Filed: Jan. 14, 2014
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4150 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DERRICK TYRONE HATFIELD, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-4151 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DERRICK TYRONE HATFIELD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:99-cr-00068-WO-1; 1:08-cr-00063- WO-1) Submitted: December
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 13-4150 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DERRICK TYRONE HATFIELD, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-4151 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. DERRICK TYRONE HATFIELD, Defendant - Appellant. Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:99-cr-00068-WO-1; 1:08-cr-00063- WO-1) Submitted: December 2..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4150
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DERRICK TYRONE HATFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-4151
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DERRICK TYRONE HATFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:99-cr-00068-WO-1; 1:08-cr-00063-
WO-1)
Submitted: December 27, 2013 Decided: January 14, 2014
Before MOTZ and DAVIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lisa S. Costner, LISA S. COSTNER, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Lisa B. Boggs, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Derrick Tyrone Hatfield appeals the district court’s
orders revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to
thirty-six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Hatfield argues the
district court erred in revoking his supervised release and that
the sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
In 1999, Hatfield pled guilty to distribution of
cocaine base and was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment with
a five-year term of supervised release. (Case No. 1:99CR68).
In 2008, he pled guilty to escape from federal custody and was
sentenced to eleven months followed by a three-year term of
supervised release. (Case No. 1:08CR63).
In 2009, Hatfield consented to modified conditions of
his supervised release, including substance abuse treatment and
a four-day period of intermittent confinement. After Hatfield
admitted to committing more violations, in 2010, the district
court revoked Hatfield’s supervised release in Case No. 1:08CR63
and sentenced Hatfield to twenty months’ imprisonment followed
by sixteen months of supervised release on the same terms and
conditions previously imposed. The court added the special
condition that Hatfield complete at least twelve months of
inpatient drug treatment. With respect to Case No. 1:99CR68,
the district court continued Hatfield on supervised release for
thirty-six months. This period of supervision was to resume
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upon release from the custodial sentence imposed for the escape
conviction in Case No. 1:08CR63.
Hatfield’s second term of supervision began July 1,
2011. On June 26, 2012, the probation officer petitioned for
revocation of Hatfield’s supervised release, alleging Hatfield
was terminated unsuccessfully from the Durham Rescue Mission on
May 28, 2012, and that Hatfield committed other crimes.
Specifically, on June 7, 2012, Hatfield was arrested for
misdemeanor assault on a female, misdemeanor contributing to the
delinquency of a juvenile, and aggressive driving. On June 23,
2012, Hatfield was arrested for misdemeanor assault on a female
and misdemeanor assault on a child under twelve. The petition
further alleged Hatfield did not notify his probation officer
within seventy-two hours of his arrests.
Hatfield admitted that he did not complete the program
at the Durham Rescue Mission, and that he did not notify
probation of his June 7, 2012 arrest. Hatfield denied the
criminal conduct underlying his arrests. After hearing
testimony, the district court concluded Hatfield had violated
the terms of his supervised release. In addition to the
violations he admitted, the district court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Hatfield was guilty of
careless and reckless driving on June 7 and of misdemeanor
assault on a female on June 23. The district court ultimately
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revoked Hatfield’s term of supervised release and sentenced him
in case no. 1:99CR68 to the statutory maximum of thirty-six
months, twenty-four months above the Sentencing Commission’s
advisory policy range of six to twelve months. It imposed no
further supervision and no additional sentence or supervised
release in case no. 1:08CR63.
We review a district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). To revoke release,
the district court must find a violation of a condition of
release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) (2012). We review for clear error factual findings
underlying the conclusion that a violation of the terms of
supervised release occurred. See United States v. Carothers,
337 F.3d 1017, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003).
In this case, Hatfield admitted that he did not
complete the inpatient treatment program ordered by the court
and that he failed to notify his probation officer within
seventy-two hours of his June 7 arrest. Hatfield’s admissions
to these Grade C violations were sufficient by themselves to
support the revocation. See U.S.S.G. § 7b1.1(a)(3). On appeal,
however, Hatfield argues that the court clearly erred in finding
that he assaulted his wife on June 23. The district court
outlined in great detail its reasons for finding unreliable Mrs.
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Hatfield’s testimony that her husband did not assault her, and
after reviewing the transcript of the hearing, we conclude that
its findings were not clearly erroneous. Based on this
determination and Hatfield’s admitted violations, we likewise
conclude that the court did not err in revoking Hatfield’s
supervised release.
Hatfield next argues his sentence is unreasonable
because the district court did not adequately consider the
Sentencing Commission’s relevant policy statement or attendant
range. When examining a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release, this court “takes a more deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines
sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court will
affirm a revocation sentence that falls within the statutory
maximum, unless it finds the sentence “plainly unreasonable.”
United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th Cir. 2006). In
reviewing a revocation sentence, the court first determines
whether the sentence is unreasonable, using the same general
analysis employed in reviewing original sentences.
Id. at 438.
Only if the sentence is procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will the court consider whether it is “plainly” so.
Id. at 439.
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A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered the policy statements
contained in Chapter Seven of the Guidelines and the applicable
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, see Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440,
and provides an adequate explanation for the sentence imposed,
United States v. Thompson,
595 F.3d 544, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2010).
The court need not provide as detailed an explanation as that
required to support an original sentence.
Crudup, 461 F.3d at
439. A sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant
should receive the sentence imposed.
Id. at 440. “[T]he court
ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous sentence
and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.”
Id. at 439. (internal quotation marks omitted).
On appeal, Hatfield contends that, although the
district court acknowledged the advisory range of six to twelve
months, his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court failed to refer to the policy statements in
Chapter Seven of the Guidelines or the applicable range when
fashioning its sentence. When imposing a revocation sentence,
the district court “must consider the policy statements
contained in Chapter 7, including the policy statement range, as
‘helpful assistance.’” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656.
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In this case, the district court did more than just
acknowledge the advisory Guidelines range of six to twelve
months at the commencement of sentencing. While pronouncing its
sentence, the court explicitly opined that a sentence within the
advisory Guidelines range would simply be insufficient, given
the court’s repeated attempts to arrange treatment options for
Hatfield. The court cited its consideration of the applicable
range, the arguments of counsel, Hatfield’s statements,
circumstances of the current violations and offenses, as well as
Hatfield’s history and characteristics in fashioning the
sentence. At the very least, the district court’s consideration
of the range was implicit in the court’s detailed reasoning for
imposing the statutory maximum sentence. See United States v.
Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 1995). The commentary to the
policy statements in Chapter Seven makes clear that district
courts should focus on the defendant’s “failure to follow the
court-imposed conditions of . . . supervised release as a
‘breach of trust’” when imposing revocation sentences. USSG,
Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt. n.3(b). Here, the district
court specifically noted Hatfield’s continuing, undeterred
involvement in criminal activity and his failure to successfully
complete treatment programs as directed by the court.
We conclude that Hatfield’s thirty-six-month sentence
is not unreasonable. To the contrary, the district court
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correctly calculated the policy statement range, adequately
explained its sentence, and appropriately relied on the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors in sentencing Hatfield. * Having discerned no
procedural or substantive error in the district court’s
imposition of the sentence, “it necessarily follows that
[Hatfield’s] sentence is not plainly unreasonable.” Crudup, 461
F.3d at 440.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgments. We further deny Hatfield’s pro se motions to file
supplemental briefs. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
To the extent Hatfield argues his sentence is unreasonable
because the district court improperly relied on its findings
that Hatfield was guilty of careless and reckless driving on
June 7, 2012, and of misdemeanor assault on a female on June 23,
2012, we reject this argument having found that such findings
were not clearly erroneous.
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