Filed: Nov. 18, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-8144 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner - Appellee, v. WALTER WOODEN, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:10-hc-02151-BO) Submitted: July 19, 2013 Decided: November 18, 2013 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Th
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-8144 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner - Appellee, v. WALTER WOODEN, Respondent - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:10-hc-02151-BO) Submitted: July 19, 2013 Decided: November 18, 2013 Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion. Tho..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-8144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
WALTER WOODEN,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-hc-02151-BO)
Submitted: July 19, 2013 Decided: November 18, 2013
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Research and
Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Michael G. James,
Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Walter Wooden appeals the district court’s order
committing him as a “sexually dangerous person” pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 4248(a) (2006). We vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
In July 2010, the Government initiated civil
commitment proceedings against Wooden by certifying him as a
“sexually dangerous person.” After a bench trial, the district
court determined that Wooden was not a “sexually dangerous
person,” dismissed the case, and ordered Wooden released. On
appeal, we reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded
for reconsideration. United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440,
462-63 (4th Cir. 2012). We reversed as clearly erroneous the
district court’s determinations that Wooden did not suffer from
pedophilia and that Wooden would not have serious difficulty
refraining from re-offending if released.
Id. at 456, 462. We
remanded with instructions that,
[o]n remand, the district court shall reconsider, on
the basis of the existing record and in light of the
questions about the district court’s original analysis
and the concerns about the existing evidence raised in
this opinion, whether Wooden is a sexually dangerous
person within the meaning of the Act.
Id. at 463.
In December 2012, the district court entered an order
civilly committing Wooden as a “sexually dangerous person.” The
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district court stated that “the law of the case in this matter
prescribes that on those issues previously found in favor of Mr.
Wooden and against the [G]overnment, the [G]overnment now
prevails.” (J.A. 353). Further, the district court held,
[t]herefore, having carefully considered and now
following the court of appeals’ thorough examination
of the evidence and its conclusions based thereon, the
Court holds that Mr. Wooden does currently suffer from
a serious mental disorder, namely pedophilia, and
finds that he will have serious difficulty refraining
from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if
released. Accordingly, . . . Wooden[] is hereby
committed . . . .
(J.A. 354). Wooden appeals, asserting that the district court
misinterpreted our mandate as compelling it to commit Wooden
without reevaluating the evidence.
“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation
of [our] mandate.” United States v. Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 679
(4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The law of
the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule
of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues
in subsequent stages in the same case.” L.J. v. Wilbon,
633
F.3d 297, 308 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The mandate rule, “a specific application of the law
of the case doctrine, . . . compels compliance on remand with
the dictates of a superior court.”
Pileggi, 703 F.3d at 679.
Accordingly, “‘[w]hen this court remands for further
proceedings, a district court must . . . implement both the
3
letter and spirit of the . . . mandate, taking into account
[our] opinion and the circumstances it embraces.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Bell,
5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993)).
In reversing the district court’s original judgment,
we found the district court’s determination that Wooden was not
a pedophile to be clearly erroneous, Wooden, 693 F.3d at 456.
As to the serious-difficulty prong, we likewise found the
district court’s factual determination to be clearly erroneous,
id. at 462. These conclusions, however, reflected our view of
the evidence that was presented at trial and the district
court’s distillation of that evidence and its explanation of how
it arrived at its factual findings, and we repeatedly emphasized
the district court’s failure to properly account for conflicting
and contrary evidence. See, e.g.,
id. at 453 (“The district
court . . . did not account for this evidence when considering
whether Wooden was a pedophile.”);
id. at 457-58 (observing that
district court made factual finding about Wooden’s volitional
impairment “without explaining how it had resolved its earlier
questions or even acknowledging the existence of those earlier
questions”);
id. at 459 (“The district court also failed to
consider Wooden’s own testimony when determining whether Wooden
would have serious difficulty refraining from re-offense.”);
id.
at 460 (“Because the district court did not consider this
critical evidence or the other evidence showing the intensity
4
and persistence of Wooden’s child-focused sexual fantasies,
thoughts, and urges, the court’s account of the evidence is not
‘plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.’”
(quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985))).
Although we expressed doubt about whether the record
could support the result reached by the district court, see
Wooden, 693 F.3d at 462 (“[I]t appears to us that the weight of
the evidence in the record indicates that Wooden’s pedophilia
would cause him to have serious difficulty refraining from re-
offense if released.” (emphasis added)), we nonetheless remanded
for reconsideration “in light of the questions about the
district court’s original analysis and the concerns about the
existing evidence raised in this opinion,”
id. at 463. Because
the opinion remanded for reconsideration rather than directed
the entry of judgment for the government, our mandate
contemplated the possibility that a proper distillation of all
the evidence, including a full accounting of all contradictory
and conflicting evidence, could perhaps support the district
court’s original findings.
Therefore, contrary to the district court’s
conclusion, our mandate thus did not require the district court
on remand to find Wooden to be sexually dangerous. Because the
district court misapprehended the scope of his authority, we
hereby vacate the district court’s order and remand for the
5
district court to reconsider the question of Wooden’s sexual
dangerousness in accordance with the guidance given in this
opinion and our original opinion. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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