Filed: Aug. 19, 2013
Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4043 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TREVOR REED, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation. (5:11-cr-00353- M-1) Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 19, 2013 Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Trev
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4043 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. TREVOR REED, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District Judge, sitting by designation. (5:11-cr-00353- M-1) Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 19, 2013 Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Trevo..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4043
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TREVOR REED,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. J. Frederick Motz,
Senior District Judge, sitting by designation. (5:11-cr-00353-
M-1)
Submitted: July 31, 2013 Decided: August 19, 2013
Before GREGORY, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Trevor Reed, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Trevor Reed of wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West Supp. 2013), and
securities fraud, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff
(2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). The court sentenced Reed
to a downward variant sentence of ninety-six months’
imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution. On appeal,
Reed alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance,
that the prosecutor and the district court judge engaged in
misconduct, and that the evidence was insufficient to support
his convictions. 1 We affirm.
Initially, we reject Reed’s conclusory allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. 2
We also conclude that Reed’s claims of judicial misconduct are
1
Although we appointed counsel to represent Reed, counsel
was permitted to withdraw. Reed declined the appointment of
replacement counsel, opting instead to represent himself on
appeal.
2
Although Reed attempts to incorporate by reference his
multiple claims of ineffective assistance and prosecutorial
misconduct previously presented to the district court, we have
determined that this is an impermissible method of raising an
issue on appeal. McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 588 n.1 (4th
Cir. 2000); see 4th Cir. R. 34(b) (directing appealing party to
present specific arguments in informal brief). Moreover,
because the record does not conclusively establish that counsel
was ineffective, this claim is not properly raised on direct
appeal. United States v. Benton,
523 F.3d 424, 435 (4th Cir.
2008).
2
without merit. The district court provided Reed with a
meaningful opportunity to allocute, did not deny Reed access to
transcripts, and did not prevent Reed from presenting argument
in the district court or from perfecting his appeal.
We now turn to Reed’s claim that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions. This court reviews the
denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion de novo. United
States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005). When a
Rule 29 motion is based on a claim of insufficient evidence, the
jury’s verdict must be sustained “if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.” United States v. Abu Ali,
528 F.3d 210, 244 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “We
have defined substantial evidence as evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
Alerre, 430 F.3d at 693 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, “we cannot make our own credibility
determinations but must assume that the jury resolved all
contradictions in testimony in favor of the Government.” United
States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp.,
989 F.2d 1390,
1402 (4th Cir. 1993).
Wire fraud has two essential elements: “(1) the
existence of a scheme to defraud and (2) the use of . . . wire
3
communication in furtherance of the scheme.” United States v.
Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 2006). The first element is
at issue in this case. To convict Reed, the Government had to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Reed had the “the
specific intent to deprive [the investors] of something of value
through a misrepresentation or other similar dishonest method.”
United States v. Wynn,
684 F.3d 473, 478 (4th Cir. 2012); see
United States v. Godwin,
272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that specific intent “may be inferred from the totality
of the circumstances and need not be proven by direct evidence”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). We find that, although
Reed insisted that he did not have the intent to defraud the
investors, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could reasonably infer that he did have that intent. We
therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support
Reed’s conviction for wire fraud.
To convict Reed of securities fraud, the Government
had to prove that Reed knowingly made a material
misrepresentation or omission in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security and that the victims’ reliance upon those
misrepresentations caused them economic loss. See United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665-66 (1997) (discussing
scienter requirement); cf. Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc.,
637 F.3d 462, 466 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011). Here, the record is
4
replete with evidence of material misrepresentations made by
Reed. The jury could reasonably have inferred that Reed made
those misrepresentations to induce investors to buy the
securities, that the investors relied upon those
misrepresentations when considering whether to invest, and that
this reliance caused the investors economic loss. We therefore
conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Reed’s
conviction for securities fraud.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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