single drug transaction may
establish participation in a larger drug conspiracy “if there is
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independent evidence that the defendant had some knowledge of
the broader conspiracy, or the single act itself is one from
which such knowledge may be inferred.” United States v.
Richards, 737 F.2d 1307, 1309 (4th Cir. 1984) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Viewing the evidence
surrounding this transaction in the light most favorable to the
Government, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to
demonstrate Castro-Sandoval’s knowing and voluntary
participation in the overarching conspiracy. See Edmonds, 679
F.3d at 174; Yearwood, 518 F.3d at 226.
Zuniga-Ruiz argues that the evidence at trial
demonstrated only that he was an end-user of cocaine, not a
participant in the conspiracy. However, viewing this evidence
in the light most favorable to the Government, we conclude the
jury could reasonably infer that Zuniga-Ruiz knowingly and
voluntarily purchased cocaine from the conspiracy with the
intent to redistribute it. See Edmonds, 679 F.3d at 174; Reid,
523 F.3d at 317; Yearwood, 518 F.3d at 226.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgments.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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