Filed: Jan. 21, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2477 VICKY T. BENNETT, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-2556 VICKY T. BENNETT, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:10-cv-00493-BO) Argued: October 29, 2013 Decided: January 21, 2014 Bef
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 12-2477 VICKY T. BENNETT, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant. No. 12-2556 VICKY T. BENNETT, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:10-cv-00493-BO) Argued: October 29, 2013 Decided: January 21, 2014 Befo..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2477
VICKY T. BENNETT,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-2556
VICKY T. BENNETT,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-cv-00493-BO)
Argued: October 29, 2013 Decided: January 21, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and FLOYD, Circuit
Judges.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Evan Mark Tager, MAYER BROWN, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. William Mullins McLeod, Jr., MCLEOD LAW GROUP, LLC,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Scott S.
Cairns, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, Jacksonville, Florida; John C.
Millberg, Meredith E. Woods, MILLBERG GORDON STEWART PLLC,
Raleigh, North Carolina; Miriam R. Nemetz, Scott M. Noveck,
MAYER BROWN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Julie L.
Moore, MCLEOD LAW GROUP, LLC, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Appellee Vicky T. Bennett, an African-American woman, sued
her former employer, Appellant CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX),
for violations of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA),
45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and state common law, alleging
that she was subjected to discriminatory and negligent acts
while employed as a conductor trainee at CSX. Thereafter, CSX
filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims. The
district granted the motion as to Bennett’s state claims but
allowed the federal claims to go forward.
At trial, the jury returned a verdict for CSX on the FELA
claim, but found for Bennett on the Title VII claim. The jury
awarded to Bennett $150,000 in compensatory damages. Pursuant
to a post-trial motion filed by Bennett, the district court also
awarded Bennett back pay and front pay, as well as attorneys’
fees and costs. Post-trial, CSX filed a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial
and/or to amend judgment, which the district court denied.
CSX subsequently filed two timely appeals: the first with
regard to the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and
costs and the second with regard to the district court’s
judgment against CSX, denial of CSX’s renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial,
3
and/or to amend judgment, and all other rulings adverse to CSX.
Thereafter, we consolidated the two appeals. Our jurisdiction
over the appeals is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of CSX.
I.
Bennett reported to CSX’s Rocky Mount terminal for her
first day of work on August 18, 2008, as part of her on-the-job
training to be a train conductor. During the session,
Trainmaster James Gilbert gave Bennett a work schedule that he
had prepared. After reviewing the schedule, Bennett noted that
it would require her to work a longer period of time than is
allowed under the Hours of Service Act (the Act), 49 U.S.C.
§ 21101. The Act mandates that railroad workers work no more
than twelve consecutive hours and receive at least ten hours of
rest between shifts, excluding time in transit. 49 C.F.R.
§ 288.19(a)(1)-(2) pt. 228 app. A. Thus, Bennett spoke to
Gilbert, and he sought to remedy the problem by providing
Bennett with a new schedule. Bennett realized that, even with
the reconfigured schedule, she would still be required to work
longer hours than the Act allows. Hence, she returned to
Gilbert a second time, but he was on the telephone so he
instructed her to call later.
4
After several unsuccessful attempts to speak with Gilbert,
Bennett contacted Lorenzo Wilkins to help remedy the scheduling
problem. Wilkins was the Manager of Conductor Training, whose
main responsibilities included hiring, assisting in training,
and supporting the new hires until their two-year anniversary.
Thereafter, Gilbert returned Bennett’s call. According to
Bennett’s statement, Gilbert asked her why she contacted
Wilkins. After she answered that she still had a scheduling
conflict after Gilbert had attempted to correct it, Gilbert
responded: “You [b]elong to Rocky Mount now and [Wilkins] does
[n]ot run this terminal[.] [H]e is only an aide to us[.] Do
you understand [l]ady? . . . I am you[r] direct supervisor and
you are no longer to contact [W]ilkins for anything[.] . . . Is
that understood?” She answered that she did.
On August 22 and 23, Bennett was scheduled to work at the
CSX terminal in Fayetteville, North Carolina. When she asked
Gilbert for directions to the train yard, he told her that he
was unfamiliar with Fayetteville, but that he would text the
trainmaster’s telephone number so that she could ask for
directions from him. After receiving the name of the
trainmaster—Ed Howze—Bennett telephoned him, and he gave her
directions. But, the next morning on her way to the yard,
Bennett telephoned Howze again and told him that she was lost.
Thereafter, according to Bennett, “[Howze] became very irritated
5
so [she] told him [she] would continue trying and call back if
needed. A few minutes passed [and she] called . . . Howze back.
[H]e screamed[,] [‘]Open [b]oth [y]our [f]ucking [e]yes [l]ady
and [y]ou [w]ill [s]ee.[’]” She then telephoned Wilkins, who
gave her directions to the train yard.
After Bennett arrived at the train yard, Howze drove up and
told her to “get in the truck.” She testified that she did as
she was told to do but, because she was scared, she left her
door open and her foot hanging out of the truck. She pulled her
foot in and closed the door, however, as he accelerated. After
asking several times where they were going, Howze finally
answered, “I’m going to teach you directions.” According to
Bennett, “[w]hile driving he continuously talked rude and said
things like [‘][W]ho do you think you are by calling a Rocky Mt.
Trainmaster[’] and [‘][Y]ou will never work my railroad.[’]”
After they arrived at the hotel where Bennett had stayed
the previous night, Howze demanded, “[L]et’s see you get me back
now lady.” She explained to him that she had left the
directions in her bag. Thereafter, he drove her back to the
train yard and then, according to Bennett, “asked which was
[her] vehicle, stopped in front of it and opened his trunk and
said[,] ‘[G]et your belongings and leave my railroad.’”
On August 25, 2008, one day before a mandatory meeting was
to be held with CSX management so that the aforementioned issues
6
could be addressed, Bennett’s vehicle was vandalized. She had
parked it at the employee parking lot of the Rocky Mount yard.
While working the midnight-to-noon shift, someone spray-painted
the messages “Stay of[f] the railroad” and “stupid nigga nigga”
on her car. Someone had also broken the rear passenger-side
window of her vehicle and placed a female mannequin head in the
backseat with its face painted black and a rope around its neck.
After the vandalism incident, the mandatory meeting was
cancelled.
Neither CSX’s police, its human resources department, nor
the Rocky Mount Police Department was able to determine who
committed the vandalism. During CSX’s investigation, Bennett
was placed on a paid leave of absence. Although she was
scheduled to return to work on October 1, 2008, she did not do
so, stating that she was unable to return to work for medical
reasons. In late November 2008, Bennett’s training class was
furloughed. CSX subsequently sent the class a letter on
July 26, 2010, recalling them to work. Bennett failed to
respond.
Based on the aforementioned incidents, Bennett filed suit
in the District of South Carolina, claiming violations of FELA
and Title VII. She also brought several state-law tort claims,
including intentional infliction of emotional distress;
negligent infliction of emotional distress; negligent hiring,
7
supervision, and retention; false imprisonment; and simple
assault. CSX subsequently filed a motion to transfer the action
to the Eastern District of North Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404, which the South Carolina district court granted.
Thereafter, CSX filed a motion for summary judgment as to
all of Bennett’s claims. The district court granted the motion
as to Bennett’s state-law tort claims but denied it as to her
two federal claims.
At trial, the jury found for CSX on the FELA claim but for
Bennett on the Title VII claim. It awarded Bennett $150,000 in
compensatory damages. The district court awarded her an
additional $92,835 in back pay and $592,869 in front pay,
$327,423.15 in attorneys’ fees and costs to Bennett’s trial
counsel, and $469,528.24 in attorneys’ fees and costs to
Bennett’s prior law firm. Thereafter, CSX filed a post-trial
motion, which included, among other things, a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law on Bennett’s Title VII claim. The
district court denied the motion.
II.
In CSX’s first assignment of error, CSX claims that the
evidence presented at trial was insufficient for the jury to
find that CSX subjected Bennett to a hostile work environment.
8
Thus, according to CSX, the district court erred in denying its
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for
judgment as matter of law de novo. Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp.,
U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 164 (4th Cir. 2012). When considering such
a motion, the court construes the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-movant. Int’l Ground Transp. v. Mayor &
City Council of Ocean City, Md.,
475 F.3d 214, 218 (4th Cir.
2007).
The correct standard for granting a motion for judgment as
a matter of law is well-settled: “If a reasonable jury could
reach only one conclusion based on the evidence or if the
verdict in favor of the non-moving party would necessarily be
based on speculation and conjecture, judgment as a matter of law
must be entered.” Myrick v. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc., 395
F.3d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 2005). But, “[i]f the evidence as a
whole is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference, a
jury issue is created and a motion for judgment as a matter of
law should be denied.”
Id. at 489-90. “Permissible inferences
must still be within the range of reasonable probability,
however, and it is the duty of the court to withdraw the case
from the jury when the necessary inference is so tenuous that it
rests merely upon speculation and conjecture.” Lovelace v.
Sherwin-Williams Co.,
681 F.2d 230, 241 (4th Cir. 1982)
9
(alternation omitted) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. McDavid, 259
F.2d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 1958)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[E]vidence which shows a ‘probability’ and not a
mere ‘possibility’ would suffice to allow jury consideration.”
Id. at 241 (quoting Raston Purina Co. v. Edmunds,
241 F.2d 164,
168 (4th Cir. 1957)).
Bennett seeks to impute liability for her hostile work
environment claim to CSX on the basis of the alleged acts of two
of her supervisors: Howze and Gilbert. To establish a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must
demonstrate “that the offending conduct (1) was unwelcome, (2)
was because of her sex [or race], (3) was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create
an abusive work environment, and (4) was imputable to her
employer.” Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir. 2011)
(alteration in original) (quoting Ziskie v. Mineta,
547 F.3d
220, 224 (4th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To establish the third element, the plaintiff must show that the
work environment was not just subjectively hostile but
objectively hostile, as well.
Id. at 385. “Such proof depends
upon the totality of the circumstances, including ‘the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
10
employee’s work performance.’” Id. (quoting EEOC v. Sunbelt
Rentals, Inc.,
521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008)).
In denying CSX’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law, the district court held that Bennett set forth “ample
circumstantial evidence” that Howze and Gilbert “vandalized her
vehicle and subjected her to a hostile work environment.”
Bennett v. CSX Transp., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 694, 698 (E.D.N.C.
2012). Although Bennett “did not present any direct evidence
that . . . Gilbert or . . . Howze vandalized her car,
circumstantial evidence is often utilized in cases involving
discrimination, and may in such circumstances be more persuasive
than direct evidence.” Id.; see Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (“Circumstantial evidence is not only
sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and
persuasive than direct evidence.” (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac.
R.R. Co.,
352 U.S. 500, 508, n.17 (1957))).
Moreover, according to the district court,
[Bennett] further presented sufficient evidence that
the harassment she withstood was both severe and
pervasive. [Bennett] proffered evidence that, inter
alia, she was one of only two African American women
in her place of employment, that she received negative
performance assessments where employees of a different
race and gender had not, that her car was vandalized
with a message to stay of[f] the railroad and a racial
slur, and that a mannequin head with a noose around
its neck was placed in the backseat of her car.
Bennett, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 698.
11
We agree with the proposition that “circumstantial evidence
is often utilized in cases involving discrimination, and may in
such circumstances be more persuasive than direct evidence.”
Id. We are unpersuaded, however, that there was “ample
circumstantial evidence” demonstrating that Howze and Gilbert
vandalized Bennett’s car and subjected her to a hostile work
environment.
Although CSX may have treated Bennett unfairly with
reference to both the schedule and the directions issues,
without the vandalism incident, she appears to agree that she
would have no hostile work environment claim. After all, rude
treatment by supervisors is “conduct falling short of that
required to sustain a hostile work environment.” Baqir v.
Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 747 (4th Cir. 2006). It is not the
province of Title VII to eliminate every instance of rudeness or
insensitivity. Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc.,
123 F.3d 766,
772-73 (4th Cir. 1997). “Workplaces are not always harmonious
locales, and even incidents that would objectively give rise to
bruised or wounded feelings will not on that account satisfy the
severe or pervasive standard. Some rolling with the punches is
a fact of workplace life.” Sunbelt Rentals,
Inc., 521 F.3d at
315.
Turning to the vandalism incident, Bennett argues that the
vandalism of her car was “the climactic event to occur in a
12
progressively hostile environment” at CSX. She also contends
that she was “specifically targeted” and that Howze and Gilbert
“each had a motive to vandalize [her] car.” Both Howze and
Gilbert were upset, she maintains, because she had contacted
Wilkins about their conduct toward her and the meeting that they
were going to be required to attend as a result of that conduct.
According to Bennett, “It was clear . . . that they did not want
. . . [her] working for CSX.”
Bennett further maintains that both Howze and Gilbert had
control over the facility, access to Bennett’s vehicle,
knowledge of her work schedule and thus, according to her, “a
level of comfort that [they] could vandalize both sides of . . .
Bennett’s vehicle in plain view of the CSX yard office and not
get caught.”
In addition to motive, Bennett argues that “the
circumstantial evidence that . . . Howze and/or . . . Gilbert
[were] responsible for the vandalism is undeniable.” In
support, she marshals the following evidence: (1) the vandalism
occurred the night before the mandatory meeting mentioned above;
(2) Bennett’s vehicle was parked in a well-lit lot 200 feet from
the door of Gilbert’s office and was easily seen from the Rocky
Mount tower all evening; (3) there were no other cars vandalized
in the CSX parking lot that night; (4) the vandal was familiar
with Bennett’s schedule; (5) given that Bennett’s car was spray-
13
painted in large, block-print letters suggests that the vandal
was not in a hurry but instead comfortable enough to take his
time; (6) the message spray painted on Bennett’s vehicle—“Stay
of[f] the railroad . . . stupid nigga nigga”—was the same
message that Howze and Gilbert conveyed to Bennett the previous
week; (7) the vandal did not take anything from Bennett’s car;
(8) based on the message spray-painted on Bennett’s vehicle and
the female mannequin head with the rope around its neck in her
back seat, the vandal knew that Bennett was African-American and
that she worked on the railroad; (9) Gilbert’s vehicle was
identical to Bennett’s so the vandal knew which of the two
vehicles belonged to Bennett; (10) the vandal’s use of white
paint shows that the vandal was targeting a black vehicle;
(11) the vandal used ballast from the train tracks to break
Bennett’s vehicle window; (12) the Rocky Mount Police
Department, which conducted its investigation at 5:00 AM, did
not mention the mannequin head in the back seat, but Brian
Stussie, another manager at CSX, mentioned seeing it at 11:48
AM, suggesting that the vandal felt comfortable in returning to
the scene to complete the vandalism; (13) Gilbert never
contacted Bennett after the vandalism was discovered to inform
her of the vandalism or insure her safety; (14) Bennett was not
on the training schedule that Gilbert sent out on the night that
the vandalism occurred, indicating that he did not think that
14
she would return to work after the incident; (15) Gilbert told
the Rocky Mount Police Department that he observed a Dodge
Charger park beside Bennett’s car and then drive away, but at
trial Gilbert denied making the statement; (16) there were
significant discrepancies in the statements with respect to when
Gilbert was made aware of the vandalism, who informed him, and
when he was informed that it was Bennett’s car that had been
vandalized; and, (17) in exchange for favorable treatment from
CSX, James Bradley, a general clerk at CSX’s Rocky Mount yard,
gave much more detailed information in his deposition and at
trial, which supported CSX, than he did in his initial statement
to the Rocky Mount Police Department.
As is evidenced above, Bennnett adopts a kitchen-sink
approach in her attempt to fix the vandalism incident on Howze
and Gilbert. For the reasons set forth below, however, we
conclude that Bennett’s circumstantial evidence was insufficient
to establish a reasonable probability that either Howze or
Gilbert committed the vandalism detailed herein.
Pertaining to Bennett’s argument that requiring Howze and
Gilbert to attend the mandatory meeting is circumstantial
evidence that one of them vandalized her vehicle: as CSX
observed, “no rational jury could infer that either [Gilbert or
Howze] would jeopardize a well-paying, long-term career and open
himself up to criminal prosecution over something as
15
insignificant as a meeting to resolve an issue about
interpersonal relations.” Although we think that a reasonable
jury could rightly infer from the evidence presented herein that
Howze and Gilbert disliked Bennett, we do not think such an
inference could reasonably lead to a conclusion that either of
the men probably criminally vandalized her vehicle. See Hawkins
v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 281 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Even if
[Howze and Gilbert] harbored some personal dislike of [Bennett]
that made [Bennett’s] job more difficult or stressful, ‘[a]n
employer is not required to like his employees.’”) (fourth
alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc.,
871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989))).
As to the proximity of Bennett’s car to Gilbert’s office,
no reasonable jury would infer from that fact that Howze and/or
Gilbert were probably responsible for the vandalism of Bennett’s
vehicle. Only sheer speculation on the jury’s part could allow
it to come to such a conclusion. And, that evidence certainly
does not point to the probability that they committed the
criminal act.
At least five of the pieces of evidence that Bennett sets
forth to establish that Howze and Gilbert vandalized her car are
facially neutral. No reasonable jury would find from the fact
that there were no other cars vandalized in the CSX parking lot
on the night that Bennett’s car was vandalized or that the
16
vandal did not take anything from her car as probative on the
question as to whether Howze and Gilbert probably vandalized
Bennett’s car. The same goes for Bennett’s statement that
Gilbert never contacted her after the vandalism. Again, neither
rudeness nor insensitivity is actionable under Title VII.
Hartsell, 123 F.3d at 772-73. Bennett’s contention that Gilbert
told the Rocky Mount Police Department that he observed a car
parked beside Bennett’s car and then drive away, but then denied
it at trial, and the discrepancies in the statements regarding
when Gilbert discovered the vandalism are also both facially
neutral and thus, are of no assistance to Bennett in her hostile
work environment claim. Quite simply, they are of no
consequence.
Several of Bennett’s contentions could just as easily be
attributed to any other employee at CSX as they could be to
Howze and/or Gilbert. This is especially true as to the
vandal’s familiarity with Bennett’s work schedule, the vandal
arguably taking his time in painting large letters on Bennett’s
vehicle because he was in no hurry, the message on Bennett’s
vehicle to stay off of the railroad, the vandal’s knowledge that
Bennett was an African-American woman who worked on the
railroad, the identity of Bennett’s vehicle as opposed to
Gilbert’s vehicle, and Bennett having a black car that would
make the use of white paint preferable. The use of ballast to
17
break Bennett’s vehicle window and the appearance of the
mannequin after the vandalism was first discovered could also
point as easily to Bennett’s co-workers as they could to Howze
and Gilbert. For a jury to find that this evidence leads to the
conclusion that Howze and Gilbert are the vandals, instead of
someone else, was based on nothing more than speculation and
conjecture.
Concerning Gilbert leaving Bennett off of the training
schedule for the following week, the evidence shows that he was
to meet with her the following day about her schedule and other
matters. Thus, no reasonable jury could infer from Bennett
being left off of the training schedule that Howze and/or
Gilbert probably had vandalized Bennett’s car.
Finally, in the matter of Bradley, in his initial statement
to police, he said that he noticed a light-colored Dodge Charger
or Magnum that he did not recognize in the Rocky Mount CSX
parking lot on the night of the vandalism. But, then at trial,
he testified that he also saw a light-skinned African-American
standing beside the car. Bennett maintains that Bradley
embellished his testimony for CSX in exchange for favorable
treatment by the company. Although we are at a loss to
understand why Bradley failed to reveal the information about
the man in the parking lot in his statement to police—be it that
he simply forgot or for some nefarious reason—the fact remains
18
that he has maintained from the start that he observed an
unfamiliar car in the parking lot on the night that the
vandalism occurred. That he later remembered that there was a
strange man there, too, is of no import.
Having reviewed Bennett’s circumstantial evidence both
individually and cumulatively, we hold that, although Bennett
demonstrated that there is a possibility that Howze and/or
Gilbert vandalized her vehicle, she failed to establish that
there is a reasonable probability that they did so. Thus, the
only verdict that a reasonable jury could have rendered on
Bennett’s hostile work environment claim is one in favor of CSX.
As such, the district court erred in not granting CSX’s renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law.
III.
CSX halfheartedly argues in a footnote that, pursuant to
Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (holding
that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious
liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the
employer to take tangible employment actions against the
victim”), “[i]t does not appear that Gilbert or Howze would
qualify as supervisors under the proper standard.” Inasmuch as
Bennett is unable to establish that Gilbert or Howze was
responsible for the vandalism of Bennett’s vehicle, however, we
19
need not decide whether they were Bennett’s supervisors pursuant
to Vance.
IV.
From the circumstantial evidence Bennett presented, no
reasonable jury could have concluded that Howze and/or Gilbert
vandalized Bennett’s vehicle. Any such finding was based purely
on speculation and conjecture. Thus, the district court erred
in not granting CSX’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district
court. In light of this reversal, we also reverse the front and
back pay awards, as well as the attorneys’ fees awards, and
remand the case with instructions to the district court to enter
judgment in favor of CSX.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
20
