PER CURIAM:
Vivienne Wulff appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Sentara Healthcare, Inc.,
Wulff worked as a nurse in the emergency department at Sentara Potomac Hospital from June 2009 through April 2010. In September 2009, Wulff presented Sentara with a doctor's note stating that she was restricted from lifting more than ten pounds with her left arm. Sentara accommodated this restriction without any complaint from Wulff. Because the note only imposed the lifting restriction for six weeks, Wulff submitted another note in December 2009 that extended the same lifting restriction for another six weeks. Sentara continued the accommodation.
In March 2010, Sentara's Occupational Health Nurse, Irene Sullivan, asked Wulff to update her restrictions because the December note had only extended them for six weeks. Sullivan gave Wulff a Physical Capacities Form to have her doctor complete. This form listed numerous possible restrictions and instructed the doctor to place a check mark next to each restriction that applied. With regard to lifting restrictions, the form presented the following options: "No lifting/carrying 0-20 lbs.," "No lifting/carrying 20-50 lbs.," and "No lifting/carrying 50-100 lbs." The form listed numerous other potential restrictions next to which the doctor could place a check mark, and the form provided a space for additional comments.
Wulff's physician's assistant completed the form on March 24, and Wulff returned it to Sullivan one week later. The restrictions noted on this form were far more stringent than the previous restrictions. Specifically, on the March 24 form, Wulff's physician's assistant placed check marks next to the following restrictions: "No lifting/carrying 0-20 lbs.," "No pushing/pulling," "No climbing ladders, poles, etc," and "No stretching or working above shoulders." J.A. 64.
After receiving the form, Sullivan emailed the Emergency Room Clinical Director, Inez Johnson, informing her of the restrictions noted on the form and inquiring whether the new restrictions could be accommodated. Johnson responded by email, stating that Sentara could not accommodate the new restrictions and that Sentara should remove Wulff from the work schedule until Wulff submitted medical documentation showing that her restrictions had abated. Then, Sullivan, along with Vice President of Human Resources Charles Ramey, Employment Manager Jane Velarde, and Human Resource employee Susan Reiss, jointly considered whether there was any way that Sentara could accommodate Wulff's new restrictions. This group ultimately reached a consensus that there was simply no reasonable accommodation that would enable Wulff to work with the new restrictions. Accordingly, Velarde called Wulff to inform her that she would remain off the work schedule until her restrictions abated.
Several months later, Wulff's attorney notified Sentara that Wulff's restrictions had been lifted, and, through her attorney, Sentara offered Wulff the opportunity to return to work. Wulff never responded to this offer. (The record reveals that on or about April 21, 2010, Wulff applied for a nursing position at a different facility and indicated in her application that all of her work restrictions had abated. Nevertheless, Wulff never sought to return to Sentara.)
Wulff filed an action in the Eastern District of Virginia for failure to accommodate, discriminatory discharge, and retaliatory discharge under the ADA. Following discovery, the district court granted Sentara's motion for summary judgment. With regard to Wulff's claims for failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge, the district court concluded that the undisputed evidence showed that Wulff could not perform the essential functions of her position, even with a reasonable accommodation (of which there were none). Therefore, the court further concluded that, as a matter of law, Wulff was not a "qualified individual" protected by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(8) & 12112. With regard to Wulff's retaliatory discharge claim, the district court concluded that the undisputed evidence showed that Sentara terminated Wulff because of her inability to perform the functions of her job and that Wulff produced no evidence that this reason was pretextual. Wulff now appeals.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment
With regard to Wulff's failure to accommodate claim, Wulff must establish several
In her deposition, Wulff listed numerous functions of her position that required the ability to lift, push, or pull some amount of weight. For example, Wulff testified that she was required to transport patients between rooms and stabilize patients who were unsteady on their feet. She also acknowledged that, in emergency situations, she could be required to lift patients and that her restrictions prevented her from doing so in accordance with Sentara's back-safety guidelines. Moreover, Wulff's own expert witness testified that a nurse who was unable to lift any weight would be unable "to perform the regular functions of an emergency nurse." J.A. 547. Therefore, under the restrictions noted on the March 24 form, Wulff was unable to perform the essential functions of her position, and she does not suggest any reasonable accommodation that would have allowed her to do so. Accordingly, she cannot establish one of the elements of her
Wulff attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the March 24 form was incorrect or misleading and that it overstated her actual restrictions. Wulff contends that the "No lifting/carrying 0-20 lbs." restriction is ambiguous and that it could be interpreted to state that she was still able to lift up to 10 pounds. However, the form clearly states that Wulff was incapable of lifting or carrying any weight within the range of zero to twenty pounds;
Wulff next attacks the March 24 form by claiming that Sentara did not believe that the restrictions noted on that form were accurate. Again, the record does not support Wulff's contention. In discovery, Wulff generated no evidence tending to show that the Sentara management and human resources personnel reviewing her circumstances questioned the accuracy of the restrictions noted on the March 24 form. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence shows that Ramey and Johnson, who were most directly involved as the ultimate decision-makers regarding Wulff's ability to perform the essential functions of her job as an emergency room clinical nurse, accepted the restrictions on that form as accurate, as they were entitled to do.
In summary, Wulff's attempts to discredit the form that her physician's assistant completed (and thus Sentara's reliance on the form in its decision to remove Wulff from the work schedule) are unavailing; those attempts do not persuade us that the district court erred in relying on the form in concluding that Wulff has failed to generate a genuine dispute of material fact critical to her ability to support her prima facie case. We agree with the district court's assessment, namely, that the form imposed restrictions that prevented Wulff from performing the essential functions of her position, and no reasonable accommodation existed that would have enabled her to do so. Therefore, Wulff fails to support an essential element of her
We turn next to Wulff's discriminatory termination claim. To establish a
To be within the ADA's protected class, one must be "a qualified individual" with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112. A "qualified individual" is one who, "with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). As explained above, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wulff, she was unable to perform the essential functions of her position. Therefore, the district court was correct to determine, as a matter of law, that she was not a "qualified individual" and could not support a
We turn now to Wulff's retaliatory termination claim. To establish a
Sentara explained that it removed Wulff from the schedule because the medical form she submitted imposed restrictions that prevented her from performing the essential functions of her job.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Sentara.
Rather than confront these inconvenient facts, Wulff's arguments have attempted to cast a burden on Sentara to go beyond the form that Wulff herself delivered to her employer.