Filed: Apr. 25, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4875 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LARRY JAMES MARTIN, a/k/a Wolfman, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey, Chief District Judge. (2:12-cr-00011-JPB-JSK-1) Submitted: April 4, 2013 Decided: April 25, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-4875 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LARRY JAMES MARTIN, a/k/a Wolfman, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey, Chief District Judge. (2:12-cr-00011-JPB-JSK-1) Submitted: April 4, 2013 Decided: April 25, 2013 Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4875
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LARRY JAMES MARTIN, a/k/a Wolfman,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (2:12-cr-00011-JPB-JSK-1)
Submitted: April 4, 2013 Decided: April 25, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lary D. Garrett, GARRETT & GARRETT, Moorefield, West Virginia,
for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States
Attorney, Stephen Warner, Assistant United States Attorney,
Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Larry James Martin pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to possession of material used in the
manufacture of methamphetamine, and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6), (d)(2) (2006), 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2006). The district court sentenced Martin to 120 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Martin asserts that his sentence is
unreasonable because the district court imposed the statutory
maximum sentence and declined to grant a downward variance. We
affirm.
We review Martin’s sentence under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.;
United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). After
determining whether the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range, we must decide whether the court
considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed the arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575-76; United States v.
Carter,
564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural error, we consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
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circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; Lynn, 592 F.3d at 575.
If the sentence is within the appropriate Guidelines range, we
apply a presumption on appeal that the sentence is reasonable.
United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza,
597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir.
2010). Such a presumption is rebutted only if the appellant
demonstrates “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Martin alleges that the district court erred in
imposing the statutory maximum sentence and in failing to grant
a downward variance. Martin does not assert any specific
procedural error, and our review of the record leads us to
conclude that Martin has not overcome the presumption of
substantive reasonableness applicable to his within-Guidelines
sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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