Filed: Aug. 23, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4832 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RICO C. AERY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00376-RJC-2) Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 23, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4832 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. RICO C. AERY, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00376-RJC-2) Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 23, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam o..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4832
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICO C. AERY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00376-RJC-2)
Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 23, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Steven A. Feldman, FELDMAN & FELDMAN, Uniondale, New York, for
Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M.
Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rico C. Aery appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to six
months’ imprisonment, followed by a new two-year term of
supervised release. Aery contends that his six-month revocation
sentence is unreasonable because the court failed to explain
adequately its reasons for imposing a sentence of that length.
He also argues that the court improperly extended the new term
of supervised release to accommodate his drug rehabilitation.
We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
On February 19, 2013, while this appeal was pending,
Aery was released from incarceration and began serving his new
term of supervised release. We may address sua sponte whether
an issue on appeal presents “a live case or controversy . . .
since mootness goes to the heart of the Article III jurisdiction
of the courts.” Friedman’s, Inc. v. Dunlap,
290 F.3d 191, 197
(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because
Aery has already served his term of imprisonment and has not
identified any collateral consequences of it, there is no longer
any live controversy regarding the length of his confinement.
Therefore, his challenge to the active prison sentence is moot.
See United States v. Hardy,
545 F.3d 280, 283-84 (4th Cir.
2008).
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However, because Aery is still serving a new term of
supervised release, we retain jurisdiction to review the
district court’s decision to impose a two-year term of
supervised release. Aery contends that the district court erred
by considering his efforts at drug rehabilitation to determine
that a two-year term of supervised release was appropriate. * We
will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised
release if it is within the governing statutory range and not
plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). “When reviewing whether a revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable, [the Court] must first
determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v.
Thompson,
595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010); see United States
v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Only if this
court finds the sentence unreasonable must the court decide
whether it is “plainly” so.
Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657.
Aery asserts that the new term of supervised release
is unreasonable because the district court extended it to two
*
The government maintains that Aery did not preserve this
issue for appeal, while Aery argues that his question to the
court (“I’m getting 2 years probation after I do the 6 months
incarcerated?”) functioned as an objection that preserved for
appeal his challenge to the length of the new term of supervised
release. We agree that Aery’s question did not amount to an
objection. However, his claim fails under either the plain
error test, United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993), or
the plainly unreasonable test set out above.
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years to accommodate his drug rehabilitation. He argues that
the sentencing court may not lengthen a sentence to promote the
defendant’s drug treatment or other rehabilitation, citing Tapia
v. United States,
131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011). His argument is
inapposite for the following reasons.
Because Aery’s original offense was a Class C felony,
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), (h) (2006), the court was
authorized to impose a new term of supervised release of up to
thirty-six months less any term of imprisonment imposed upon
revocation of supervised release, which in Aery’s case meant a
term of up to thirty months was authorized by statute. Aery did
not request that the court forego a new term of supervised
release, impose a new term of less than two years, or address
that aspect of his sentence at all.
Further, the rationale used in Tapia, that
imprisonment is not an appropriate way to promote a defendant’s
rehabilitation, does not appear to prohibit a district court
from relying on a defendant’s rehabilitative needs in choosing
to impose a supervised release term or in determining the length
or manner of supervision.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment, but
dismiss the appeal as moot to the extent that Aery seeks to
challenge his expired sentence of incarceration. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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